## 1AC---Warming

### 1AC---Plan

**Resolved: The United States Federal Government should substantially increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by energy companies by expanding the scope of its core antitrust laws to account for “total welfare” and determining that failure to pay an upstream carbon fee on greenhouse gas emissions, with all revenue reimbursed as dividends to the population, is anticompetitive conduct.**

### 1AC---Warming

#### The advantage is warming:

**The consumer welfare relies on a “market failure” approach that is impossible to prove and fails to address systemic risks like climate change. Only expanding the scope of the CWS to account for total welfare can address systematic failure.**

**Miazad 21** (Amelia Miazad is Founding Director and Senior Research Fellow of the Business in Society Institute at Berkeley Law., “PROSOCIAL ANTITRUST”, Prosocial Antitrust (March 11, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3802194 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3802194)

While courts **routinely dismiss noneconomic or “non-welfare” justifications**, precisely what procompetitive reasons come into play is, as Justice Stevens famously stated, “an absolute mystery”.242 As Professor John Newman points out, the “relevant case law reveals multiple competing approaches and seemingly irreconcilable opinions” on what constitutes “beneficial”.243 After all, whether a particular activity is beneficial necessarily begs the question— beneficial to what end? Professor Newman traces this confusion to the use of three different tests by courts:

Under the “market failure” approach, a valid justification is present if—and only if—the challenged restraint alleviates a market failure. Alternatively, the “competitive process” approach attempts to condemn restraints that harm (and bless restraints that benefit) “competition” itself or the so-called “competitive process”. Lastly, the “type of effect” approach appears to offer a shortcut: simply identify the effects of the challenged restraint, then ascertain whether they align with a pre-approved typology of virtuous marketplace effects (e.g., higher output, lower prices, etc.).244

This Article agrees with Professor Newman’s doctrinal, normative, and practical arguments in favor of the market failure test.245 Most contemporary courts also hold that “alleviating a market failure is an acceptable procompetitive justification.”246 But the market failure test is fundamentally at odds with the market reality of **increasing universal ownership**. Two limitations explain its inability to account for systematic and portfolio-wide risks. First, the market failure test relies on the prevailing consumer welfare standard.247 That generally means that a particular restraint of trade must alleviate a market failure by increasing consumer surplus in order for courts to deem it a valid procompetitive justification.248 By fastening market failure to consumer welfare, the market failure test becomes indistinguishable from the “type of effect” approach, which also focuses on measurable impacts on consumers including output and price. Second, **the market failure test assumes the perspective of a single market, preventing it from capturing portfolio-wide systemic risks like climate change.**

To be clear, this Article is not arguing that antitrust law should abandon the consumer welfare standard and expand its purview to encompass noneconomic impacts. Rather, it argues that **the consumer welfare standard is too narrow to account for economic impacts on a portfolio-wide level.** The **total welfare standard** is most closely aligned with the market reality of universal ownership, although it has been largely abandoned by courts.249 It seeks to maximize the total surplus of all participants in a market, including consumers and producers. The total welfare test’s aggregate value approach is more closely aligned with universal ownership, but it also analyzes an individual market—as opposed to market-wide impacts— because a so-called “general equilibrium analysis” is impractical. Developing a standard that aligns with the market reality of concentrated ownership is beyond the scope of this Article. This Article does argue, however, that **the current consumer welfare standard impedes collaboration to address systematic economic risks**, as the next Part explores

**Climate change is a system disruptor and a risk amplifier---only mitigation prevents biodiversity loss, marine ecosystem collapse, resource wars, global food scarcity, and extreme weather events. Uniquely—has disparate impacts.**

**Pachauri & Meyer 15** (Rajendra K. Pachauri Chairman of the IPCC, Leo Meyer Head, Technical Support Unit IPCC were the editors for this IPCC report, “Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report” <http://epic.awi.de/37530/1/IPCC_AR5_SYR_Final.pdf> IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, 151 pp)

SPM 2.3 Future risks and impacts caused by a changing climate

Climate change will **amplify existing risks** and **create new risks for natural and human systems**. Risks are unevenly distributed and are generally greater for disadvantaged people and communities in countries at all levels of development. {2.3}

Risk of climate-related impacts results from the interaction of climate-related hazards (including hazardous events and trends) with the vulnerability and exposure of human and natural systems, including their ability to adapt. Rising rates and **magnitudes of warming** and other changes in the climate system, **accompanied by ocean acidification**, increase the risk of severe, pervasive and in some cases irreversible detrimental impacts. Some risks are particularly relevant for individual regions (Figure SPM.8), while others are global. The overall risks of future climate change impacts can be reduced by **limiting the rate and magnitude of climate change**, including ocean acidification. The precise levels of climate change sufficient to trigger abrupt and irreversible change remain uncertain, but the risk associated with **crossing such thresholds increases with rising temperature** (medium confidence). For risk assessment, it is important to evaluate the **widest possible range of impacts**, including low-probability outcomes with large consequences. {1.5, 2.3, 2.4, 3.3, Box Introduction.1, Box 2.3, Box 2.4}

A large fraction of species faces **increased extinction risk** due to climate change during and beyond the 21st century, especially as climate change interacts with other stressors (high confidence). Most plant species cannot naturally shift their geographical ranges sufficiently fast to keep up with current and high projected rates of climate change in most landscapes; most small mammals and freshwater molluscs will not be able to keep up at the rates projected under RCP4.5 and above in flat landscapes in this century (high confidence). Future risk is indicated to be high by the observation that natural global climate change at rates lower than current anthropogenic climate change caused significant ecosystem shifts and species extinctions during the past millions of years. **Marine organisms will face progressively low**er **oxygen levels** and high rates and magnitudes of ocean acidification (high confidence), with associated risks exacerbated by rising ocean temperature extremes (medium confidence). **Coral reefs and polar ecosystems are highly vulnerable**. Coastal systems and low-lying areas are at risk from sea level rise, which will continue for centuries even if the global mean temperature is stabilized (high confidence). {2.3, 2.4, Figure 2.5}

Climate change is projected to undermine food security (Figure SPM.9). Due to projected climate change by the mid-21st century and beyond, global marine species redistribution and marine biodiversity reduction in sensitive regions will **challenge the sustained provision of fisheries** productivity and other ecosystem services (high confidence). For wheat, rice and maize in tropical and temperate regions, climate change without adaptation is projected to negatively impact production for local temperature increases of 2°C or more above late 20th century levels, although individual locations may benefit (medium confidence). Global temperature increases of ~4°C or more 13 above late 20th century levels, combined with increasing food demand, would pose large risks to **food security globally** (high confidence). Climate change is projected to reduce renewable **surface water and groundwater resources** in most dry subtropical regions (robust evidence, high agreement), **intensifying competition for water among sectors** (limited evidence, medium agreement). {2.3.1, 2.3.2}

Until mid-century, projected climate change will impact human health mainly by exacerbating health problems that already exist (very high confidence). Throughout the 21st century, climate change is expected to lead to **increases in ill-health** in many regions and especially in developing countries with low income, as compared to a baseline without climate change (high confidence). By 2100 for RCP8.5, the combination of high temperature and humidity in some areas for parts of the year is expected to compromise common human activities, including growing food and working outdoors (high confidence). {2.3.2}

In urban areas climate change is projected to increase risks for people, assets, economies and ecosystems, including risks from **heat stress**, **storms** and **extreme precipitation**, **inland and coastal flooding,** **landslides**, **air pollution**, **drought**, **water scarcity**, **sea level rise** and storm surges (very high confidence). These risks are amplified for those lacking essential infrastructure and services or living in exposed areas. {2.3.2}

Rural areas are expected to experience major impacts on water availability and supply, food security, infrastructure and agricultural incomes, including shifts in the production areas of food and non-food crops around the world (high confidence). {2.3.2}

**Aggregate economic losses accelerate with increasing temperature** (limited evidence, high agreement), but global economic impacts from climate change are currently difficult to estimate. From a poverty perspective, **climate change impacts are projected to slow down economic growth**, make poverty reduction more difficult, further erode food security and prolong **existing and create new poverty traps**, the latter particularly in urban areas and emerging hotspots of hunger (medium confidence). International dimensions such as trade and relations among states are also important for understanding the risks of climate change at regional scales. {2.3.2}

Climate change is projected to increase displacement of people (medium evidence, high agreement). Populations that lack the resources for planned migration experience higher exposure to extreme weather events, particularly in developing countries with low income. **Climate change can indirectly increase risks of violent conflicts** by amplifying well-documented drivers of these conflicts such as poverty and economic shocks (medium confidence). {2.3.2}

**Climate change is a regressive social inequity**

**Levy & Patz 15** (Barry S.LevyMD, MPH Jonathan A.PatzMD, MPH, “Climate Change, Human Rights, and Social Justice”, Annals of Global Health Volume 81, Issue 3, May–June 2015, Pages 310-322)

The environmental and health consequences of climate change, which disproportionately affect low-income countries and poor people in high-income countries, **profoundly affect human rights and social justice**. Environmental consequences include increased temperature, excess precipitation in some areas and droughts in others, extreme weather events, and increased sea level. These consequences adversely affect agricultural production, access to safe water, and worker productivity, and, by inundating land or making land uninhabitable and uncultivatable, **will force many people to become environmental refugees**. Adverse health effects caused by climate change include heat-related disorders, vector-borne diseases, foodborne and waterborne diseases, respiratory and allergic disorders, malnutrition, collective violence, and mental health problems.

These environmental and health **consequences threaten civil and political rights** and economic, social, and cultural rights, including rights to life, access to safe food and water, health, security, shelter, and culture. On a national or local level, those people who are most vulnerable to the adverse environmental and health consequences of climate change include poor people, members of minority groups, women, children, older people, people with chronic diseases and disabilities, those residing in areas with a high prevalence of climate-related diseases, and workers exposed to extreme heat or increased weather variability. On a global level, there is much inequity, with low-income countries, which **produce the least** greenhouse gases (**GHGs**), being more adversely affected by climate change than high-income countries, which produce substantially higher amounts of GHGs yet are less immediately affected. In addition, low-income countries have far less capability to adapt to climate change than high-income countries.

**Mitigation is the silver bullet increasing levels of climate change exponentially increase its negative consequences**

**Letzter 19** (Rafi, Staff writer for Live Science citing – Katharine Mach, a climate scientist at the University of Miami and one of several lead authors of the IPCC report., Lini Wollenberg, a University of Vermont climate researcher and leader of the CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security, Colin Carlson, an ecologist at Georgetown University who studies how climate change influences infectious diseases, 9/26/19, “Are We Really Running Out of Time to Stop Climate Change?”, https://www.livescience.com/12-years-to-stop-climate-change.html)

But ultimately, all the researchers Live Science contacted said these **problems become less catastrophic with less warming**. Holding the world to a 1.5-C warming increase by the end of the century creates much more manageable short- and long-term problems than holding it to 2 C of warming, which is much less harmful to Earth than 3 C, which is much more survivable than 4 C, which is still less catastrophic than 6 C … and so on. None of those possible futures necessarily leads to a charred, lifeless global desert in our lifetimes. But **each increase is** almost **unimaginably more dire for life on this planet than the one preceding it.**

"**It's always worth it to prevent more warming,"** Mach said.

With regard to the spread of mosquito-borne diseases, Carlson said, "**We can stop it.** **Mitigating climate change is truly the silver bullet**. Sometimes it is as simple as, 'If we stop climate change, we can stop a lot of the bad health impacts that are coming.'" (Though the devil is in the details, he added. **The level of disease reduction will depend on how fast the carbon-mitigation project moves**, and its effects won't be felt immediately or equally everywhere.)

The science points relentlessly to one reality: **The best way to deal with climate change is to start cutting emissions now.** It's easier to stop warming by keeping CO2 in the ground now than it is to pull carbon out of the air later. **And mitigation makes adaptation much more effective.**

**AND--short term mitigation matters--the impact is exponential and increasing.**

**Desjardins 13** – member of Concordia university Media Relations Department, academic writer, citing Damon Matthews; associate professor of the Department of Geography, Planning and Environment at Concordia University, PhD, Member of the Global Environmental and Climate Change Center

(Cléa, “Global Warming: Irreversible but Not Inevitable,” http://www.concordia.ca/now/what-we-do/research/20130402/global-warming-irreversible-but-not-inevitable.php)

Carbon dioxide emission cuts will **immediately affect** the rate of future global warming Concordia and MIT researchers show Montreal, April 2, 2013 – There is a persistent misconception among both scientists and the public that there is a delay between emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and the climate’s response to those emissions. This misconception has led policy makers to argue that CO2 emission cuts implemented now will not affect the climate system for many decades. This **erroneous line of argument** makes the climate problem **seem more intractable** than it actually is, say Concordia University’s Damon Matthews and MIT’s Susan Solomon in a recent Science article. The researchers show that **immediate decreases** in CO2 emissions would in fact result in an **immediate decrease** in the rate of climate warming. Explains Matthews, professor in the Department of Geography, Planning and Environment, “If we can successfully decrease CO2 emissions in the near future, this change will be felt by the climate system when the emissions reductions are implemented **– not in several decades**." “The potential for a **quick climate response** to prompt cuts in CO2 emissions opens up the possibility that the climate benefits of emissions reductions would occur on the same timescale as the political decisions themselves.” In their paper, Matthews and Solomon, Ellen Swallow Richards professor of Atmospheric Chemistry and Climate Science, show that the onus for slowing the rate of global warming falls squarely on current efforts at **reducing CO2 emissions**, and the resulting future emissions that we produce. This means that there are critical implications for the equity of carbon emission choices currently being discussed internationally. Total emissions from developing countries may soon exceed those from developed nations. But developed countries are expected to maintain a far higher per-capita contribution to present and possible future warming. “This disparity clarifies the urgency for low-carbon technology investment and diffusion to enable developing countries to continue to develop,” says Matthews. “Emission **cuts made now** will have an **immediate effect** on the rate of global warming,” he asserts. “I see more hope for averting difficult-to-avoid negative impacts by accelerating advances in technology development and diffusion, than for averting climate system changes that are already inevitable. Given the enormous scope and complexity of the climate mitigation challenge, clarifying these points of hope is critical to motivate change.”

**Antitrust is historically a weapon of the elite, but it can be revitalized for public goods like climate change**

V. **Sodano** **2010.** University of Naples Federico II, Department of Agricultural Economics. “Food system and climate change: the false premises of antitrust Policy”

Introduction

According to recent estimates (IAASTD, 2008), the global food system is currently accountable for at least 30% of the global GHG emissions that cause climate change. Considering also emissions by indirect activities associated with food production and distribution, such as home storage and refrigerators, waste disposal, transportation by final consumers and so on, this estimate may rise dramatically to as high as nearly 50% of total emissions (Grain, 2009). Agribusiness corporations, backing a model of food production and distribution that functions by converting oil into food, are largely responsible for these huge emissions. Influencing the behaviour of food TNCs in such a way as to shift towards a more sustainable food model may greatly contribute to tackling global warming. Actions to induce food corporations to assume a more sustainable form of conduct come from both the private and the public sector. On the private sector side initiatives come from consumers (individuals and consumer associations), environmental associations and non governmental organizations. On the public sector side, there are at least three kinds of intervention: (1) direct regulation, based on a command-and-control approach; (2) ‘soft regulation’, including self-regulation, use of incentives, awards and accreditation systems, market-based initiatives, disclosure obligations and educational campaigns; (3) definitions of duties of corporations, through corporate law and competition policy. The paper stresses that, given that **reducing GHG emissions is comparable to a public good**, **only state intervention may be expected to be effective**. Moreover, given that corporations cannot be granted the same moral status as natural persons, even soft regulation, which requires some form of corporate social responsibility and therefore of corporate morality, cannot be effective. With regards to state intervention the paper analyzes the role of **competition policy**, showing how it **can help in fighting global warming, provided that it overcomes** the over thirty year lasting dominance of **the ‘Chicago paradigm’**. Global warming mitigation: the role of public and private sector It is a matter of fact that induced climate change is representative of a tragedy of the commons, a typical collective action problem. Maintaining a stable climate has the structure of a public good exhibiting both the property of non excludability and non rivalry. The free riding problem, i.e. the fact that non contributors can benefit from others’ GHG reductions without taking on costs themselves, prevents private rational actors from engaging in mitigation efforts. Beyond being a public good, the protection of a stable climate that fits human biological and economic needs, **can be considered to be a human right**. In particular, it is of the kind of second generation human rights, i.e. economic and social rights, grounded in the notion that government has affirmative obligations to protect individuals from deprivation of the basic material necessities of life. In the case of public goods, economic and social theories based on rational choice models hold that the market (i.e. the private sector) fails to supply them. Therefore**, the only effective provider is the state**, as the latter has the precise political mandate to accommodate for general public welfare against scattered private interests. With regards to human rights the general view is that the state has the ultimate duty to uphold them. The state can intervene either directly or indirectly. Direct interventions include: public investments in global warming mitigation; setting compulsory standards in defence of low emission production and consumption activities; imposing human rights duties on corporations for climate change and environmental harm; implementing tort liability laws that make private actors pay for damage to climate and environment. Indirect interventions include: market based incentives aimed at promoting private climate friendly behaviour; embracing a voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) approach that shifts the burden of public interest onto corporations, which are deemed to possess other-regarding preferences and moral values. In this paper it is claimed that only direct intervention can be effective because, in the case of market-based instruments, it may apply the same sources of market failure that the intervention seeks to correct. The voluntary CSR approach is not viable because it hinges on the false premise that corporations have the same moral status as natural persons. The moral status of corporations endorsed by scholars like French (French, 1984) is to be rejected when the three necessary conditions for moral agency are examined: the ability to intend an action; the ability to perform an action; the ability to autonomously choose an intentional action. In the case of conglomerate collectives, such as corporations, these conditions are not fulfilled (Ronnegard, 2006: 82) and therefore they do not qualify as moral agents conceived as distinct from their members. Consequently, corporate moral responsibility attributions to collectives as distinct from their corporate members are illegitimate. Competition policy and climate change: the perspective of the Chicago school Given that only direct intervention by the state can assure adequate levels of global warming mitigation, the issue to be addressed is what role competition policy, among other forms of public intervention, can have in promoting corporate climate friendly behaviour. Competition policy originated in the US in 1890 with the Sherman Act. In the European Union the first antitrust regulation was set by the treaty of Rome in 1957. There are commonly described three historical phases of US antitrust law implementation, the first dating from 1890 to 1940, the second from 1945 to 1975 and the third from 1970 to the present (Viscusi et al., 2005). These three phases have been characterized by different economic and political theories incorporating two different ideologies of the market and the state: the evolutionary vision and the intentional vision (Page, 2008). The evolutionary vision views the market, framed solely by laws on property and contracts, as a mechanism for facilitating free exchanges among countless individuals in the pursuit of their best interests. In this vision, the market without state intervention naturally tends to a perfect competition ideal form destroying monopoly. On the contrary, the intentional vision views the market as a mechanism within which powerful interests can coerce consumers, labour and small businesses. In this vision markets tend toward monopoly unless government intervenes. The political economic theories corresponding to these two visions are the laissez-faire and the welfare state theories. The more the intentional vision is preferred to the evolutionary vision, the greater is the scope and the enforcement of antitrust law, and vice versa. The Sherman Act and the first period of antitrust law implementation embodied a compromise between the two visions. Notwithstanding the faith in the market, coherent with a strong liberal theory of the state, it was recognized as a matter of fact that monopolies and extreme economic power concentrations actually occur in the real world, producing social inequalities and injustice. At that time, state intervention was intended as a way to promote social justice and mediate among class conflicts in society. In the second period, the intentional view prevailed. Stemming from the disillusionment with markets during the Great Depression, the New Deal initiated the era of the welfare state based on the idea, supported by the growing economic literature on market failure, that economic state intervention should be legitimated by efficiency more than by equity concerns. The years between 1950 and 1970 are the golden era of antitrust legislation. The view of the markets taken up by the Court was that of recognition that coercion is the reality of market relationships. That is to say that in contrast with the previous ideological faith in the freedom of contracts, it was acknowledged that in a market transaction each party may be forced by the bargaining power of the other to accept unfair payments and obligations. Along with these views, the then prevailing theory of industrial organization, the structure-conduct-performance paradigm, facilitated a strong enforcement of antitrust legislation, holding that the mere measure of market share was sufficient to witness the presence of market power and monopoly inefficiencies. By the mid-1970s the evolutionary view completely dismissed the intentional view with the uprising of the so called Chicago school of antitrust. Chicago scholars applying neoclassical economics maintained that unfettered markets always lead to the best social outcomes. They pointed out that many of the practices that the courts had been viewing as harmful to competition and economic welfare, such as vertical restraints, may instead improve economic efficiency. Moreover they contested the structuralist view by claiming that a firm’s large market share may signal superior efficiency and that, consistently with the contestability theory (Baumol et al., 1982), freedom of entry is the only parameter to be scrutinized by antitrust laws. The general wisdom of the Chicago school was that state intervention and regulation is always harmful to the general interest. The Chicago ‘revolution’ has made competition policy a useless instrument for reaching goals of general interest such as providing public goods and promoting social justice. **In order to make competition policy a useful instrument against global warming,** it is necessary to reject some assumptions of the **Chicago antitrust school** and revive instead the conventional wisdom of the previous approaches in the wake of the intentional view. Among the assumptions to be scrutinized are those related to the three following issues: the theory of the firm; the nature of corporation; the goals of antitrust policy. The Chicago approach endorses a neoclassical theory of the firm where the firm is defined by a technical production function. The neoclassical theory of the firm, even in its modern neo-institutional version that accounts for transaction costs, explains a firm’s behaviour exclusively through the efficiency argument (exploitation of scale and scope economies). According to Chicago scholars, large size and above-normal returns must be due to efficiency differentials between firms. In their world made of equilibria and complete contracts, power-seeking behaviours are not conceivable (Raghuram and Zingales, 1998). Organizational, institutional and cognitive problems addressed by alternative theories (such as managerial, evolutionary, property rights, and behavioural theories) are dismissed as trivial. With regards to the legal debate on the nature of corporations (the latter defined as economic organizations whose members are granted limited liability by incorporation statutes), the Chicago view is consistent with the Nexus-of-Contracts theory, which contrasts the two alternative theories, namely the Legal Fiction and the Real Entity theories (Ronnegard, 2006). The Nexus-of-Contracts theory depicts the corporation as a web of contracts among all the members, which implies that it should not be regarded as a separate legal entity from the shareholders and that rights and duties can be defined only with regards to its members. Because the corporation is the result of a free contract, it is not dependent upon state grants and the same act of incorporation (granted by the state) is only a shorthand way of obtaining a contractual situation equivalent to that which could materialize through the private contracting of individuals. This conception of corporation is based on a libertarian ideology that says that corporations ought to merely be a commercial instrument for furthering the ends of the incorporating parties. Because corporations are not autonomous entities, any moral status (and therefore social responsibility) is ruled out, and because they are not a ‘creature’ of the state but the result of free contracts, they cannot be given rules and duties by the state. Therefore, one cannot expect them to provide public goods, such as climate stabilization, either voluntarily or compulsorily. Finally, as regards the goals of antitrust, the Chicago school states that antitrust policy ought to deal only with **consumer losses** due to high prices and/or output restrictions (Burns, 2006). Any equity concern about wealth distribution or unfair business practices is dismissed. For instance, in the Chicago view low final prices generally signal efficiency and practices like predatory pricing, reciprocal selling and cross-subsidization by conglomerates, unfair procurement contracts, and so on, are given little attention. All these three sets of assumptions entail that corporations pertain to the private more **than to the public sphere** and that antitrust pertains to the economic more than to the political sphere. In consequence, corporations should not be required to seek public goals (like providing public goods such as climate stabilization) and antitrust should not be required to seek goals like equity and justice (among which climate justice) but should only pursue economic efficiency in terms of low consumer prices. Competition policy and climate change: reversing the false premises of the Chicago school Stemming from the intentional vision, and in opposition to the evolutionary vision of the Chicago school, **the previous assumptions can be reversed in such a way as to justify a wider scope of antitrust policy** able to encompass the goal of climate stabilization. **The first** hypotheses to be reversed **are those** **concerning** the theory of **the firm** and the nature of the corporation. Firms cannot be described purely as technical production functions but as institutions (as economic theory had to acknowledge after the seminal work of Coase of 1937) that in some way substitute the market with power as means of resource allocation. Like states, firms exercise power in various forms, either inside their organizational boundaries or outside, over their competitors, their suppliers, their customers and the same state, through lobbying and bribing. Modern corporations are firms which, through the limited liability and other rights granted by the state (such as unlimited life span, unlimited asset acquisition, complete flexibility and mobility in business conduct, constitutional rights equal to those of natural persons), possess even superpowers (Nace, 2003; Korten, 2001), i.e. powers that cannot be enjoyed by a single individual and even less (because of territorial limits) by a single state. Because corporations are legal persons, with specific rights granted by the state, their nature cannot be described through the Nexus-of-Contract theory endorsed by the Chicago School. Their nature is better described by the Legal Fiction theory. The Legal Fiction theory essentially says that the corporation is merely an abstract creation of law which is granted to an association of individuals. The corporation is an artificial legal entity with an existence distinct from the incorporating members and exists entirely at the discretion of the state. The Legal Fiction theory differs from the Nexus-of-Contract theory which does not recognize the corporation distinct from its members and does affirm that it is independent from the power of the state because it is the result of free contracts by individuals. The Legal Fiction theory also differs from the Real Entity theory that considers corporations to be real, social organisms that possess a will and life of their own, with characteristics that are distinct from their individual members. Similar to the Nexus-of-Contracts theory, the Real Entity theory rejects the notion that corporation is a creation or grant from the state. However, differently from the Nexus-of-Contracts theory, the Real Entity theory claims that corporations ought to be granted legal rights as natural persons, rights which are owed to the corporation itself as a separate organism and are not derived from the rights of the individual members. The Legal Fiction theory is the only theory on the nature of corporations that is consistent with the advocacy of an antitrust regulation aimed at directly controlling and limiting the scope of activity of corporations. Because corporations are legal persons they can be given rights and duties. Nevertheless, because they are not natural persons, as instead envisaged by the Real Entity theory, they do not automatically enjoy basic rights (like the rights to free speech and due process of law) and do not possess moral responsibility. Because they are creatures of the state, they do not have their own life and in the divide between the private and public sphere they can be put somehow on the public side. Shifting from the idea of corporations as private efficiency-seeking organizations to the idea of corporations as social bodies enjoying large powers by virtue of state grants allows us to recognize that corporations may have an important role in addressing general social problems like global warming. Two arguments must be considered. First, because the power of corporations, including the power to affect global warming, depends on state grants, state regulations and obligations imposed on corporations in order to contribute to climate stabilization cannot be considered as illegitimate limitation to private freedom (as envisioned by Chicago scholars and neo-liberalists). Such regulations and obligations should instead **be considered a due act of governance** involving subjects (state regulators and corporations) that both pertain to the public sphere. Secondly, obligations imposed on corporations may be of the kind of human rights duties in case of environmental harm (Mabaquiao, 2002). It is worth noticing that rights are, after all, a response to the problem of power; in particular human rights are asserted in order to protect individuals from abuse of power by states. When one recognizes that many TNCs are really as powerful as or more powerful than many states, it does make sense to treat them as duty-holders, with the same obligations as the states to uphold human rights (Sinden, 2007). It is also important to notice that, because according to the Legal Fiction theory corporations do not possess moral responsibility, we cannot rely on CSR or voluntary codes of conducts as ways to protect the public from environmental harm and any power abuse made by corporations. The second set of hypotheses to be reversed is that concerning the definition of the scope of antitrust policy. It is general wisdom that antitrust policy should prevent excesses in exercise of power by large firms. The difference between the Chicago School and alternative approaches based on the intentional view is with the kind of power at stake. The Chicago school only considers market power in the form of high consumer prices. Alternative approaches instead look at different kinds of power: the bargaining power towards suppliers and employees; the power to choose technologies and products with different environmental impacts; the power to influence the political arena; the power to ‘capture’ regulators; the power to influence cultural and social values; and even more. If antitrust policy has to deal with all these kinds of power then it must widen its scope, adding to the economic goal efficiency, social and political goals, such as business fairness, distributive equity, environment protection, enforcement of human rights and so on. In this perspective, **antitrust policy should provide incentives** (either positive or negative) **for business firms to pursue public goals**, **such as global warming mitigation.** Conclusion The global food system is populated by many large TNCs (Etc.Group, 2008). These corporations have de facto become a key part of the fabric of global environmental governance. In their role as investors, polluters, experts, manufacturers, lobbyists and employers, corporations are central players in environmental issues. While necessary, voluntary action on the part of corporations and consumers is not alone sufficient to mitigate the worst effects of global warming. However, in the food sector, voluntary actions have been weak and sparse so far (Cogan, 2006). For instance in the Ceres report (CERES, 2008), which rates firms by their achievements in climate-related corporate governance, there are no companies from the food sector among the top ten firms. Among the bottom twelve there are instead three food giants: ConAgra, Bunge, and PepsiCo. Climate stabilization, as in general environmental protection, is a public good and as such is not provided by the private sector but needs public intervention. Among the many kinds of public intervention, the paper has focused on antitrust legislation. At its origin, antitrust legislation was conceived as a means to mitigate power wielded by large corporations in society. With the spread of neo-liberalism from the mid-1970s, the Chicago School radically changed the meaning and the scope of antitrust laws, with drastic changes in its enforcement (Mueller, 2009). The general claim of this paper is that it **is necessary** to go back to the original spirit of antitrust legislation which endorses an idea of corporation as an artificial powerful legal entity created by the state in order to serve the public interest. Only in this way can large firms, in particular TNCs in the food sector, **be expected to comply with environmental regulations and guarantee human rights.**

**It is not enough to come up with answers to the issue of climate change without a possible path towards achieving sustainable development through economic and political means. Strength of integration of economics into climate policy is key.**

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The environmental sciences have documented large and worrisome changes in earth systems, from climate change and loss of biodiversity, to changes in hydrological and nutrient cycles and depletion of natural resources (1⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓–12). These global environmental changes have potentially **large negative consequences for future human well-being**, and **raise questions about whether global civilization is on a sustainable path** or is “consuming too much” by depleting vital natural capital (13). The increased scale of economic activity and the consequent increasing impacts on a finite Earth arises from both **major demographic changes**—including population growth, shifts in age structure, urbanization, and spatial redistributions through migration (14⇓⇓⇓–18)—**and rising per capita income and shifts in consumption patterns**, such as increases in meat consumption with rising income (19, 20).

**At the same time, many people are consuming too little**. In 2015, ∼10% of the world’s population (736 million) lived in extreme poverty with incomes of less than $1.90 per day (21). In 2017, 821 million people were malnourished, an increase in the number reported malnourished compared with 2016 (22). **There is an urgent need for further economic development to lift people out of poverty**. In addition, rising inequality resulting in increasing polarization of society is itself a threat to achieving sustainable development. Eliminating poverty (goal 1) and hunger (goal 2), achieving gender equality (goal 6), and reducing inequality (goal 10) feature prominently in the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (23). A recent special issue in PNAS on natural capital framed the challenge of sustainable development as one of developing “economic, social, and governance systems capable of ending poverty and achieving sustainable levels of population and consumption while securing the life-support systems underpinning current and future human well-being” (24).

The discipline of economics arguably **should play a central role in meeting the sustainable development challenge**. The core question at the heart of sustainable development is how to allocate the finite resources of the planet to meet “the needs of the present, **without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”** (25). A central focus of economics is how to allocate scarce resources to meet desired goals; indeed, a standard definition of economics is the study of allocation under scarcity. More specifically, economics studies the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services, which are both a key driver of development (increasing standards of living through providing food, housing, and other basic human requirements) and a main cause of current changes in earth systems. Economics, combined with earth system sciences, **is crucial for understanding both positive and negative impacts of alternatives and the trade-offs involved**. Economics, **combined with other social and behavioral sciences**, is crucial for understanding **how it might be possible to shift human behavior toward achieving sustainable development.** Economics has well-developed fields in development economics, ecological economics, environmental economics, and natural resource economics, with large bodies of research relevant to the sustainable development challenge. **The application of economic principles and empirical findings should be a central component in the quest to meet the aspirations of humanity for a good life given the finite resources of the earth**.

Indeed, an extensive body of work by economists provides key insights into aspects of sustainable development. At its best, this work integrates work by other natural and social sciences into a policy-relevant framework and demonstrates the rich potential for collaborations among economists, natural scientists, and other social scientists on sustainable development challenges. For example, economists have developed integrated economic and climate models to address important climate change policy questions, such as how much and how fast greenhouse gas emissions should be reduced (26⇓⇓⇓⇓–31). In 2018, William Nordhaus shared the Nobel Prize in economics, in large part for his seminal work on such models. These models have sparked large debates within economics over fundamental issues such as the proper discount rate (32⇓⇓–35), and with the natural sciences over the likely scale of damages from climate change (36, 37). Another Nobel Prize winner in economics, Elinor Ostrom, used economic models to highlight the importance of governance and institutions for sustainable use of common property resources (38⇓–40). Another important area of work by economists directly relevant to sustainable development defines and measures inclusive wealth (13, 41⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓–49). Ken Arrow, yet another Nobel Prize winner in economics, was a leader in this field. It is also notable that the intellectual roots of inclusive wealth trace to work in the 1970s of two Nobel Prize winners in economics, William Nordhaus and James Tobin (50). Inclusive wealth is a measure of the aggregate wealth of society, including the value of natural capital along with the values of human capital, manufactured capital, and social capital. Inclusive wealth is a sufficient statistic for showing whether or not global society is on a sustainable trajectory. For the past two decades, the Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics, part of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, has held annual meetings bringing together leading economists and ecologists to discuss issues at the intersection of ecology and economics, which have resulted in a number of high-impact papers (51). The idea for a forum to highlight work in economics on environment and sustainable development originated at one of these meetings.

Despite these examples and many others, the center of gravity in the analysis of sustainable development remains in the natural sciences, **and the center of gravity in economics remains far removed from the challenge of sustainable development**. The natural sciences that form the core of earth systems science, including ecology, geology, climatology, hydrology, and oceanography, are a logical place to start to build understanding of the current state and the evolution of earth systems. Natural scientists have taken the lead in prominent analyses of pathways to achieve sustainable development. For example, Pacala and Socolow (52) outline feasible methods using existing technology to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to secure a livable climate. Foley et al. (53) analyze how to meet growing food demand without expanding the footprint of agriculture. Costello et al. (54) suggest how extensive fishery reform could result in improved productivity and ecosystem health. Tallis et al. (55) analyze how to improve material standard of living for a growing population in ways that simultaneously sustain biodiversity, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and reduce water use and air pollution. These works show that it is feasible to achieve multiple sustainable development goals with existing technology. The harder challenge is combining what is feasible in a biophysical sense **with the difficult economic, political, and social hurdles that prevent society from getting to sustainable outcomes** (55). In other words, natural science understanding **is necessary but not sufficient to achieve sustainable development.**

While natural science understanding is insufficient on its own to achieve sustainable development, the same is true of economics. Economists alone do not have the knowledge base supplied by the natural sciences necessary to understand the complex ecological systems within which the economic system operates and on which economic activity causes impacts. **Progress in sustainable development requires collaboration** between social scientists, including economists and natural scientists. Of course, **achieving sustainable development requires institutions and political alignment that go well beyond assembling the science knowledge arising from integrated scientific knowledge.**

Numerous examples show the incomplete nature of collaboration between economists and other disciplines engaged in the analysis of sustainable development. To take one recent example, there were no economists involved in a special section on “Ecosystem Earth” published in Science in April 2017 that contained discussions of population, consumption, agricultural production, land use, human behavior, collective action, and policy (56). The lack of involvement by economists in ongoing discussions of sustainable development **leads to gaps in understanding production and consumption decisions, the resulting market outcomes that drive global environmental change, and how to regulate or reduce negative environmental impacts from economic activities.**

The incomplete engagement of economists mirrors the structure of the economics discipline. The fields of ecological, environmental, and resource economics are not core fields within economics. There are few ecological, environmental, or resource economics publications in flagship journals within economics. For example, in 2018 only two papers published in the American Economic Review listed classification codes for renewable resources and conservation, nonrenewable resources and conservation, energy economics, or environmental economics (57, 58). Only a small minority of the top economics departments have fields in ecological, environmental, or resource economics. In contrast, virtually every top economics program offers fields in labor economics, industrial organization, and international trade. Ecological, environmental, and resource economics programs often are in schools of the environment or natural resources, schools of public policy, or in departments of agricultural economics. In addition, economics is notable among academic disciplines for its relative isolation: “Though all disciplines are in some way insular…this trait peculiarly characterizes economics” (59). Compared with other social scientists, economists have far lower citation rates for work in other disciplines. Jacobs (60) found that the percentage of within-field citations in economics was 81%, versus 59% for political science, 53% for anthropology, and 52% for sociology. In addition, the core of the economics discipline is relatively isolated from the natural sciences that have played a large role in sustainability science to date, ecology, geology, climatology, hydrology, and marine biology. Network maps of disciplines using citations patterns often show economics and fields, such as ecology and geosciences, at opposite ends of the spectrum (figure 3 in ref. 61).

**Given the large role of economic activity in causing rapid change in earth systems, and the scale of the sustainable development challenge, there is an urgent need for more rapid integration of economics into the core of sustainable development, and for more rapid integration of sustainable development into the core of economics.**

**The plan is necessary—corporations are driven by profit incentives and allowing mergers and monopolies make solving the climate change impossible—they maintain perverse incentives that need to be reigned in. Any alternative leads to collusion!**

**Schinkel and Treuren 21.** Maarten Pieter Schinkel and Leonard Treuren. “Green Antitrust: Friendly Fire In The Fight Against Climate Change” <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3749147>

4 **Not less but more competition leads to greater sustainability** The central question of whether it should be expected that firms will produce more sustainably in an anticompetitive agreement than in competition squarely falls on economics to answer. It is reasonable to base the analysis on two standard premises. The first is that (potential) consumers care about sustainability. Eichholtz et al. (2010) document a higher willingness to pay for office buildings with sustainability labels. Casadesus-Masanell et al. (2009) report a higher willingness to pay for T-shirts made with organic cotton. In a survey of the literature Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012) conclude that willingness to pay depends in general positively on the degree of corporate social responsibility a firm engages in.23 More recently, Aghion et al. (2020) find that **green innovation is positively correlated with consumers’ stated sustainability preferences**.

A second premise is that, no matter how noble the initiatives may appear, **firms are ultimately driven by profit motives**. Rate of return incentives can certainly lead to intricate and forward-looking firm behavior, for instance investing in a good public image in order to attract more consumers. Running up short term losses with a CEO passionate about corporate social responsibility can therefore still be consistent with long term profit maximization. Yet under pressure of shareholders and investors, **firms are interested in sustainability initiatives first and foremost to increase their profitability**, in particular **through buyers’ higher willingness to pay**.24 The latter are the revenue returns to sustainability investments, which are costs. Therefore, companies will strive for profit-maximizing price increases and sustainability advances, for which cost-minimization is a necessary condition. That these incentives lead to little green is reflected in the literature on greenwashing. Firms certainly like to have a “green” public image, but when consumers cannot assess the true extent of their sustainability investments, they only undertake the minimum.25 In general, we should expect no less, and no more, from for-profit enterprises, both in competition and in coordination.

The relationship between competition and sustainability is studied in a limited but recently growing literature. The current **consensus** is that competition increases investments in sustainability, with firms investing in sustainability because it lowers their costs or allows them to stand out to consumers. Green, in other words, **is a dimension of product differentiation**. Bansal and Roth (2000), Porter and Kramer (2006), and Roulet and Bothello (2020) point out that corporate social responsibility (CSR) can be a strong competitive advantage. Graafland (2016) finds in survey data that price competition does not influence companies’ environmental performance ratings. Simon and Prince (2016) show that a reduction in industrial concentration in the United States is associated with a reduction in toxic releases at the factory level. Fernández-Kranz and Santaló (2010) and Flammer (2015) find that competition has a positive effect on CSR at the firm level, in studies of variation in import duties and concentration. Aghion et al. (2020) show that the positive relation between consumers’ stated sustainability preferences and the probability that a firm engages in green innovation increases with the degree of product market competition. This suggests that as pro-environment attitudes become more common over time, **the role of competition in fostering green innovation will only increase.** Ding et al. (2020) link antitrust policy to sustainability by showing that **stricter competition law regimes are positively associated with CSR, and that this link is stronger in countries where consumers indicate stronger pro-environment attitudes.**

Few papers study the relationship between horizontal agreements and sustainability directly. They relate to the literature on exempting research joint-ventures, which can increase R&D investments above competitive levels if spillovers of innovations are so large that unilateral investments are discouraged.26 For this reason, there is a broad exemption clause available for R&D joint-ventures, including for research into more sustainable production methods. However, with limited spill-overs, **competition is the stronger driver of R&D**. There is concern, therefore, that **mergers reduce innovation**.27 Importantly, sustainability initiatives of the kind considered for exemption, such as investments in cleaner technology or better quality of live for farm animals, have little or no spillover from one company to another. These cases, and the current green antitrust debate about advancing a transition to more sustainable ways of manufacturing, are primarily about the implementation of existing cleaner technologies, rather than about innovation.

Schinkel and Spiegel (2017) analyze the link between anticompetitive agreements and sustainability in a two-stage duopoly model where firms first select investments in sustainability and subsequently compete on the product market. They find that allowing the firms to coordinate their sustainability efforts **leads to the lowest sustainability levels**. Sustainability is a product attribute that consumers care about, and hence is used by firms to compete and attract each other’s customers. Treuren and Schinkel (2018) generalize these findings to more firms and remaining competition. Note that when firms coordinate prices and sustainability investments, **sustainability levels are still lower than in competition**. This means that if coordinating their sustainability investments allows the **companies to collude on prices** as well, a risk we noted above, **sustainability does not benefit from coordination.**

**Even a total shift in individual attitudes about climate change would benefit from a more competitive economic environment.**

**Schinkel and Treuren 21.** Maarten Pieter Schinkel and Leonard Treuren. “Green Antitrust: Friendly Fire In The Fight Against Climate Change” <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3749147>

Proponents of green antitrust policy point out that today’s corporate leadership increasingly pledges allegiance to take responsibility for stakeholders more widely, including for their environment.28 They view profit-driven firm analysis as outdated, and Friedman’s appeal to it as an ancient belief.29 Green CEO’s may not even be controllable by shareholders anymore if they wanted to. Importantly, however, if firms operate with an intrinsic motivation to produce more sustainably too, **investments typically remain higher in competition than with sustainability agreements**, and the difference may even become larger. In Schinkel and Treuren (2021), the level of sustainability investments features directly in each firm’s objective function, besides in the profits part. Since intrinsically motivated investments are independent of the competitive regime, they are higher in absolute value in both competition and coordination. Moreover, **coordination reduces the additional intrinsically motivated green investments**, since the loss of profit due to increasing sustainability beyond the normal profit maximizing level is larger for firms who **jointly decide on sustainability**. That an intrinsic motivation to do green **makes anticompetitive agreements not more, but rather even less suitable to promote sustainability investments underlines our warning not to lean too far in sympathies for initiatives to take corporate social responsibility jointly.**

**AND it’s sufficient – Establishing a basis for “green anit-trust” creates government leverage for large-scale climate action – the plan propels a series of policy solutions that**

**Schinkel and Treuren 21.** Maarten Pieter Schinkel and Leonard Treuren. “Green Antitrust: Friendly Fire In The Fight Against Climate Change” <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3749147>

7 **Green antitrust** excuses government failure to regulate In the classical economic approach, damaging side-effects of market interactions are seen as externalities. **The solution is to force market participants to internalize these externalities.** The social costs of pollution, for example, then become part of the production costs to be expressed in the product prices. Higher prices decrease demand and thereby environmental damage, while higher costs incentivize firms to look for more sustainable production methods. This way, market forces are harnessed to benefit the environment. Through competition, an optimal allocation of production and consumption will result, based on a society’s preferences for the climate relative to consumption goods. The efficient allocation of scarce resources over alternative means then remains firmly based on consumer sovereignty, i.e. the preferences of the people.36 Care for the future has a prominent place in this framework. Welfare of future generations is taken into account, for instance through the intergenerational altruism and bequest motives of the current population.37 **This is** also **how the future can** consistently enterinto **competition authorities’ assessments** of green efficiencies. It is first and foremost a government task to ensure that the social costs of production are reflected in the private costs of manufacturers. **This can be done through taxation, or by ensuring that private property rights for climate-related issues are well defined, such that private parties will ensure that the costs of their use will be priced in.** **Where this is hard to achieve,** for instance because the source of pollution remains disputed, **governments can use direct regulation** **to force firms to produce in a more sustainable way**. Unsustainable production, like under-provision of public goods, is a well-understood market failure, but it is a government failure that well-known solutions have only been sparingly used in the last several decades. Trying to remedy this government failure by creating a market failure – market power – seems a response that is itself doomed to fail. To begin with, trying to have private market power advance public interests is orthogonal to key lessons of classical public economic theory. **One way of seeing this green antitrust policy is as mandating private companies to increase their prices by an overcharge, i.e. “tax” a private good**, **and to use that money to finance a compensating public good**; sustainability. Samuelson’s rule prescribes that public good provision should be increasing with the utility that people derive from the public good. But for an anticompetitive sustainability agreement, the higher the willingness to pay for sustainable products, the less sustainability the corporate cooperative needs to deliver to compensate consumers for a given product price increase. After all, consumers with a high appreciation for green can be made indifferent with less of it, compared with consumers that appreciate green little. There is no reason for a green corporate cooperative to invest more of its extra revenue in sustainability than it is minimally required to do: the rest it can pocket as profit. Government, though certainly imperfect, at least strives for optimal taxation and break-even public good provision. Companies with market power instead have an incentive to maximize their margin. In addition, green antitrust policy runs the risk of exacerbating government failure. That governments keep failing to live up to their **mandate to guarantee the public interest** has many reasons, including public choice incentives ranging from regulatory laziness to outright corruption. Being able to point to industry self-regulation, in the form of sustainability agreements in restriction of competition, is another perfect excuse for governments not to take up their regulatory responsibility. Why the effort to regulate, after all, if government officials can simply rely on private initiatives to help meet sustainability goals? This is exactly how Chicken (2015) entered the stage: the Dutch cabinet did not want to improve by regulation the abysmal circumstances in which poultry is reared, because it would apply to all chicken, including the vast majority bred for export purposes. Yet there was strong public pressure to act. The problem was conveniently redirected towards the ACM, which was subsequently reproached for refusing to exempt the meagre initiative. The green antitrust movement therefore insists on a turn that, once taken, risks leading us down a path where competition authorities are accused of standing in the way of sustainability initiatives, behind which accusations firms can hide as an excuse for not becoming more sustainable. That is barking up the wrong tree: where there is a need for coordinated implementation of more sustainable production, government should regulate it, and firms with such green initiatives should lobby the designated public authority for effective regulation, rather than the competition authorities for protection from competition.

**Emissions mitigation policy as an early mover is key to future abatement and preventing lock-in – solves leakage and green paradox.**

**Arroyo-Currás et al 15** (Tabaré Arroyo-Currás, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Nico Bauer, Elmar Kriegler, Valeria Jana Schwanitz, Gunnar Luderer, Tino Aboumahboub, Anastasis Giannousakis, Jérôme Hilaire, “Carbon leakage in a fragmented climate regime: The dynamic response of global energy markets’, Technological Forecasting and Social Change Volume 90, Part A, January 2015, Pages 192–203)

5. Conclusions

Given the challenges to international cooperation on mitigating climate change, a number of climate policies have been implemented by various countries and regions, while others remain on the sideline. The heterogeneity of climate policy approaches has given rise to an internationally fragmented climate policy regime. Subsequently, global emission externalities such as carbon leakage have emerged as an important topic within the climate change mitigation debate.

This study illustrates the incidence and consequences of carbon leakage as an effect of early action in a fragmented climate policy regime. For this analysis, the REMIND integrated assessment model of the global economy, energy sector and the climate system is used to evaluate the environmental effectiveness and economic implications of unilateral and joint mitigation efforts. Overall, the main scope of this paper is to examine the role of carbon leakage via the energy channel, i.e. the increase in fossil fuel use in regions with weaker or non-existent climate policies due to more stringent mitigation action in other regions. The study also includes the capital market channel of carbon leakage.

We derive four main findings from our study. First, a reference policy scenario extrapolating fragmented action at current levels of ambition into the future will reduce emissions only modestly compared to the idealized case of immediate cooperative action on reaching a 450 ppm CO2e stabilization target (compare Blanford et al. [35]). Therefore, **a pioneering region adopting more stringent emission reductions may be needed to strengthen climate mitigation**. We show that the main impact on **additional emission reductions** does not come from the early mover action itself, but from the rest of the world following up with strengthening their abatement effort **post 2030**. Thus, a pioneer in adopting more stringent mitigation action needs to be particularly concerned with its ability to induce others to follow.

Second, the carbon leakage rate via the energy channel **is limited to below 16%** of the additional emission reductions from more stringent abatement action by pioneering regions. This result holds for different sizes and compositions of the early mover coalition. The carbon leakage mechanisms include the reduction of coal use in pioneering regions, or indirectly in other regions via knock-on substitution effects from reduced gas use in abating regions, leading to increased coal consumption in the rest of the world. While the type of mechanism and the regions that increase their fossil fuel consumption vary with the early mover coalition, **the general result of limited leakage stands**. This implies that carbon leakage, at least via the energy channel investigated here, **is not strongly impacting the emission reduction gains from early mover action**, and **does not permanently increase the lock-in into fossil fuel infrastructure in other regions**. It therefore does not provide a strong counter-argument against adoption of more stringent mitigation efforts by pioneering regions.

Compared with the scientific literature that mainly focused on the competitiveness channel the upper limit of 16% **carbon leakage rate due to the energy market channel is small** (Babiker [36]; Babiker [37]; Bernstein et al. [38]; Bollen et al. [39]; Burniaux and Oliveira-Martins [40]; Burniaux and Truong [41]; Gerlagh and Kuik [42]; Kuik and Gerlagh [43]; Light et al. [44]; Manne and Richels [45]; McKibbin et al. [19]). In the REMIND model the representation of international fossil fuel markets is highly flexible and fossil based energy **conversion technologies can easily replace alternatives**. Hence, fossil fuel suppliers can, in principle, find new demands easily, if demand is reduced due to unilateral climate policies. Carbon leakage via the energy market channel is mainly limited **due to trade costs of fossil fuels and demand for final energies in non-abating countries**. In the present study also the carbon prices of the moderate climate policies dampen the carbon leakage. Studies focusing on the competitiveness channel usually depend on the choice of trade elasticities with higher elasticities implying larger carbon leakage rates. In this study fossil energy trade is not limited in a similar way, and therefore limitations should imply even smaller carbon leakage rates.

Third, we observe that the re-allocation of emissions due to carbon leakage depends mostly on the energy system structure of the region that takes abatement action i.e. whether the region is a fossil resource importer (e.g. Europe), exporter (e.g. the United States) or de facto carbon intensive economy (e.g. China). We conclude that carbon leakage is a dynamic effect that mostly depends on (i) demand response of fuel importers to price changes, (ii) inter-fuel substitution possibilities and (iii) transportation cost barriers in the fossil fuel market.

Regarding the economic implications of fragmented climate action we confirm the assertion that early mitigation action leads to short-run GDP losses for the first movers, but **delayed implementation of the carbon tax can lead to larger losses after the introduction of the tax.** The larger tax shock can act as a significant barrier to take more stringent action and therefore delaying action might further impede the adoption of more ambitious carbon tax levels in the long run. We also find reallocation of GDP between early mover and late-comer regions triggered by the international capital market, but this is not a major driver of carbon leakage. This result is, however, different to the result of McKibbin et al. [19] who identified the converse effect on carbon leakage for the US.

Several caveats apply to the analysis here. First, the REMIND version used for this study does not take into account bilateral fossil fuel trade, but assumes a global pool trading scheme. Considering bilateral (or multilateral) trading reduces the flexibility of fossil fuel owners to redirect their supplies as some regions reduce their demand. Hence, this improvement might lead to lower leakage rates. Second, the study focused only on the energy channel of carbon leakage, although macro-economic substitution effects between energy, capital and labor were accounted for. Expanding the analysis of dynamic leakage in staged accession scenarios to a larger set of leakage channels, particularly including the re-allocation of energy intensive industries, would help to **better constrain the full carbon leakage effect**. It is worth mentioning that technology spillovers related to technology learning are not observed in this study.

We conclude from the results that the value of individual regions or coalitions adopting more stringent climate action rises or falls with their ability to induce others to follow suit. Thus, while global cooperation on climate mitigation may prove illusory in the short run, **credible and strong mitigation action by major countries can help to keep the door open for future global action to stabilize climate change as carbon leakage effects are limited**.

**Even small carbon price increases impact behavior—changes consumption patterns**

**Hsu 11** (Shi-Ling Hsu, Professor of Law at University of British Columbia – previously Associate Prof at George Washington School of Law, Senior Attorney & Economist for the Environmental Law Institute The Case for a Carbon Tax: Getting Past our Hang-ups to Effective Climate Policy, Island Press Page 139-142)

While curmudgeons may grudgingly concede that a high carbon tax like that in Sweden would reduce emissions, a smaller one like the British Columbia carbon tax is a different matter. When the British Columbia government introduced its carbon tax in 2008, it admitted that its modest price effects would not have a substantial effect on car- bon dioxide emissions in the province. 41 More action was needed, and was in fact contemplated as the British Columbia government also en- acted a companion program laving the foundation for a cap-and-trade program as part of British Columbia's participation in the California- led Western Climate Initiative. But the carbon tax is indeed so small that one wonders if it really was meant to accomplish anything. The BC carbon tax was designed to ramp up from about $9 per ton of C02 in 2008 to about $30 in 2012. This translates into about 2.4 cents per little of gasoline, up to about 7.2 cents per liter in 2012. Gasoline prices fluctuate a great deal more than that, spiking in 2005 in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina to more than $1.12 per liter, only to see a higher spike in the summer of 2008 to nearly $1.50, fol- lowed by a dip just a few months later to below 80 cents. 42 In Vancou- ver, gas stations even commonly lower the price by three and a half cents at nighttime. Does an extra 2.4 cents—or even 7 cents—per liter really change behavior very much?

It is a fair question. The standard economic answer is that a price increase will lead to a decline in consumption. It could take a while, but higher prices always lead to lower consumption, all other things being equal. So for the household wondering if it will drive less be- cause of a small increase in the price of gasoline, the answer could well be no, but there are many, many other consumers that could be right at the margins of making a consumption decision. Price elasticity is the term that economists use to denote how much of an adjustment con- sumers, in the aggregate, can be expected to make in response to a price change. Consumption of commodities respond not only to changes in the price of the commodity itself—measured by the own- price elasticity—but also changes in the prices of other goods that may be substitutes or affect the economic environment some other wav— measured by the cross-price elasticities. Finally, consumption of com- modities can change to varying degrees as income changes— measured by the income elasticity. Bread and milk have low income elasticities. Sports cars and cosmetic surgery have high income elasticities.

Most energy analysis is conducted on own-price elasticities, al- though income also figures very prominently in energy consumption. There are short-term and long-term elasticities—adjustments that are made in the relatively short term—on the order of a few months—and those that are made for the longer term. Long-term elasticities are in- variably greater, since at any given time, the timing may or many not be right for any individual household to make an adjustment. Over a longer period of time, there arise more and more times during which an adjustment—some decision that might be affected by a price— seems appropriate. For example, a family that has just purchased a new sport-utility vehicle would not contemplate replacing it even if gaso- line prices rose sharply. One would expect very few adjustments of that sort. However, over a five- or ten-year period, as the sport-utility vehi- cle starts to age and incur more maintenance costs, and as it nears the end of its useful life, a replacement decision is more likely to take into account gasoline prices. As the same family contemplates what they will buy to replace that sport-utility vehicle, the family has a wider ar- ray of options available than it does when it has a brand-new shiny SUV. And in the aggregate, over a longer period, more and more households are likely to arrive at that decision point at which they con- template replacing an aging vehicle, and more adjustments are likely to be made. As long-term elasticity takes into account this greater number of adjustments, it would naturally be larger than short-term elasticities.

Among commodities, fossil fuel usage is one of the more studied phenomena, **and the likelihood that people adjust to even small price changes in fossil fuel price is so well-established that it almost rises to the level of an economic maxim**. While one might ask oneself whether a family might change their mind about anything if the carbon price is as small as $9 per ton of C02 (translating into 2.4 cents per liter at the gas pump), there are a myriad of other decision makers that could well change their behavior. As argued above, the University of British Columbia is just such an entity. Facing a tax liability that would be consid- ered small by industrial standards, but significant to an academic institution or a medium-sized business or industry, it set about finding ways to reduce its reliance on fossil fuels for powering the campus.

For decades, economists have been studying the aggregate responses to change in energy prices. The range of estimates can be quite large, as some studies are limited to certain regions or countries, and some ate limited in time, so the economic environment in which price changes are studied can be quite varied. As an empirical matter, it is safe to say that long-term elasticities are indeed greater than short- term elasticities. It is also likely that industrial and commercial consumers have larger long-term elasticities than residential consumers. 43 So it might be misleading for individuals to examine their own personal situation and ask themselves, "would I turn down my thermo- stat if the price of natural gas went up by 5 percent?" The point is how much, in the aggregate, all consumers of energy change their behavior, and on this score, industrial and commercial consumers, which ac- counted for half of all energy consumption in the United States in 2008 (with residential accounting for 22 percent), 44 would provide a different answer.

**Pragmatism is better than purity**

Frederic C. **RICH**, J.D., University of Virginia School of Law, practiced at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (1981-2014), Vice Chair of the Land Trust Alliance, head of the Environmental Leaders Group in New York State, **16** [*Getting to Green*, 2016, p. 196-198]

Bill Clinton recently said of the U.S. Constitution, "[I]t ought to be subtitled: 'Let's make a deal.'"10 He's right. But the Green movement has for decades been led by policy experts who are confident that their policies present the best solutions to environmental issues and who often are unwilling to consider alternatives, or accept incremental progress when a comprehensive solution is not possible. Green advocates have appeared to many to prefer confrontation to compromise, and Green colleagues are often harsh in criticizing others [END PAGE 196] who accept partial solutions or show willingness to deviate from the movement's ask in order to show some progress.11

Even after the fact, Green orthodoxy often paints landmark compromises as failures. David Brower, longtime head of the Sierra Club, came to regret the deal that saved Dinosaur National Monument because it involved a compromise that permitted a single dam at the spectacular Glen Canyon.12 Rejection of compromise is deeply embedded in the DNA of the more radical part of the movement. Earth First!, for example, has as its slogan "No compromise in the defense of Mother Earth." And although the rest of the movement does not share the approach of these more radical groups, their rhetoric echoes in the consciences of mainstream Greens. As a result, among Greens **purity** too often is prized above **pragmatism**. The former president of the Izaak Walton League complains bitterly about some of his colleagues in the Green movement, where, he says, "people often want to be viewed as the most holy defender of the faith, rather than the most effective at making progress."13

The Green movement has had a particular problem accepting incrementalism, although recent history is filled with examples, such as the **gradual tightening of fuel efficiency and auto emissions standards**, that are **successful models** of exactly this approach. In some cases opposition to incremental gain is strategically sound, or is simply a tactic designed to improve and broaden the scope of a law or rule. But when it results in positive legislation or regulation being stalled or killed, with no realistic hope of anything better replacing it, then **it is a mistake**. When motivated by pure politics, such as the desire to deny the Republicans an environmental victory, then it is a betrayal of our environmental mission for partisan gain.

Greens also sometimes seem to take pride in spewing out "big thinking" without regard to its political feasibility. Gus Speth, for example, wrote, "If someone says these proposals are impractical, [END PAGE 197] or politically naïve, then I would respond that we need impractical answers."14 These habits—reluctance to compromise, distrust of incrementalism, and insufficient attention to pragmatism—have **contributed to the movement's failures** and resulted in missed opportunities to make at least some progress on climate change. Any well-managed organization should insist that results define success. If the perfect policy is dead on arrival as a political matter, **then compromise**. The environmental movement is funded by its supporters to make a difference in the environment. So figure out what is achievable and go for that, even if it means you are negotiating with yourself, compromising before you sit down at the table with the other side, or "thinking small," all of which have been cardinal sins in many NGO cultures. **Incremental progress is progress, and progress is what is urgently needed**.

**Working within the system is necessary to solve particular instances of climate change—there’s no guarantee revolution will solve**

-It’s too late to solve the whole environmental crisis, but can work to mitigate the damage

-No guarantee the alternative’s regression to socialism won’t have same environmental problems

Christian **PARENTI**, professor of sustainable development at the School for International Training, Graduate Institute, **13** [“A Radical Approach to the Climate Crisis,” *Dissent*, Summer 2013, http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/a-radical-approach-to-the-climate-crisis]

Several strands of green thinking maintain that capitalism is incapable of a sustainable relationship with non-human nature because, as an economic system, capitalism has a growth imperative while the earth is finite. One finds versions of this argument in the literature of eco-socialism, deep ecology, eco-anarchism, and even among many mainstream greens who, though typically declining to actually name the economic system, are fixated on the dangers of “growth.”

All this may be true. Capitalism, a system in which privately owned firms must continuously out-produce and out-sell their competitors, may be incapable of accommodating itself to the limits of the natural world. However, that is not the same question as whether capitalism can solve the more immediate climate crisis.

Because of its magnitude, the climate crisis can appear **as the sum total of all environmental problems**—deforestation, over-fishing, freshwater depletion, soil erosion, loss of biodiversity, chemical contamination. But halting greenhouse gas emissions is a much more specific problem, the **most pressing subset** of the **larger apocalyptic panorama**.

And the very bad news is, time has run out. As I write this, news arrives of an ice-free arctic summer by 2050. Scientists once assumed that would not happen for hundreds of years.

Dealing with climate change by first achieving radical social transformation—be it a socialist or anarchist or deep-ecological/neo-primitive revolution, or a nostalgia-based localista conversion back to a mythical small-town capitalism—would be a very **long and drawn-out**, maybe even **multigenerational, struggle**. It would be marked by years of **mass education** and organizing of a scale and intensity not seen in most core capitalist states since the 1960s or even the 1930s.

**Nor is there any guarantee** that the new system would not also degrade the soil, lay waste to the forests, despoil bodies of water, and find itself still addicted to coal and oil. Look at the history of “actually existing socialism” before its collapse in 1991. To put it mildly, the economy was not at peace with nature. Or consider the vexing complexities facing the left social democracies of Latin America. Bolivia, and Ecuador, states run by socialists who are beholden to very powerful, autonomous grassroots movements, are still very **dependent on petroleum** revenue.

A more radical approach to the crisis of climate change begins **not with a long-term vision** of an alternate society but with an honest engagement with the very compressed timeframe that current climate science implies. In the age of climate change, **these are the real parameters of politics**.

**Strategic use of market mechanisms to politicize the inequalities of the status quo is possible – radical system change alone is a demand for a clean slate we don’t have**

**Hoffman 16** (Andrew, Professor and director of the Erb Institute for Global Sustainable Enterprise at the University of Michigan, 2/15/2016, The Invisible Hand Won’t Solve the Climate Crisis. Capitalism Must Evolve., Evonomics, http://evonomics.com/the-invisible-hand-wont-solve-the-climate-crisis-capitalism-must-evolve/)

This binary framing masks the real questions we face, both what we need to do and how we are going to get there. Yet there are serious conversations within management education, research and practice about the next steps in the evolution of capitalism. The goal is to develop a more sophisticated notion of the role of the corporation within society. These discussions are being driven not only by climate change, but concerns raised by the financial crisis, growing income inequality and other serious social issues.¶ The market’s rough edges¶ Capitalism is a set of institutions for structuring our commerce and interaction. It is not, as some think, some sort of natural state that exists free from government intrusion. It is designed by human beings in the service of human beings and it can evolve to the needs of human beings. As Yuval Levin points out in National Affairs, even Adam Smith argued that “the rules of the market are not self-legislating or naturally obvious. On the contrary, Smith argued, the market is a public institution that requires rules imposed upon it by legislators who understand its workings and its benefits.”¶ And, it is worth noting, capitalism has been quite successful. Over the past century, the world’s population increased by a factor of four, the world economy increased by a factor of 14 and global per capita income tripled. In that time, average life expectancy increased by almost **two-thirds** due in large part to advances in medicine, shelter, food production and other amenities provided by the market economy.¶ Capitalism is, in fact, quite malleable to meet the needs of society as they emerge. Over time, regulation has evolved to address emergent issues such as monopoly power, collusion, price-fixing and a host of other impediments to the needs of society. **Today, one of those needs is responding to climate change**.¶ The question is not whether capitalism works or doesn’t work. The question is how it can and will evolve to address the new challenges we face as a society. Or, as Anand Giridharadas pointed out at the Aspen Action Forum, “Capitalism’s rough edges must be sanded and its surplus fruit shared, but the underlying system must never be questioned.”¶ These rough edges need be considered with the theories we use to understand and teach the market. In addition, we need to reconsider the metrics we use to measure its outcomes, and the ways in which the market has deviated from its intended form.¶ Homo economicus?¶ To begin, there are growing questions around the underlying theories and models used to understand, explain and set policies for the market. Two that have received significant attention are neoclassical economics and principal-agent theory. Both theories form the foundation of management education and practice and are built on extreme and rather dismal simplifications of human beings as largely untrustworthy and driven by avarice, greed and selfishness.¶ As regards neoclassical economics, Eric Beinhocker and Nick Hanauer explain:¶ Behavioral economists have accumulated a mountain of evidence showing that real humans don’t behave as a rational homo economicus would. Experimental economists have raised awkward questions about the very existence of utility; and that is problematic because it has long been the device economists use to show that markets maximize social welfare. Empirical economists have identified anomalies suggesting that financial markets aren’t always efficient.¶ As regards principal-agent theory, Lynn Stout goes so far to say that the model is quite simply “wrong.” The Cornell professor of business and law argues that its central premise – that those running the company (agents) will shirk or even steal from the owner (principal) since they do the work and the owner gets the profits – does not capture “the reality of modern public corporations with thousands of shareholders, scores of executives and a dozen or more directors.”¶ The most pernicious outcome of these models is the idea that the purpose of the corporation is to “make money for its shareholders.” This is a rather recent idea that began to take hold within business only in the 1970s and 1980s and has now become a taken-for-granted assumption.¶ If I asked any business school student (and perhaps any American) to complete the sentence, “the purpose of the corporation is to…” they would parrot “make money for the shareholder.” But that is not what a company does, and most executives would tell you so. Companies transform ideas and innovation into products and services that serve the needs of some segment of the market. In the words of Paul Pollman, CEO of Unilever, “business is here to serve society.” Profit is the metric for how well they do that.¶ The problem with the pernicious notion that a corporation’s sole purpose is to serve shareholders is that it leads to many other undesirable outcomes. For example, it leads to an increased focus on quarterly earnings and short-term share price swings; it limits the latitude of strategic thinking by decreasing focus on long-term investment and strategic planning; and it rewards only the type of shareholder who, in the words of Lynn Stout, is “shortsighted, opportunistic, willing to impose external costs, and indifferent to ethics and others’ welfare.”¶ A better way to gauge the economy¶ Going beyond our understanding of what motivates people and organizations within the market, there is growing attention to the metrics that guide the outcomes of that action. One of those metrics is the discount rate. Economist Nicholas Stern stirred a healthy controversy when he used an unusually low discount rate when calculating the future costs and benefits of climate change mitigation and adaptation, arguing that there is a ethical component to this metric’s use. For example, a common discount rate of 5% leads to a conclusion that everything 20 years out and beyond is worthless. When gauging the response to climate change, is that an outcome that anyone – particularly anyone with children or grandchildren – would consider ethical?¶ Another metric is gross domestic product (GDP), the foremost economic indicator of national economic progress. It is a measure of all financial transactions for products and services. But one problem is that it does not acknowledge (nor value) a distinction between those transactions that add to the well-being of a country and those that diminish it. Any activity in which money changes hands will register as GDP growth. GDP treats the recovery from natural disasters as economic gain; GDP increases with polluting activities and then again with pollution cleanup; and it treats all depletion of natural capital as income, even when the depreciation of that capital asset can limit future growth.¶ A second problem with GDP is that it is not a metric dealing with true human well-being at all. Instead, it is based on the tacit assumption that the more money and wealth we have, the better off we are. But that’s been challenged by numerous studies. ¶As a result, French ex-president Nicolas Sarkozy created a commission, headed by Joseph Stieglitz and Amartya Sen (both Nobel laureates), to examine alternatives to GDP. Their report recommended a shift in economic emphasis from simply the production of goods to a broader measure of overall well-being that would include measures for categories like health, education and security. It also called for greater focus on the societal effects of income inequality, new ways to measure the economic impact of sustainability and ways to include the value of wealth to be passed on to the next generation. Similarly, the king of Bhutan has developed a GDP alternative called gross national happiness, which is a composite of indicators that are much more directly related to human well-being than monetary measures. ¶ The form of capitalism we have today has evolved over centuries to reflect growing needs, but also has been warped by private interests. Yuval Levin points out that some key moral features of Adam Smith’s political economy have been corrupted in more recent times, most notably by “a growing collusion between government and large corporations.” This issue has become most vivid after the financial crisis and the failed policies that both preceded and succeeded that watershed event. The answers, as Auden Schendler and Mark Trexler point out, are both “policy solutions” and “corporations to advocate for those solutions.”¶ We can never have a clean slate¶ How will we get to the solutions for climate change? Let’s face it. Installing efficient LED light bulbs, driving the latest Tesla electric car and recycling our waste are admirable and desirable activities. But they are not going to solve the climate problem by reducing our **collective emissions** to a necessary level. To achieve that goal **requires systemic change**. To that end, **some argue for creating a new system to replace capitalism.** For example, Naomi Klein calls for “shredding the free-market ideology that has dominated the global economy for more than three decades.”¶ Klein is performing a valuable service with her call for extreme action. She, like Bill McKibben and his 350.org movement, is helping to make it possible for a conversation to take place over the magnitude of the challenge before us through what is called the “radical flank effect.”¶ All members and ideas of a social movement are viewed in contrast to others, and extreme positions can make other ideas and organizations seem more reasonable to movement opponents. For example, when Martin Luther King Jr first began speaking his message, it was perceived as too radical for the majority of white America. But when Malcolm X entered the debate, he pulled the radical flank further out and made King’s message look more moderate by comparison. Capturing this sentiment, Russell Train, second administrator of the EPA, once quipped, “Thank God for [environmentalist] Dave Brower; he makes it so easy for the rest of us to be reasonable.”¶ But **the nature of social change never allows us the clean slate that makes sweeping statements for radical change attractive.** Every set of institutions by which society is structured evolved from some set of structures that preceded it. Stephen Jay Gould made this point quite powerfully in his essay “The Creation Myths of Cooperstown,” where he pointed out that baseball was not invented by Abner Doubleday in Cooperstown New York in 1839. In fact, he points out, “no one invented baseball at any moment or in any spot.” It evolved from games that came before it. In a similar way, Adam Smith did not invent capitalism in 1776 with his book The Wealth of Nations. He was writing about changes that he was observing and had been taking place for centuries in European economies; most notably the division of labor and the improvements in efficiency and quality of production that were the result. ¶ In the same way, we **cannot simply invent a new system** to replace capitalism. Whatever form of commerce and interchange we adopt must **evolve out of the form we have at the present**. There is simply no other way. ¶ But one particularly difficult challenge of climate change is that, unlike Adam Smith’s proverbial butcher, brewer or baker who provide our dinner out of the clear alignment of their self-interest and our needs, climate change breaks the link between action and outcome in profound ways. A person or corporation cannot learn about climate change through direct experience. We cannot feel an increase in global mean temperature; we cannot see, smell or taste greenhouse gases; and we cannot link an individual weather anomaly with global climate shifts. ¶ A real appreciation of the issue requires an understanding of **large-scale systems** through “big data” models. Moreover, both the knowledge of these models and an appreciation for how they work require deep scientific knowledge about complex dynamic systems and the ways in which feedback loops in the climate system, time delays, accumulations and nonlinearities operate within them. Therefore, the evolution of capitalism to address climate change must, in many ways, be based on trust, belief and faith in stakeholders outside the normal exchange of commerce. To get to the next iteration of this centuries-old institution, we must envision the market through all components that help to establish the rules; corporations, government, civil society, scientists and others. ¶ The evolving role of the corporation in society¶ At the end of the day, the solutions to climate change must come from the market and more specifically, from business. The market is the most powerful institution on earth, and business is the most powerful entity within it. Business makes the goods and services we rely upon: the clothes we wear, the food we eat, the forms of mobility we use and the buildings we live and work in. ¶ Businesses can transcend national boundaries and possess resources that exceed that of many countries. **You can lament** that fact, **but it is a fact**. If business does not lead the way toward solutions for a carbon-neutral world, there will be no solutions.

**Economic valuation is key to the environment**

**Polasky 12** (Stephen, Professor of Ecological/Environmental Economics, University of Minnesota, Seth Binder, Summer 2012, Valuing the Environment for Decisionmaking, http://issues.org/28-4/polasky/)

Virtually all important environmental management and policy decisions have a wide range of effects. For example, zoning or development decisions about land use can have a variety of environmental impacts (for example, on local water and air quality, the potential for flooding downstream, carbon sequestration, and habitat for wildlife) as well as economic and social effects (on economic development, jobs, and income). Similarly, decisions on limits on emissions of air pollutants or greenhouse gases can affect a range of environmental, economic, and social concerns. These results affect multiple groups who often have very different views about desired outcomes (for example, developers versus environmentalists). Effects differ across geography (upstream versus downstream) and time (current versus future impacts). Choosing among management or policy options that differ in terms of environmental, economic, and social outcomes with spatial and temporal components may at first glance seem overwhelmingly complex, with dimensions that seem incomparable. Good environmental management and policy decisionmaking, however, necessitates systematic evaluation and consideration of the effects of management and policy on the affected public. **Even though the quantitative valuation of these effects will never be perfect**, the outcome of **attempts to assess value provides important information to help guide decisionmaking**.¶ ¶ Decisions, decisions¶ ¶ Management and policy decisions typically involve difficult tradeoffs that bring improvements in some dimensions and declines in others. Ultimately, deciding whether to choose management or policy alternative A or B requires an evaluation of whether A or B is “better,” where better is determined by the objectives of the decisionmaker. It is easy to conclude that one alternative is better than another if it is better in all dimensions. But making comparisons in which one alternative is better in some dimensions but worse in others requires making difficult value judgments. For example, clearing land for housing development may result in higher incomes and more jobs but reduce habitat for species and worsen local water quality. Whether land clearing is the right decision will depend on whether an increase in incomes and jobs is valued more highly than maintaining habitat and water quality. But how can one really compare income versus habitat for species or jobs versus water quality? Comparing across these different dimensions seems like comparing the proverbial apples and oranges. Reaching an environmental management or policy decision, though, requires the decisionmaker to compare apples and oranges, either explicitly or implicitly.¶ ¶ For an individual, deciding which college to attend, where to live, or what job to take is often a hard choice to make, in large part because it involves changes in multiple dimensions simultaneously. Moving to a new job in a new city may be a better professional opportunity and offer a new set of cultural amenities, but is it worth disrupting family life, moving away from friends, and making adjustments to a new community? Though it is difficult to compare such alternatives, people do make these decisions all the time. In choosing an option, taking account of all the factors, people make a determination that one option is better than the other available options.¶ ¶ As difficult as such choices can be for an individual, making environmental management and policy decisions adds yet another level of complexity. Such decisions affect many people simultaneously and thus require finding a way to aggregate values across different people to reach a decision. Management and policy decisions can make some groups better off while making others worse off, requiring a different sort of apples-and-oranges comparison.¶ ¶ Two methods used in such multidimensional, multiperson decisionmaking contexts are economic benefit/cost calculations and multicriteria decision analysis (MCDA). Each of these methods transforms a complex multidimensional problem involving multiple people into a single dimension that can be used to rank alternatives. These methods act like a blender that mixes apples and oranges to produce a fruit smoothie. Decisionmakers can then decide which fruit smoothie they like the best.¶ ¶ Economics reduces multidimensional problems to a single dimension by measuring the value of changes in each dimension with a common metric, which is typically, but not necessarily, a monetary metric. Economist8s tend to prefer a monetary metric because it is a pervasive, intuitive, and easily observable measure of the values that people attribute to an array of everyday goods and services. In wellfunctioning markets, the price of a good or service reflects its marginal value to the buyer measured in terms of the common monetary metric: what the buyer is willing to pay to have the good or service. This fact makes the marginal values of many very different goods and services commensurable. The concept extends even to environmental attributes that do not have a market value, such as clean air, as long as people are willing to make tradeoffs in their consumption of some market goods in order to obtain other nonmarket attributes.¶ ¶ The ability to measure values with a common monetary metric rests on two key premises. First, individual willingness to pay for an item is assumed to accurately represent the value of that item to the individual: that is, how much better off the individual is with the item than without the item, measured in monetary terms. Second, the aggregation of values to the societal level requires that the correspondence between willingness to pay and well-being be comparable across individuals, so that a measure of societal value is equal to the (appropriately weighted) sum of values across all individuals in society. This comparability is necessary in order to do benefit/cost analysis resulting in a single number that summarizes social net benefits.¶ ¶ With the ability to produce an aggregate social net benefit calculation for any policy option, the economic benefit/cost decision rule is simple: Choose the option that maximizes social net benefits. This simple rule can be extended to account for uncertainty by maximizing expected social net benefits, where net benefits for individuals can include risk aversion (that is, a willingness to pay to avoid being subjected to uncertain outcomes). The decision rule can also incorporate constraints that restrict outcomes, so that they do not violate minimum environmental standards or basic human rights. As noted, however, the social net benefit calculation requires that individuals evaluate multiple dimensions with a single monetary metric of value and that these values be comparable across individuals. Without such interpersonal comparability, management or policy changes resulting in both winners and losers cannot be evaluated. In this case, only alternatives in which everyone is better off are clearly superior, and such alternatives are extremely unlikely to emerge.¶ ¶ Benefit/cost calculations have been applied to a wide variety of environmental policies. All recent presidents, both Democratic and Republican, have required agencies to evaluate the benefits and costs of regulations, including environmental regulations. Executive Order 12866 signed by President Clinton in 1993 states that agencies “shall assess both the costs and the benefits of the intended regulation” and “in choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, agencies should select those approaches that maximize net benefits” The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has done extensive benefit/cost calculations of regulations, particularly regulations under the Clean Air Act. The EPA estimated that the 1990 Clean Air Act would provide benefits of $2 trillion between 1990 and 2020 while imposing costs of $65 billion, a benefit-to-cost ratio of approximately 30-to-1. A prior study of the benefits and costs of the Clean Air Act from 1970 to 1990 found a similarly large benefitto-cost ratio.¶ ¶ The economic benefit/cost approach to maximizing social net benefits may be thought of as belonging to the broader class of MCDA methods, all of which require explicit or implicit weighting of various attributes of expected outcomes of management or policy decisions. Although some MCDA methods accommodate only quantitative attributes, others also permit qualitative attributes. Given attributes and weights, different MCDA methods take different approaches to evaluating alternatives. Some methods seek to identify the best alternative, similar to the economic approach of maximizing social net benefits, while others, such as goal programming, seek to identify alternatives that meet certain thresholds of performance. In goal programming, aspirational or minimally acceptable thresholds are set for each criterion, and alternatives are evaluated according to the priority-weighted distances by which criteria fall short of these thresholds. In general, MCDA methods seek to maximize a social welfare function of a particular, often implicit, form.¶ ¶ Setting relative values¶ ¶ To be operational, benefit/cost and MCDA methods require information on relative values (weights) for different dimensions of value affected by environmental management or policy. Economics and decision sciences tend to take different approaches to assembling information about values. In economics, the values of different management or policy options are derived from aggregating the net benefits to individuals in society for that option. In decision sciences, a variety of methods are used to assemble information on weights to assign to different dimensions.¶ ¶ The task of the economist in understanding relative values for an individual is far easier for marketed goods and services than for nonmarketed environmental attributes. For marketed goods and services, economists use observations on how much is purchased at a given price over a range of different prices to construct a demand function. The demand function summarizes information on the willingness to pay of the individual for the good or service. In competitive markets, the supply function reflects the marginal cost of producing the good or service. Demand and supply can be used to define economic surplus, which is the difference between the (marginal) willingness to pay given by demand and the marginal cost of production given by supply. Summing up this difference over the entire quantity traded is equal to economic surplus; that is, the value generated from the production and consumption of the good or service.¶ ¶ Some environmental changes directly affect marketed goods and services, and the value of these effects can be evaluated by assessing the net change in economic surplus in the affected markets. Take, for example, the potential effects of excess nutrients in a body of water that cause dead zones (areas of low oxygen), resulting in lowered fish and shellfish populations and reduced commercial harvests. With basic information about consumer demand and the costs of supply, economists can estimate the expected loss in economic surplus from the reduction in harvests. Adjustments to economic surplus calculations are necessary when market imperfections, such as monopoly pricing, taxes, or subsidies, result in price distortions so that prices are not a true reflection of the value of marketed goods and services.¶ ¶ The concept of economic surplus (value) also applies to environmental attributes, such as clean air or access to natural areas, for which there is no market. Valuing nonmarket goods and services is more difficult, because there is no readily observable signal of value that is comparable to a marke8t price. Economists have devised a suite of nonmarket valuation tools that can be applied to value nonmarketed environmental attributes. Some nonmarket valuation methods use observable expenditure on a different marketed good or service to draw an inference about the value of the nonmarketed environmental attribute of interest. For example, housing prices may reflect the increased willingness to pay for housing in locations with better environmental amenities, such as access to lakes and parks or better air quality. The choice of where to recreate can reveal information about the relative value of environmental amenities that vary across recreation sites. Other methods of estimating value record changes in expenditures, such as changes in the cost to treat drinking water with changes in water quality.¶ ¶ Economists cannot use observed expenditures to value all important changes to the environment. For example, if all of the lakes in a region are polluted and no one uses them for recreation, it will be difficult to assess the value of reducing pollution on recreational value, unless one is willing to make inferences from other regions. More fundamentally, there are limited or no directly observable expenditures or other behavioral clues for some environment attributes, particularly non-use benefits such as knowing that species exist. In Antonio Briceño, Overfishing, from the Millions of Pieces: Only One Puzzle Project, Digital c-print on Fuji Crystal Archival paper, 21 x 60 inches, 2010. the absence of observable behavior, economists use survey questions to ask people about values for changes in environmental attributes. Such “stated preference” methods include contingent valuation and conjoint analysis. The contingent valuation method presents survey respondents with a hypothetical change in the environment, such as a 10% increase in the size of humpback whale populations, and asks whether they would be willing to pay a specified amount for the change. Varying the specified amount and observing the proportion of people saying yes generates information analogous to a demand curve for marketed goods and services. In conjoint analysis, people are asked to rank a series of outcomes that differ in the quantities of various attributes. Conjoint analysis allows direct evaluation of how people trade off one attribute versus another, such as an improvement in air quality versus greater access to open space. If one of the attributes is income or expenditure, then the analyst can also estimate willingness to pay.¶ ¶ Some actions, such as emissions of greenhouse gases, cause changes in multiple dimensions that occur over extended periods. For example, a change in carbon storage in ecosystems that reduces atmospheric concentrations causes changes in climate forcing and ocean acidification, which in turn affect myriad other environmental attributes, including precipitation patterns, with effects on agricultural production, the probability and severity of flooding, and the health of marine resources, among others. Summarizing the value of all these changes into a single estimate of the social cost of carbon (SCC) requires complex integrated assessment models that predict both environmental and economic outcomes and attach estimates of the value of those outcomes. Further complicating matters, SCC estimates depend on levels of emissions that can be affected by the very policy choice that SCC is meant to inform. For this reason and others, such as the choice of social discount rate, the estimates of the SCC range from near zero to hundreds of dollars per ton of carbon.¶ ¶ Instead of the often-complex process of economic valuation, MCDA typically relies on a set of alternative methods for establishing relative values or weights on different criteria, to be chosen by the decisionmakers. The identification of weights may be done by introspection, deliberation, or negotiation—or some combination of the three—among stakeholders. Setting relative weights may also be done as part of an iterative process in which alternatives are evaluated, weights reassessed in light of the evaluation, and new criteria weights applied.¶ ¶ One example of how relative weights for different criteria are set in MCDA is through application of the analytical hierarchy process. In this process, decisionmakers are asked to determine a set of top-level criteria, and within each of these to determine the subcomponent criteria. They are then asked to rank the relative importance of criteria at each level of the hierarchy. For example, suppose a decisionmaker is evaluating policies aimed at controlling non–point-source pollution from agriculture with two overarching criteria of water quality and economic effects. If these criteria are assigned equal importance, then each receives a weight of 0.5. At the next level of hierarchy, suppose that the water quality criteria include water clarity, dissolved oxygen content, and temperature, and that the economic criteria include farm income and jobs. If the decisionmaker believes that water clarity is twice as important as dissolved oxygen, and dissolved oxygen is twice as important as temperature, their weights at this level of hierarchy are 4/7, 2/7, and 1/7, respectively. Suppose that jobs are ranked as twice as important as farm income, then the weights would be 2/3 and 1/3. The overall weights in the analysis would then be 0.5 times these values: 2/7 for water clarity, 1/7 for dissolved oxygen content, 1/14 for water temperature, 1/3 for jobs, and 1/6 for farm income.¶ ¶ A potentially important difference between economic and MCDA approaches to valuation is in whose values are incorporated. In principle, valuation in benefit/cost assessments includes the value of everyone affected by management or policy choices, though in practice there may be questions about whether economic valuation methods accurately reflect societal values. In MCDA, it is typically a smaller subset of people that is involved in setting relative weights. For local-scale problems, MCDA methods could include all affected parties in a deliberative process, but as the scale of the problem grows, this will not be possible. For larger-scale environmental problems, ranging up to global concerns such as climate change, there is the question of representation and whether those present adequately reflect the views of the wider public. In addition, relative weights in MCDA should not be treated as constant but should reflect changes in circumstances, something that is typically captured in economic valuation methods.¶ ¶ Weighty issues¶ ¶ Any environmental management or policy decision is likely to entail winners and losers. How should the distribution of benefits and costs across groups be treated in environmental management and policy decisions? Critics of benefit/cost analysis contend that reliance on economic valuation systematically disadvantages those with less money. Greater wealth means greater ability (and thus willingness) to pay, so benefit/cost analysis effectively gives more weight to those with more money (“voting with dollars”). One way to answer this criticism is to give a higher weight to the values of those with less wealth. Economists have found considerable evidence of diminishing marginal utility of income, meaning that the value of an additional dollar to a poor person is greater than to a rich person. This fact can be used to justify “equity weights” based on differences in wealth. For example, an equity weight argument would mean that otherwise equal damages from future climate change should be given greater weight in low-income countries than in high-income countries. In addition, if society is committed to protecting the interests of particular groups, it can constrain consideration of options to those that achieve specified distributional goals.¶ ¶ Since the effects of alternative environmental management and policy options will differ across generations, a fundamental challenge in valuing environmental management and policy decisions is how to aggregate benefits and costs that accrue to current and future generations (inter-generational distribution). For example, more aggressive climate change mitigation strategies impose costs on the current generation but generate benefits for future generations.Economists typically use discounting to aggregate benefits and costs over time. The standard economic rationale for discounting is that investments yield a positive expected real rate of return, so that having a dollar today is worth more than having a dollar in the future. Costs and benefits realized at different points in time are thus commensurable in present value terms after discounting.¶ ¶ The standard discounting approach works well for nearterm private investment decisions, but what about for longterm social decisions affecting the welfare of future generations? If one accepts the principle of equal moral standing of all generations, there would seem to be little ethical justification for discounting future welfare. Frank Ramsay, the father of economic approaches to discounting and growth theory, maintained that it was “ethically indefensible” to treat the welfare of current and future generations differently. However, to the extent that future generations are expected to be better off than the current generation, discounting can be justified as an intergenerational application of equity weights. By the same principle, if environmental conditions worsen significantly and future generations are expected to be less well off than the present generation, this would imply a negative discount rate; that is, discounting of present benefits relative to future benefits. As recent debates on climate change policy aptly illustrate, there is little agreement among economists, or between economists and others, on discounting.¶ ¶ Uncertainty is a central issue in environmental management and policy. Uncertainty enters at various steps in the link between management and policy choices and eventual effects on the value of outcomes. There can be uncertainty about how changes in management or policy affect choices made by individuals and businesses (behavioral uncertainty), how changes in human actions affect the environment (scientific uncertainty), and how consequent changes in the environment will affect human well-being (value uncertainty). Recent work on the value of ecosystems services illustrates each of these uncertainties. For example, the Conservation Reserve Program, which pays landowners for taking land out of production and restores perennial vegetation, can shift patterns of land use and, in turn, result in changes in carbon sequestration, water quality, and habitat provision. Program participation and the provision of services depend on the choices of individual landowners, which are uncertain. There are key gaps in the science linking land use to service provision, such as how changes in land use will affect changes in carbon storage in soil or populations of particular species, making provision uncertain even when behavioral uncertainty is ignored. There are also key gaps in information pertaining to the link between services and benefits, making value uncertain even if provision is known. The value of water quality improvement, for example, depends as much on who uses the water and for what purpose as on the water quality itself.¶ ¶ Economic approaches typically use an expected utility framework to deal with uncertainty, where the value of each potential outcome is weighted by its probability of occurrence. This approach summarizes expected social net benefits across dimensions, as discussed above, but also across all possible outcomes that could occur given a management or policy choice. Using the expected utility framework, however, requires information about probabilities as well as values under all potential outcomes. For environmental issues involving complex system dynamics, such as climate change or the provision of ecosystem services, the list of possible outcomes in the future may be unknown, much less how to specify probabilities or likely values for each of these outcomes. Beyond the challenge of scientific uncertainty, there may also be uncertainty about the preferences of future generation and how they will value various outcomes. Inability to objectively quantify probabilities or values requires modifying expected utility, such as by using subjective judgments to establish probabilities or values, or setting bounds on decisions thought to pose unacceptable risks (for example, safe minimum standards). A particular challenge to making decisions under uncertainty arises from consideration of catastrophic outcomes. It is difficult to set probabilities on such events because they are rare, but small changes in assumptions about these probabilities can lead to large changes in policy advice.¶ ¶ People make mistakes, often in systematic and predictable ways. They tend to be overly optimistic, biased toward the present, and averse to losses. They have trouble thinking through complex problems, especially those with uncertainty. Given these facts, some analysts question the validity of using valuation studies that rely on observed choices, survey responses, or even deliberative processes among affected parties as an important input for setting environmental policy**. The alternative**, however, **would be to delegate judgments about the relative value of outcomes to political leaders or scientific experts**. Elected leaders, at least in theory, should reflect public values. Environmental scientists, however, have no special claim to understanding public values. In either case, there is no guarantee that top-down decisions will reflect the underlying values of the public at large any better than an imperfect reflection of values gathered through valuation exercises.¶ ¶ In principle, economic valuation methods can estimate value for all environmental attributes, either through inferences from observable behavior or responses in stated preference surveys. In practice, however, it is generally not possible to get a complete economic assessment of all environmental values. Some values connected with the environment are notoriously difficult to assess in monetary terms. For example, what is the monetary value of conserving species with important spiritual or cultural value? Some critics contend that individuals are cognitively incapable of evaluating tradeoffs between utilitarian goods (such as commodities and ecosystem services) and moral goods (such as the existence of a species). There are sharp disagreements between psychologists and economists—and among economists themselves—on this point. Even when it is possible in principle to estimate monetary values, there may be insufficient data to do so. Nevertheless, economic methods can provide evidence about the value of many important environmental attributes.¶ ¶ The value of valuation¶ ¶ Though difficult, collecting information about the relative values of alternative potential outcomes, in all of their multiple dimensions, is vital to good environmental management and policy decisionmaking. Setting environmental policy is not simply a matter of applying the best science, as important as that is. **Environmental management and policy typically involve making decisions about tradeoffs** among multiple objectives about which society cares. **Making decisions about such tradeoffs involves making value judgments.** If these judgments are to improve human wellbeing, they should reflect the underlying values of individuals affected by the policy.¶ ¶ Economic valuation methods applied in the context of environmental management and policy seek to inform decisionmaking by collecting information about the value of alternatives to affected individuals and then aggregating these values to determine an estimate of social net benefits. In simple benefit/cost analysis, the management or policy option with the highest social net benefits should then be the preferred option. The great advantage of the simple benefit/cost approach is that it incorporates economic valuation methods to represent values of the affected public, summarizes this information into a single ranking, and uses this ranking to help guide policy. Valuation information can also be combined with other decisions rules, such as those that minimize the risk of bad outcomes occurring.

**Radical alternatives pave the way for authoritarian environmentalism.**

Simon **HAILWOOD**, Philosophy @ Liverpool, **‘4** [*How to be a Green Liberal*, 2004, p. 155-156]

For me, **the main worry** emerging from such considerations **is not that liberal societies are incapable of embracing meaningful change towards "eco-sanity**", such that anarchism is the only hope. That hope seems more unrealistic - more utopian in that sense - than that of liberal reform. **The main worry is that those from the authoritarian end of the spectrum will convince people that the liberal mainstream is inherently incapable of reform, and** so **must be replaced by more coercive forms of green politics**, **and people from the radical left will help with the critique**, **provide no realistic, non-utopian alternative** themselves, **thus leaving the door open for the "Leviathan or oblivion" school: nakedly authoritarian, radically hierarchical programmes** regarding substantive political equality as an obstacle to progress. 10) Sometimes the point about the practical need to oppose the state is made with impatience about philosophy and abstract theorizing. This does not apply to Carter. But it does to Sale, for example, who denounces abstract philosophical discussion of ethical responses to the "environmental crisis", mainly because dithering over abstruse conceptual matters is to ignore the simple practical issue of scale. '°4 **It would be better if those with such powerful rhetorical skills used them to further the green cause as continuous with furthering the liberal cause against** more **reactionary elements**. Perhaps this is **particularly** true **in the USA**, **clearly the main player in the scientific-industrial-capitalist global order and, in terms of environmental policy agenda**, in various ways a beacon of unreconstructed unreason. **That would** probably **be of greater practical benefit than giving fellow citizens of the modern world a collection of quasi-religiose blueprinting ideas** coloured with the dismal tinge of an anxious instrumentalism. That is, **it seems more practically feasible to seek to work with the flow of modernity in order to help channel it on to a course more respectful of nature**. That it is, in principle, possible to do this within the terms of what is often taken to be the main political philosophy of modernity, has been the point of this book.

**Command and control and regulations don’t set a price signal – invites litigation not innovation**

**Hsu 11** (Shi-Ling Hsu, Professor of Law at University of British Columbia – previously Associate Prof at George Washington School of Law, Senior Attorney & Economist for the Environmental Law Institute The Case for a Carbon Tax: Getting Past our Hang-ups to Effective Climate Policy, Island Press] Page 33-34)

In the United States, command-and-control regulation of green- house gas emissions would fall under the ambit of the Clean Air Act. The EPA, having issued the finding that greenhouse gas emissions,"18 "endanger" the "public health and welfare, is empowered to issue regulations, industry by industry, pertaining to greenhouse gas reduction measures that will be requited as a condition of a permit under the Clean Air Act. The Canadian counterpart to EPA, Environment Canada, issued an analogous finding far earlier (in 2005), that green- house gases fell within a statutory definition of "toxic substances," in that they, among other effects, "have or may have an immediate or long-term harmful effect on the environment or its biological diver- sitv."19 Environment Canada is thus also positioned to issue command- and-control-style greenhouse gas regulations, although other forms of regulation are possible under the Canadian statute.

One might think that command-and-control regulation, by potentially imposing the highest price on emitters, would be the most effective in re-ordering economies to be lower-carbon. The mistake is to equate an administrative price with a market price. Under command- and-control regulation, an administrative price is imposed by an agency. This price need not bear any relation to greenhouse gas emissions. Most often, the key consideration in setting standards is the state of technology of pollution abatement. If abatement technology seems "cheap" or "feasible," then it likely factors into the setting of an administrative standard. This is, in very rough measure, an agency's at- tempt to balance costs and benefits: if requiring abatement technology seems somehow "worth it," by an eyeball estimate of the compliance costs and environmental benefits, then it becomes law.

Over the past several decades, command-and-control regulation has been continuously and successfully attacked on efficiency grounds. The most common arguments ate that: (i) command-and-control **regulation is clumsy**, its uniformity of standards **sometimes too stringent** and **sometimes too lenient**, resulting in wasteful over-abatement m some cases and missed opportunities to abate more in other cases, (ii) fails to strike a correct balance between costs and benefits as administrative agencies make poor guesses about compliance costs, (iii) being a fixed administrative price, fails to offer incentives for emitters to **find innovative ways of reducing emissions**, and (iv) provides **fodder for delay and litigation** by well-funded and disgruntled industry groups.

These well-rehearsed criticisms are thoroughly treated elsewhere. I argue here that, in addition to these arguments, command-and- control **regulation sends an uneven price signal** to greenhouse gas emitters. While there is controversy over the amount of damages from greenhouse gas emissions, it is still worth making the price proportional to greenhouse gas emissions. Command-and-**c**ontrol regulation, be- cause it imposes a different requirement for each industry, imposes a different price for each industry. A price signal that is different from one industry to another **is no price signal at all**, if the goal is to sort industries by carbon emissions. If the price wanes from industry to industry, then the sorting is not accomplished by carbon emissions, but by an administrative agency. Moreover, command-and-control regulation has in the past generated so much litigation, the **administrative "price" often does not emerge at all**. Because the locus of so much decision making and adjudication is at the administrative agency, and be- cause these decisions and adjudications invariably invite comparisons with those that affect other industries, perceptions of unfairness (accurate or not) run rampant through command-and-control regulation. So not only does an uneven price signal frustrate greenhouse gas reduction objectives, but sometimes litigation or just the threat of litigation **erases the price signal completely.**

# 1AC

## 1AC---Warming

### 1AC---Plan

**Resolved: The United States Federal Government should substantially increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by energy companies by expanding the scope of its core antitrust laws to account for “total welfare” and determining that failure to pay an upstream carbon fee on greenhouse gas emissions, with all revenue reimbursed as dividends to the population, is anticompetitive conduct.**

### 1AC---Warming

#### The advantage is warming:

**The consumer welfare relies on a “market failure” approach that is impossible to prove and fails to address systemic risks like climate change. Only expanding the scope of the CWS to account for total welfare can address systematic failure.**

**Miazad 21** (Amelia Miazad is Founding Director and Senior Research Fellow of the Business in Society Institute at Berkeley Law., “PROSOCIAL ANTITRUST”, Prosocial Antitrust (March 11, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3802194 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3802194)

While courts **routinely dismiss noneconomic or “non-welfare” justifications**, precisely what procompetitive reasons come into play is, as Justice Stevens famously stated, “an absolute mystery”.242 As Professor John Newman points out, the “relevant case law reveals multiple competing approaches and seemingly irreconcilable opinions” on what constitutes “beneficial”.243 After all, whether a particular activity is beneficial necessarily begs the question— beneficial to what end? Professor Newman traces this confusion to the use of three different tests by courts:

Under the “market failure” approach, a valid justification is present if—and only if—the challenged restraint alleviates a market failure. Alternatively, the “competitive process” approach attempts to condemn restraints that harm (and bless restraints that benefit) “competition” itself or the so-called “competitive process”. Lastly, the “type of effect” approach appears to offer a shortcut: simply identify the effects of the challenged restraint, then ascertain whether they align with a pre-approved typology of virtuous marketplace effects (e.g., higher output, lower prices, etc.).244

This Article agrees with Professor Newman’s doctrinal, normative, and practical arguments in favor of the market failure test.245 Most contemporary courts also hold that “alleviating a market failure is an acceptable procompetitive justification.”246 But the market failure test is fundamentally at odds with the market reality of **increasing universal ownership**. Two limitations explain its inability to account for systematic and portfolio-wide risks. First, the market failure test relies on the prevailing consumer welfare standard.247 That generally means that a particular restraint of trade must alleviate a market failure by increasing consumer surplus in order for courts to deem it a valid procompetitive justification.248 By fastening market failure to consumer welfare, the market failure test becomes indistinguishable from the “type of effect” approach, which also focuses on measurable impacts on consumers including output and price. Second, **the market failure test assumes the perspective of a single market, preventing it from capturing portfolio-wide systemic risks like climate change.**

To be clear, this Article is not arguing that antitrust law should abandon the consumer welfare standard and expand its purview to encompass noneconomic impacts. Rather, it argues that **the consumer welfare standard is too narrow to account for economic impacts on a portfolio-wide level.** The **total welfare standard** is most closely aligned with the market reality of universal ownership, although it has been largely abandoned by courts.249 It seeks to maximize the total surplus of all participants in a market, including consumers and producers. The total welfare test’s aggregate value approach is more closely aligned with universal ownership, but it also analyzes an individual market—as opposed to market-wide impacts— because a so-called “general equilibrium analysis” is impractical. Developing a standard that aligns with the market reality of concentrated ownership is beyond the scope of this Article. This Article does argue, however, that **the current consumer welfare standard impedes collaboration to address systematic economic risks**, as the next Part explores

**Climate change is a system disruptor and a risk amplifier---only mitigation prevents biodiversity loss, marine ecosystem collapse, resource wars, global food scarcity, and extreme weather events. Uniquely—has disparate impacts.**

**Pachauri & Meyer 15** (Rajendra K. Pachauri Chairman of the IPCC, Leo Meyer Head, Technical Support Unit IPCC were the editors for this IPCC report, “Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report” <http://epic.awi.de/37530/1/IPCC_AR5_SYR_Final.pdf> IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, 151 pp)

SPM 2.3 Future risks and impacts caused by a changing climate

Climate change will **amplify existing risks** and **create new risks for natural and human systems**. Risks are unevenly distributed and are generally greater for disadvantaged people and communities in countries at all levels of development. {2.3}

Risk of climate-related impacts results from the interaction of climate-related hazards (including hazardous events and trends) with the vulnerability and exposure of human and natural systems, including their ability to adapt. Rising rates and **magnitudes of warming** and other changes in the climate system, **accompanied by ocean acidification**, increase the risk of severe, pervasive and in some cases irreversible detrimental impacts. Some risks are particularly relevant for individual regions (Figure SPM.8), while others are global. The overall risks of future climate change impacts can be reduced by **limiting the rate and magnitude of climate change**, including ocean acidification. The precise levels of climate change sufficient to trigger abrupt and irreversible change remain uncertain, but the risk associated with **crossing such thresholds increases with rising temperature** (medium confidence). For risk assessment, it is important to evaluate the **widest possible range of impacts**, including low-probability outcomes with large consequences. {1.5, 2.3, 2.4, 3.3, Box Introduction.1, Box 2.3, Box 2.4}

A large fraction of species faces **increased extinction risk** due to climate change during and beyond the 21st century, especially as climate change interacts with other stressors (high confidence). Most plant species cannot naturally shift their geographical ranges sufficiently fast to keep up with current and high projected rates of climate change in most landscapes; most small mammals and freshwater molluscs will not be able to keep up at the rates projected under RCP4.5 and above in flat landscapes in this century (high confidence). Future risk is indicated to be high by the observation that natural global climate change at rates lower than current anthropogenic climate change caused significant ecosystem shifts and species extinctions during the past millions of years. **Marine organisms will face progressively low**er **oxygen levels** and high rates and magnitudes of ocean acidification (high confidence), with associated risks exacerbated by rising ocean temperature extremes (medium confidence). **Coral reefs and polar ecosystems are highly vulnerable**. Coastal systems and low-lying areas are at risk from sea level rise, which will continue for centuries even if the global mean temperature is stabilized (high confidence). {2.3, 2.4, Figure 2.5}

Climate change is projected to undermine food security (Figure SPM.9). Due to projected climate change by the mid-21st century and beyond, global marine species redistribution and marine biodiversity reduction in sensitive regions will **challenge the sustained provision of fisheries** productivity and other ecosystem services (high confidence). For wheat, rice and maize in tropical and temperate regions, climate change without adaptation is projected to negatively impact production for local temperature increases of 2°C or more above late 20th century levels, although individual locations may benefit (medium confidence). Global temperature increases of ~4°C or more 13 above late 20th century levels, combined with increasing food demand, would pose large risks to **food security globally** (high confidence). Climate change is projected to reduce renewable **surface water and groundwater resources** in most dry subtropical regions (robust evidence, high agreement), **intensifying competition for water among sectors** (limited evidence, medium agreement). {2.3.1, 2.3.2}

Until mid-century, projected climate change will impact human health mainly by exacerbating health problems that already exist (very high confidence). Throughout the 21st century, climate change is expected to lead to **increases in ill-health** in many regions and especially in developing countries with low income, as compared to a baseline without climate change (high confidence). By 2100 for RCP8.5, the combination of high temperature and humidity in some areas for parts of the year is expected to compromise common human activities, including growing food and working outdoors (high confidence). {2.3.2}

In urban areas climate change is projected to increase risks for people, assets, economies and ecosystems, including risks from **heat stress**, **storms** and **extreme precipitation**, **inland and coastal flooding,** **landslides**, **air pollution**, **drought**, **water scarcity**, **sea level rise** and storm surges (very high confidence). These risks are amplified for those lacking essential infrastructure and services or living in exposed areas. {2.3.2}

Rural areas are expected to experience major impacts on water availability and supply, food security, infrastructure and agricultural incomes, including shifts in the production areas of food and non-food crops around the world (high confidence). {2.3.2}

**Aggregate economic losses accelerate with increasing temperature** (limited evidence, high agreement), but global economic impacts from climate change are currently difficult to estimate. From a poverty perspective, **climate change impacts are projected to slow down economic growth**, make poverty reduction more difficult, further erode food security and prolong **existing and create new poverty traps**, the latter particularly in urban areas and emerging hotspots of hunger (medium confidence). International dimensions such as trade and relations among states are also important for understanding the risks of climate change at regional scales. {2.3.2}

Climate change is projected to increase displacement of people (medium evidence, high agreement). Populations that lack the resources for planned migration experience higher exposure to extreme weather events, particularly in developing countries with low income. **Climate change can indirectly increase risks of violent conflicts** by amplifying well-documented drivers of these conflicts such as poverty and economic shocks (medium confidence). {2.3.2}

**Climate change is a regressive social inequity**

**Levy & Patz 15** (Barry S.LevyMD, MPH Jonathan A.PatzMD, MPH, “Climate Change, Human Rights, and Social Justice”, Annals of Global Health Volume 81, Issue 3, May–June 2015, Pages 310-322)

The environmental and health consequences of climate change, which disproportionately affect low-income countries and poor people in high-income countries, **profoundly affect human rights and social justice**. Environmental consequences include increased temperature, excess precipitation in some areas and droughts in others, extreme weather events, and increased sea level. These consequences adversely affect agricultural production, access to safe water, and worker productivity, and, by inundating land or making land uninhabitable and uncultivatable, **will force many people to become environmental refugees**. Adverse health effects caused by climate change include heat-related disorders, vector-borne diseases, foodborne and waterborne diseases, respiratory and allergic disorders, malnutrition, collective violence, and mental health problems.

These environmental and health **consequences threaten civil and political rights** and economic, social, and cultural rights, including rights to life, access to safe food and water, health, security, shelter, and culture. On a national or local level, those people who are most vulnerable to the adverse environmental and health consequences of climate change include poor people, members of minority groups, women, children, older people, people with chronic diseases and disabilities, those residing in areas with a high prevalence of climate-related diseases, and workers exposed to extreme heat or increased weather variability. On a global level, there is much inequity, with low-income countries, which **produce the least** greenhouse gases (**GHGs**), being more adversely affected by climate change than high-income countries, which produce substantially higher amounts of GHGs yet are less immediately affected. In addition, low-income countries have far less capability to adapt to climate change than high-income countries.

**Mitigation is the silver bullet increasing levels of climate change exponentially increase its negative consequences**

**Letzter 19** (Rafi, Staff writer for Live Science citing – Katharine Mach, a climate scientist at the University of Miami and one of several lead authors of the IPCC report., Lini Wollenberg, a University of Vermont climate researcher and leader of the CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security, Colin Carlson, an ecologist at Georgetown University who studies how climate change influences infectious diseases, 9/26/19, “Are We Really Running Out of Time to Stop Climate Change?”, https://www.livescience.com/12-years-to-stop-climate-change.html)

But ultimately, all the researchers Live Science contacted said these **problems become less catastrophic with less warming**. Holding the world to a 1.5-C warming increase by the end of the century creates much more manageable short- and long-term problems than holding it to 2 C of warming, which is much less harmful to Earth than 3 C, which is much more survivable than 4 C, which is still less catastrophic than 6 C … and so on. None of those possible futures necessarily leads to a charred, lifeless global desert in our lifetimes. But **each increase is** almost **unimaginably more dire for life on this planet than the one preceding it.**

"**It's always worth it to prevent more warming,"** Mach said.

With regard to the spread of mosquito-borne diseases, Carlson said, "**We can stop it.** **Mitigating climate change is truly the silver bullet**. Sometimes it is as simple as, 'If we stop climate change, we can stop a lot of the bad health impacts that are coming.'" (Though the devil is in the details, he added. **The level of disease reduction will depend on how fast the carbon-mitigation project moves**, and its effects won't be felt immediately or equally everywhere.)

The science points relentlessly to one reality: **The best way to deal with climate change is to start cutting emissions now.** It's easier to stop warming by keeping CO2 in the ground now than it is to pull carbon out of the air later. **And mitigation makes adaptation much more effective.**

**AND--short term mitigation matters--the impact is exponential and increasing.**

**Desjardins 13** – member of Concordia university Media Relations Department, academic writer, citing Damon Matthews; associate professor of the Department of Geography, Planning and Environment at Concordia University, PhD, Member of the Global Environmental and Climate Change Center

(Cléa, “Global Warming: Irreversible but Not Inevitable,” http://www.concordia.ca/now/what-we-do/research/20130402/global-warming-irreversible-but-not-inevitable.php)

Carbon dioxide emission cuts will **immediately affect** the rate of future global warming Concordia and MIT researchers show Montreal, April 2, 2013 – There is a persistent misconception among both scientists and the public that there is a delay between emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and the climate’s response to those emissions. This misconception has led policy makers to argue that CO2 emission cuts implemented now will not affect the climate system for many decades. This **erroneous line of argument** makes the climate problem **seem more intractable** than it actually is, say Concordia University’s Damon Matthews and MIT’s Susan Solomon in a recent Science article. The researchers show that **immediate decreases** in CO2 emissions would in fact result in an **immediate decrease** in the rate of climate warming. Explains Matthews, professor in the Department of Geography, Planning and Environment, “If we can successfully decrease CO2 emissions in the near future, this change will be felt by the climate system when the emissions reductions are implemented **– not in several decades**." “The potential for a **quick climate response** to prompt cuts in CO2 emissions opens up the possibility that the climate benefits of emissions reductions would occur on the same timescale as the political decisions themselves.” In their paper, Matthews and Solomon, Ellen Swallow Richards professor of Atmospheric Chemistry and Climate Science, show that the onus for slowing the rate of global warming falls squarely on current efforts at **reducing CO2 emissions**, and the resulting future emissions that we produce. This means that there are critical implications for the equity of carbon emission choices currently being discussed internationally. Total emissions from developing countries may soon exceed those from developed nations. But developed countries are expected to maintain a far higher per-capita contribution to present and possible future warming. “This disparity clarifies the urgency for low-carbon technology investment and diffusion to enable developing countries to continue to develop,” says Matthews. “Emission **cuts made now** will have an **immediate effect** on the rate of global warming,” he asserts. “I see more hope for averting difficult-to-avoid negative impacts by accelerating advances in technology development and diffusion, than for averting climate system changes that are already inevitable. Given the enormous scope and complexity of the climate mitigation challenge, clarifying these points of hope is critical to motivate change.”

**Antitrust is historically a weapon of the elite, but it can be revitalized for public goods like climate change**

V. **Sodano** **2010.** University of Naples Federico II, Department of Agricultural Economics. “Food system and climate change: the false premises of antitrust Policy”

Introduction

According to recent estimates (IAASTD, 2008), the global food system is currently accountable for at least 30% of the global GHG emissions that cause climate change. Considering also emissions by indirect activities associated with food production and distribution, such as home storage and refrigerators, waste disposal, transportation by final consumers and so on, this estimate may rise dramatically to as high as nearly 50% of total emissions (Grain, 2009). Agribusiness corporations, backing a model of food production and distribution that functions by converting oil into food, are largely responsible for these huge emissions. Influencing the behaviour of food TNCs in such a way as to shift towards a more sustainable food model may greatly contribute to tackling global warming. Actions to induce food corporations to assume a more sustainable form of conduct come from both the private and the public sector. On the private sector side initiatives come from consumers (individuals and consumer associations), environmental associations and non governmental organizations. On the public sector side, there are at least three kinds of intervention: (1) direct regulation, based on a command-and-control approach; (2) ‘soft regulation’, including self-regulation, use of incentives, awards and accreditation systems, market-based initiatives, disclosure obligations and educational campaigns; (3) definitions of duties of corporations, through corporate law and competition policy. The paper stresses that, given that **reducing GHG emissions is comparable to a public good**, **only state intervention may be expected to be effective**. Moreover, given that corporations cannot be granted the same moral status as natural persons, even soft regulation, which requires some form of corporate social responsibility and therefore of corporate morality, cannot be effective. With regards to state intervention the paper analyzes the role of **competition policy**, showing how it **can help in fighting global warming, provided that it overcomes** the over thirty year lasting dominance of **the ‘Chicago paradigm’**. Global warming mitigation: the role of public and private sector It is a matter of fact that induced climate change is representative of a tragedy of the commons, a typical collective action problem. Maintaining a stable climate has the structure of a public good exhibiting both the property of non excludability and non rivalry. The free riding problem, i.e. the fact that non contributors can benefit from others’ GHG reductions without taking on costs themselves, prevents private rational actors from engaging in mitigation efforts. Beyond being a public good, the protection of a stable climate that fits human biological and economic needs, **can be considered to be a human right**. In particular, it is of the kind of second generation human rights, i.e. economic and social rights, grounded in the notion that government has affirmative obligations to protect individuals from deprivation of the basic material necessities of life. In the case of public goods, economic and social theories based on rational choice models hold that the market (i.e. the private sector) fails to supply them. Therefore**, the only effective provider is the state**, as the latter has the precise political mandate to accommodate for general public welfare against scattered private interests. With regards to human rights the general view is that the state has the ultimate duty to uphold them. The state can intervene either directly or indirectly. Direct interventions include: public investments in global warming mitigation; setting compulsory standards in defence of low emission production and consumption activities; imposing human rights duties on corporations for climate change and environmental harm; implementing tort liability laws that make private actors pay for damage to climate and environment. Indirect interventions include: market based incentives aimed at promoting private climate friendly behaviour; embracing a voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) approach that shifts the burden of public interest onto corporations, which are deemed to possess other-regarding preferences and moral values. In this paper it is claimed that only direct intervention can be effective because, in the case of market-based instruments, it may apply the same sources of market failure that the intervention seeks to correct. The voluntary CSR approach is not viable because it hinges on the false premise that corporations have the same moral status as natural persons. The moral status of corporations endorsed by scholars like French (French, 1984) is to be rejected when the three necessary conditions for moral agency are examined: the ability to intend an action; the ability to perform an action; the ability to autonomously choose an intentional action. In the case of conglomerate collectives, such as corporations, these conditions are not fulfilled (Ronnegard, 2006: 82) and therefore they do not qualify as moral agents conceived as distinct from their members. Consequently, corporate moral responsibility attributions to collectives as distinct from their corporate members are illegitimate. Competition policy and climate change: the perspective of the Chicago school Given that only direct intervention by the state can assure adequate levels of global warming mitigation, the issue to be addressed is what role competition policy, among other forms of public intervention, can have in promoting corporate climate friendly behaviour. Competition policy originated in the US in 1890 with the Sherman Act. In the European Union the first antitrust regulation was set by the treaty of Rome in 1957. There are commonly described three historical phases of US antitrust law implementation, the first dating from 1890 to 1940, the second from 1945 to 1975 and the third from 1970 to the present (Viscusi et al., 2005). These three phases have been characterized by different economic and political theories incorporating two different ideologies of the market and the state: the evolutionary vision and the intentional vision (Page, 2008). The evolutionary vision views the market, framed solely by laws on property and contracts, as a mechanism for facilitating free exchanges among countless individuals in the pursuit of their best interests. In this vision, the market without state intervention naturally tends to a perfect competition ideal form destroying monopoly. On the contrary, the intentional vision views the market as a mechanism within which powerful interests can coerce consumers, labour and small businesses. In this vision markets tend toward monopoly unless government intervenes. The political economic theories corresponding to these two visions are the laissez-faire and the welfare state theories. The more the intentional vision is preferred to the evolutionary vision, the greater is the scope and the enforcement of antitrust law, and vice versa. The Sherman Act and the first period of antitrust law implementation embodied a compromise between the two visions. Notwithstanding the faith in the market, coherent with a strong liberal theory of the state, it was recognized as a matter of fact that monopolies and extreme economic power concentrations actually occur in the real world, producing social inequalities and injustice. At that time, state intervention was intended as a way to promote social justice and mediate among class conflicts in society. In the second period, the intentional view prevailed. Stemming from the disillusionment with markets during the Great Depression, the New Deal initiated the era of the welfare state based on the idea, supported by the growing economic literature on market failure, that economic state intervention should be legitimated by efficiency more than by equity concerns. The years between 1950 and 1970 are the golden era of antitrust legislation. The view of the markets taken up by the Court was that of recognition that coercion is the reality of market relationships. That is to say that in contrast with the previous ideological faith in the freedom of contracts, it was acknowledged that in a market transaction each party may be forced by the bargaining power of the other to accept unfair payments and obligations. Along with these views, the then prevailing theory of industrial organization, the structure-conduct-performance paradigm, facilitated a strong enforcement of antitrust legislation, holding that the mere measure of market share was sufficient to witness the presence of market power and monopoly inefficiencies. By the mid-1970s the evolutionary view completely dismissed the intentional view with the uprising of the so called Chicago school of antitrust. Chicago scholars applying neoclassical economics maintained that unfettered markets always lead to the best social outcomes. They pointed out that many of the practices that the courts had been viewing as harmful to competition and economic welfare, such as vertical restraints, may instead improve economic efficiency. Moreover they contested the structuralist view by claiming that a firm’s large market share may signal superior efficiency and that, consistently with the contestability theory (Baumol et al., 1982), freedom of entry is the only parameter to be scrutinized by antitrust laws. The general wisdom of the Chicago school was that state intervention and regulation is always harmful to the general interest. The Chicago ‘revolution’ has made competition policy a useless instrument for reaching goals of general interest such as providing public goods and promoting social justice. **In order to make competition policy a useful instrument against global warming,** it is necessary to reject some assumptions of the **Chicago antitrust school** and revive instead the conventional wisdom of the previous approaches in the wake of the intentional view. Among the assumptions to be scrutinized are those related to the three following issues: the theory of the firm; the nature of corporation; the goals of antitrust policy. The Chicago approach endorses a neoclassical theory of the firm where the firm is defined by a technical production function. The neoclassical theory of the firm, even in its modern neo-institutional version that accounts for transaction costs, explains a firm’s behaviour exclusively through the efficiency argument (exploitation of scale and scope economies). According to Chicago scholars, large size and above-normal returns must be due to efficiency differentials between firms. In their world made of equilibria and complete contracts, power-seeking behaviours are not conceivable (Raghuram and Zingales, 1998). Organizational, institutional and cognitive problems addressed by alternative theories (such as managerial, evolutionary, property rights, and behavioural theories) are dismissed as trivial. With regards to the legal debate on the nature of corporations (the latter defined as economic organizations whose members are granted limited liability by incorporation statutes), the Chicago view is consistent with the Nexus-of-Contracts theory, which contrasts the two alternative theories, namely the Legal Fiction and the Real Entity theories (Ronnegard, 2006). The Nexus-of-Contracts theory depicts the corporation as a web of contracts among all the members, which implies that it should not be regarded as a separate legal entity from the shareholders and that rights and duties can be defined only with regards to its members. Because the corporation is the result of a free contract, it is not dependent upon state grants and the same act of incorporation (granted by the state) is only a shorthand way of obtaining a contractual situation equivalent to that which could materialize through the private contracting of individuals. This conception of corporation is based on a libertarian ideology that says that corporations ought to merely be a commercial instrument for furthering the ends of the incorporating parties. Because corporations are not autonomous entities, any moral status (and therefore social responsibility) is ruled out, and because they are not a ‘creature’ of the state but the result of free contracts, they cannot be given rules and duties by the state. Therefore, one cannot expect them to provide public goods, such as climate stabilization, either voluntarily or compulsorily. Finally, as regards the goals of antitrust, the Chicago school states that antitrust policy ought to deal only with **consumer losses** due to high prices and/or output restrictions (Burns, 2006). Any equity concern about wealth distribution or unfair business practices is dismissed. For instance, in the Chicago view low final prices generally signal efficiency and practices like predatory pricing, reciprocal selling and cross-subsidization by conglomerates, unfair procurement contracts, and so on, are given little attention. All these three sets of assumptions entail that corporations pertain to the private more **than to the public sphere** and that antitrust pertains to the economic more than to the political sphere. In consequence, corporations should not be required to seek public goals (like providing public goods such as climate stabilization) and antitrust should not be required to seek goals like equity and justice (among which climate justice) but should only pursue economic efficiency in terms of low consumer prices. Competition policy and climate change: reversing the false premises of the Chicago school Stemming from the intentional vision, and in opposition to the evolutionary vision of the Chicago school, **the previous assumptions can be reversed in such a way as to justify a wider scope of antitrust policy** able to encompass the goal of climate stabilization. **The first** hypotheses to be reversed **are those** **concerning** the theory of **the firm** and the nature of the corporation. Firms cannot be described purely as technical production functions but as institutions (as economic theory had to acknowledge after the seminal work of Coase of 1937) that in some way substitute the market with power as means of resource allocation. Like states, firms exercise power in various forms, either inside their organizational boundaries or outside, over their competitors, their suppliers, their customers and the same state, through lobbying and bribing. Modern corporations are firms which, through the limited liability and other rights granted by the state (such as unlimited life span, unlimited asset acquisition, complete flexibility and mobility in business conduct, constitutional rights equal to those of natural persons), possess even superpowers (Nace, 2003; Korten, 2001), i.e. powers that cannot be enjoyed by a single individual and even less (because of territorial limits) by a single state. Because corporations are legal persons, with specific rights granted by the state, their nature cannot be described through the Nexus-of-Contract theory endorsed by the Chicago School. Their nature is better described by the Legal Fiction theory. The Legal Fiction theory essentially says that the corporation is merely an abstract creation of law which is granted to an association of individuals. The corporation is an artificial legal entity with an existence distinct from the incorporating members and exists entirely at the discretion of the state. The Legal Fiction theory differs from the Nexus-of-Contract theory which does not recognize the corporation distinct from its members and does affirm that it is independent from the power of the state because it is the result of free contracts by individuals. The Legal Fiction theory also differs from the Real Entity theory that considers corporations to be real, social organisms that possess a will and life of their own, with characteristics that are distinct from their individual members. Similar to the Nexus-of-Contracts theory, the Real Entity theory rejects the notion that corporation is a creation or grant from the state. However, differently from the Nexus-of-Contracts theory, the Real Entity theory claims that corporations ought to be granted legal rights as natural persons, rights which are owed to the corporation itself as a separate organism and are not derived from the rights of the individual members. The Legal Fiction theory is the only theory on the nature of corporations that is consistent with the advocacy of an antitrust regulation aimed at directly controlling and limiting the scope of activity of corporations. Because corporations are legal persons they can be given rights and duties. Nevertheless, because they are not natural persons, as instead envisaged by the Real Entity theory, they do not automatically enjoy basic rights (like the rights to free speech and due process of law) and do not possess moral responsibility. Because they are creatures of the state, they do not have their own life and in the divide between the private and public sphere they can be put somehow on the public side. Shifting from the idea of corporations as private efficiency-seeking organizations to the idea of corporations as social bodies enjoying large powers by virtue of state grants allows us to recognize that corporations may have an important role in addressing general social problems like global warming. Two arguments must be considered. First, because the power of corporations, including the power to affect global warming, depends on state grants, state regulations and obligations imposed on corporations in order to contribute to climate stabilization cannot be considered as illegitimate limitation to private freedom (as envisioned by Chicago scholars and neo-liberalists). Such regulations and obligations should instead **be considered a due act of governance** involving subjects (state regulators and corporations) that both pertain to the public sphere. Secondly, obligations imposed on corporations may be of the kind of human rights duties in case of environmental harm (Mabaquiao, 2002). It is worth noticing that rights are, after all, a response to the problem of power; in particular human rights are asserted in order to protect individuals from abuse of power by states. When one recognizes that many TNCs are really as powerful as or more powerful than many states, it does make sense to treat them as duty-holders, with the same obligations as the states to uphold human rights (Sinden, 2007). It is also important to notice that, because according to the Legal Fiction theory corporations do not possess moral responsibility, we cannot rely on CSR or voluntary codes of conducts as ways to protect the public from environmental harm and any power abuse made by corporations. The second set of hypotheses to be reversed is that concerning the definition of the scope of antitrust policy. It is general wisdom that antitrust policy should prevent excesses in exercise of power by large firms. The difference between the Chicago School and alternative approaches based on the intentional view is with the kind of power at stake. The Chicago school only considers market power in the form of high consumer prices. Alternative approaches instead look at different kinds of power: the bargaining power towards suppliers and employees; the power to choose technologies and products with different environmental impacts; the power to influence the political arena; the power to ‘capture’ regulators; the power to influence cultural and social values; and even more. If antitrust policy has to deal with all these kinds of power then it must widen its scope, adding to the economic goal efficiency, social and political goals, such as business fairness, distributive equity, environment protection, enforcement of human rights and so on. In this perspective, **antitrust policy should provide incentives** (either positive or negative) **for business firms to pursue public goals**, **such as global warming mitigation.** Conclusion The global food system is populated by many large TNCs (Etc.Group, 2008). These corporations have de facto become a key part of the fabric of global environmental governance. In their role as investors, polluters, experts, manufacturers, lobbyists and employers, corporations are central players in environmental issues. While necessary, voluntary action on the part of corporations and consumers is not alone sufficient to mitigate the worst effects of global warming. However, in the food sector, voluntary actions have been weak and sparse so far (Cogan, 2006). For instance in the Ceres report (CERES, 2008), which rates firms by their achievements in climate-related corporate governance, there are no companies from the food sector among the top ten firms. Among the bottom twelve there are instead three food giants: ConAgra, Bunge, and PepsiCo. Climate stabilization, as in general environmental protection, is a public good and as such is not provided by the private sector but needs public intervention. Among the many kinds of public intervention, the paper has focused on antitrust legislation. At its origin, antitrust legislation was conceived as a means to mitigate power wielded by large corporations in society. With the spread of neo-liberalism from the mid-1970s, the Chicago School radically changed the meaning and the scope of antitrust laws, with drastic changes in its enforcement (Mueller, 2009). The general claim of this paper is that it **is necessary** to go back to the original spirit of antitrust legislation which endorses an idea of corporation as an artificial powerful legal entity created by the state in order to serve the public interest. Only in this way can large firms, in particular TNCs in the food sector, **be expected to comply with environmental regulations and guarantee human rights.**

**It is not enough to come up with answers to the issue of climate change without a possible path towards achieving sustainable development through economic and political means. Strength of integration of economics into climate policy is key.**

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The environmental sciences have documented large and worrisome changes in earth systems, from climate change and loss of biodiversity, to changes in hydrological and nutrient cycles and depletion of natural resources (1⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓–12). These global environmental changes have potentially **large negative consequences for future human well-being**, and **raise questions about whether global civilization is on a sustainable path** or is “consuming too much” by depleting vital natural capital (13). The increased scale of economic activity and the consequent increasing impacts on a finite Earth arises from both **major demographic changes**—including population growth, shifts in age structure, urbanization, and spatial redistributions through migration (14⇓⇓⇓–18)—**and rising per capita income and shifts in consumption patterns**, such as increases in meat consumption with rising income (19, 20).

**At the same time, many people are consuming too little**. In 2015, ∼10% of the world’s population (736 million) lived in extreme poverty with incomes of less than $1.90 per day (21). In 2017, 821 million people were malnourished, an increase in the number reported malnourished compared with 2016 (22). **There is an urgent need for further economic development to lift people out of poverty**. In addition, rising inequality resulting in increasing polarization of society is itself a threat to achieving sustainable development. Eliminating poverty (goal 1) and hunger (goal 2), achieving gender equality (goal 6), and reducing inequality (goal 10) feature prominently in the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (23). A recent special issue in PNAS on natural capital framed the challenge of sustainable development as one of developing “economic, social, and governance systems capable of ending poverty and achieving sustainable levels of population and consumption while securing the life-support systems underpinning current and future human well-being” (24).

The discipline of economics arguably **should play a central role in meeting the sustainable development challenge**. The core question at the heart of sustainable development is how to allocate the finite resources of the planet to meet “the needs of the present, **without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”** (25). A central focus of economics is how to allocate scarce resources to meet desired goals; indeed, a standard definition of economics is the study of allocation under scarcity. More specifically, economics studies the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services, which are both a key driver of development (increasing standards of living through providing food, housing, and other basic human requirements) and a main cause of current changes in earth systems. Economics, combined with earth system sciences, **is crucial for understanding both positive and negative impacts of alternatives and the trade-offs involved**. Economics, **combined with other social and behavioral sciences**, is crucial for understanding **how it might be possible to shift human behavior toward achieving sustainable development.** Economics has well-developed fields in development economics, ecological economics, environmental economics, and natural resource economics, with large bodies of research relevant to the sustainable development challenge. **The application of economic principles and empirical findings should be a central component in the quest to meet the aspirations of humanity for a good life given the finite resources of the earth**.

Indeed, an extensive body of work by economists provides key insights into aspects of sustainable development. At its best, this work integrates work by other natural and social sciences into a policy-relevant framework and demonstrates the rich potential for collaborations among economists, natural scientists, and other social scientists on sustainable development challenges. For example, economists have developed integrated economic and climate models to address important climate change policy questions, such as how much and how fast greenhouse gas emissions should be reduced (26⇓⇓⇓⇓–31). In 2018, William Nordhaus shared the Nobel Prize in economics, in large part for his seminal work on such models. These models have sparked large debates within economics over fundamental issues such as the proper discount rate (32⇓⇓–35), and with the natural sciences over the likely scale of damages from climate change (36, 37). Another Nobel Prize winner in economics, Elinor Ostrom, used economic models to highlight the importance of governance and institutions for sustainable use of common property resources (38⇓–40). Another important area of work by economists directly relevant to sustainable development defines and measures inclusive wealth (13, 41⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓⇓–49). Ken Arrow, yet another Nobel Prize winner in economics, was a leader in this field. It is also notable that the intellectual roots of inclusive wealth trace to work in the 1970s of two Nobel Prize winners in economics, William Nordhaus and James Tobin (50). Inclusive wealth is a measure of the aggregate wealth of society, including the value of natural capital along with the values of human capital, manufactured capital, and social capital. Inclusive wealth is a sufficient statistic for showing whether or not global society is on a sustainable trajectory. For the past two decades, the Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics, part of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, has held annual meetings bringing together leading economists and ecologists to discuss issues at the intersection of ecology and economics, which have resulted in a number of high-impact papers (51). The idea for a forum to highlight work in economics on environment and sustainable development originated at one of these meetings.

Despite these examples and many others, the center of gravity in the analysis of sustainable development remains in the natural sciences, **and the center of gravity in economics remains far removed from the challenge of sustainable development**. The natural sciences that form the core of earth systems science, including ecology, geology, climatology, hydrology, and oceanography, are a logical place to start to build understanding of the current state and the evolution of earth systems. Natural scientists have taken the lead in prominent analyses of pathways to achieve sustainable development. For example, Pacala and Socolow (52) outline feasible methods using existing technology to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to secure a livable climate. Foley et al. (53) analyze how to meet growing food demand without expanding the footprint of agriculture. Costello et al. (54) suggest how extensive fishery reform could result in improved productivity and ecosystem health. Tallis et al. (55) analyze how to improve material standard of living for a growing population in ways that simultaneously sustain biodiversity, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and reduce water use and air pollution. These works show that it is feasible to achieve multiple sustainable development goals with existing technology. The harder challenge is combining what is feasible in a biophysical sense **with the difficult economic, political, and social hurdles that prevent society from getting to sustainable outcomes** (55). In other words, natural science understanding **is necessary but not sufficient to achieve sustainable development.**

While natural science understanding is insufficient on its own to achieve sustainable development, the same is true of economics. Economists alone do not have the knowledge base supplied by the natural sciences necessary to understand the complex ecological systems within which the economic system operates and on which economic activity causes impacts. **Progress in sustainable development requires collaboration** between social scientists, including economists and natural scientists. Of course, **achieving sustainable development requires institutions and political alignment that go well beyond assembling the science knowledge arising from integrated scientific knowledge.**

Numerous examples show the incomplete nature of collaboration between economists and other disciplines engaged in the analysis of sustainable development. To take one recent example, there were no economists involved in a special section on “Ecosystem Earth” published in Science in April 2017 that contained discussions of population, consumption, agricultural production, land use, human behavior, collective action, and policy (56). The lack of involvement by economists in ongoing discussions of sustainable development **leads to gaps in understanding production and consumption decisions, the resulting market outcomes that drive global environmental change, and how to regulate or reduce negative environmental impacts from economic activities.**

The incomplete engagement of economists mirrors the structure of the economics discipline. The fields of ecological, environmental, and resource economics are not core fields within economics. There are few ecological, environmental, or resource economics publications in flagship journals within economics. For example, in 2018 only two papers published in the American Economic Review listed classification codes for renewable resources and conservation, nonrenewable resources and conservation, energy economics, or environmental economics (57, 58). Only a small minority of the top economics departments have fields in ecological, environmental, or resource economics. In contrast, virtually every top economics program offers fields in labor economics, industrial organization, and international trade. Ecological, environmental, and resource economics programs often are in schools of the environment or natural resources, schools of public policy, or in departments of agricultural economics. In addition, economics is notable among academic disciplines for its relative isolation: “Though all disciplines are in some way insular…this trait peculiarly characterizes economics” (59). Compared with other social scientists, economists have far lower citation rates for work in other disciplines. Jacobs (60) found that the percentage of within-field citations in economics was 81%, versus 59% for political science, 53% for anthropology, and 52% for sociology. In addition, the core of the economics discipline is relatively isolated from the natural sciences that have played a large role in sustainability science to date, ecology, geology, climatology, hydrology, and marine biology. Network maps of disciplines using citations patterns often show economics and fields, such as ecology and geosciences, at opposite ends of the spectrum (figure 3 in ref. 61).

**Given the large role of economic activity in causing rapid change in earth systems, and the scale of the sustainable development challenge, there is an urgent need for more rapid integration of economics into the core of sustainable development, and for more rapid integration of sustainable development into the core of economics.**

**The plan is necessary—corporations are driven by profit incentives and allowing mergers and monopolies make solving the climate change impossible—they maintain perverse incentives that need to be reigned in. Any alternative leads to collusion!**

**Schinkel and Treuren 21.** Maarten Pieter Schinkel and Leonard Treuren. “Green Antitrust: Friendly Fire In The Fight Against Climate Change” <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3749147>

4 **Not less but more competition leads to greater sustainability** The central question of whether it should be expected that firms will produce more sustainably in an anticompetitive agreement than in competition squarely falls on economics to answer. It is reasonable to base the analysis on two standard premises. The first is that (potential) consumers care about sustainability. Eichholtz et al. (2010) document a higher willingness to pay for office buildings with sustainability labels. Casadesus-Masanell et al. (2009) report a higher willingness to pay for T-shirts made with organic cotton. In a survey of the literature Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012) conclude that willingness to pay depends in general positively on the degree of corporate social responsibility a firm engages in.23 More recently, Aghion et al. (2020) find that **green innovation is positively correlated with consumers’ stated sustainability preferences**.

A second premise is that, no matter how noble the initiatives may appear, **firms are ultimately driven by profit motives**. Rate of return incentives can certainly lead to intricate and forward-looking firm behavior, for instance investing in a good public image in order to attract more consumers. Running up short term losses with a CEO passionate about corporate social responsibility can therefore still be consistent with long term profit maximization. Yet under pressure of shareholders and investors, **firms are interested in sustainability initiatives first and foremost to increase their profitability**, in particular **through buyers’ higher willingness to pay**.24 The latter are the revenue returns to sustainability investments, which are costs. Therefore, companies will strive for profit-maximizing price increases and sustainability advances, for which cost-minimization is a necessary condition. That these incentives lead to little green is reflected in the literature on greenwashing. Firms certainly like to have a “green” public image, but when consumers cannot assess the true extent of their sustainability investments, they only undertake the minimum.25 In general, we should expect no less, and no more, from for-profit enterprises, both in competition and in coordination.

The relationship between competition and sustainability is studied in a limited but recently growing literature. The current **consensus** is that competition increases investments in sustainability, with firms investing in sustainability because it lowers their costs or allows them to stand out to consumers. Green, in other words, **is a dimension of product differentiation**. Bansal and Roth (2000), Porter and Kramer (2006), and Roulet and Bothello (2020) point out that corporate social responsibility (CSR) can be a strong competitive advantage. Graafland (2016) finds in survey data that price competition does not influence companies’ environmental performance ratings. Simon and Prince (2016) show that a reduction in industrial concentration in the United States is associated with a reduction in toxic releases at the factory level. Fernández-Kranz and Santaló (2010) and Flammer (2015) find that competition has a positive effect on CSR at the firm level, in studies of variation in import duties and concentration. Aghion et al. (2020) show that the positive relation between consumers’ stated sustainability preferences and the probability that a firm engages in green innovation increases with the degree of product market competition. This suggests that as pro-environment attitudes become more common over time, **the role of competition in fostering green innovation will only increase.** Ding et al. (2020) link antitrust policy to sustainability by showing that **stricter competition law regimes are positively associated with CSR, and that this link is stronger in countries where consumers indicate stronger pro-environment attitudes.**

Few papers study the relationship between horizontal agreements and sustainability directly. They relate to the literature on exempting research joint-ventures, which can increase R&D investments above competitive levels if spillovers of innovations are so large that unilateral investments are discouraged.26 For this reason, there is a broad exemption clause available for R&D joint-ventures, including for research into more sustainable production methods. However, with limited spill-overs, **competition is the stronger driver of R&D**. There is concern, therefore, that **mergers reduce innovation**.27 Importantly, sustainability initiatives of the kind considered for exemption, such as investments in cleaner technology or better quality of live for farm animals, have little or no spillover from one company to another. These cases, and the current green antitrust debate about advancing a transition to more sustainable ways of manufacturing, are primarily about the implementation of existing cleaner technologies, rather than about innovation.

Schinkel and Spiegel (2017) analyze the link between anticompetitive agreements and sustainability in a two-stage duopoly model where firms first select investments in sustainability and subsequently compete on the product market. They find that allowing the firms to coordinate their sustainability efforts **leads to the lowest sustainability levels**. Sustainability is a product attribute that consumers care about, and hence is used by firms to compete and attract each other’s customers. Treuren and Schinkel (2018) generalize these findings to more firms and remaining competition. Note that when firms coordinate prices and sustainability investments, **sustainability levels are still lower than in competition**. This means that if coordinating their sustainability investments allows the **companies to collude on prices** as well, a risk we noted above, **sustainability does not benefit from coordination.**

**Even a total shift in individual attitudes about climate change would benefit from a more competitive economic environment.**

**Schinkel and Treuren 21.** Maarten Pieter Schinkel and Leonard Treuren. “Green Antitrust: Friendly Fire In The Fight Against Climate Change” <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3749147>

Proponents of green antitrust policy point out that today’s corporate leadership increasingly pledges allegiance to take responsibility for stakeholders more widely, including for their environment.28 They view profit-driven firm analysis as outdated, and Friedman’s appeal to it as an ancient belief.29 Green CEO’s may not even be controllable by shareholders anymore if they wanted to. Importantly, however, if firms operate with an intrinsic motivation to produce more sustainably too, **investments typically remain higher in competition than with sustainability agreements**, and the difference may even become larger. In Schinkel and Treuren (2021), the level of sustainability investments features directly in each firm’s objective function, besides in the profits part. Since intrinsically motivated investments are independent of the competitive regime, they are higher in absolute value in both competition and coordination. Moreover, **coordination reduces the additional intrinsically motivated green investments**, since the loss of profit due to increasing sustainability beyond the normal profit maximizing level is larger for firms who **jointly decide on sustainability**. That an intrinsic motivation to do green **makes anticompetitive agreements not more, but rather even less suitable to promote sustainability investments underlines our warning not to lean too far in sympathies for initiatives to take corporate social responsibility jointly.**

**AND it’s sufficient – Establishing a basis for “green anit-trust” creates government leverage for large-scale climate action – the plan propels a series of policy solutions that**

**Schinkel and Treuren 21.** Maarten Pieter Schinkel and Leonard Treuren. “Green Antitrust: Friendly Fire In The Fight Against Climate Change” <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3749147>

7 **Green antitrust** excuses government failure to regulate In the classical economic approach, damaging side-effects of market interactions are seen as externalities. **The solution is to force market participants to internalize these externalities.** The social costs of pollution, for example, then become part of the production costs to be expressed in the product prices. Higher prices decrease demand and thereby environmental damage, while higher costs incentivize firms to look for more sustainable production methods. This way, market forces are harnessed to benefit the environment. Through competition, an optimal allocation of production and consumption will result, based on a society’s preferences for the climate relative to consumption goods. The efficient allocation of scarce resources over alternative means then remains firmly based on consumer sovereignty, i.e. the preferences of the people.36 Care for the future has a prominent place in this framework. Welfare of future generations is taken into account, for instance through the intergenerational altruism and bequest motives of the current population.37 **This is** also **how the future can** consistently enterinto **competition authorities’ assessments** of green efficiencies. It is first and foremost a government task to ensure that the social costs of production are reflected in the private costs of manufacturers. **This can be done through taxation, or by ensuring that private property rights for climate-related issues are well defined, such that private parties will ensure that the costs of their use will be priced in.** **Where this is hard to achieve,** for instance because the source of pollution remains disputed, **governments can use direct regulation** **to force firms to produce in a more sustainable way**. Unsustainable production, like under-provision of public goods, is a well-understood market failure, but it is a government failure that well-known solutions have only been sparingly used in the last several decades. Trying to remedy this government failure by creating a market failure – market power – seems a response that is itself doomed to fail. To begin with, trying to have private market power advance public interests is orthogonal to key lessons of classical public economic theory. **One way of seeing this green antitrust policy is as mandating private companies to increase their prices by an overcharge, i.e. “tax” a private good**, **and to use that money to finance a compensating public good**; sustainability. Samuelson’s rule prescribes that public good provision should be increasing with the utility that people derive from the public good. But for an anticompetitive sustainability agreement, the higher the willingness to pay for sustainable products, the less sustainability the corporate cooperative needs to deliver to compensate consumers for a given product price increase. After all, consumers with a high appreciation for green can be made indifferent with less of it, compared with consumers that appreciate green little. There is no reason for a green corporate cooperative to invest more of its extra revenue in sustainability than it is minimally required to do: the rest it can pocket as profit. Government, though certainly imperfect, at least strives for optimal taxation and break-even public good provision. Companies with market power instead have an incentive to maximize their margin. In addition, green antitrust policy runs the risk of exacerbating government failure. That governments keep failing to live up to their **mandate to guarantee the public interest** has many reasons, including public choice incentives ranging from regulatory laziness to outright corruption. Being able to point to industry self-regulation, in the form of sustainability agreements in restriction of competition, is another perfect excuse for governments not to take up their regulatory responsibility. Why the effort to regulate, after all, if government officials can simply rely on private initiatives to help meet sustainability goals? This is exactly how Chicken (2015) entered the stage: the Dutch cabinet did not want to improve by regulation the abysmal circumstances in which poultry is reared, because it would apply to all chicken, including the vast majority bred for export purposes. Yet there was strong public pressure to act. The problem was conveniently redirected towards the ACM, which was subsequently reproached for refusing to exempt the meagre initiative. The green antitrust movement therefore insists on a turn that, once taken, risks leading us down a path where competition authorities are accused of standing in the way of sustainability initiatives, behind which accusations firms can hide as an excuse for not becoming more sustainable. That is barking up the wrong tree: where there is a need for coordinated implementation of more sustainable production, government should regulate it, and firms with such green initiatives should lobby the designated public authority for effective regulation, rather than the competition authorities for protection from competition.

**Emissions mitigation policy as an early mover is key to future abatement and preventing lock-in – solves leakage and green paradox.**

**Arroyo-Currás et al 15** (Tabaré Arroyo-Currás, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Nico Bauer, Elmar Kriegler, Valeria Jana Schwanitz, Gunnar Luderer, Tino Aboumahboub, Anastasis Giannousakis, Jérôme Hilaire, “Carbon leakage in a fragmented climate regime: The dynamic response of global energy markets’, Technological Forecasting and Social Change Volume 90, Part A, January 2015, Pages 192–203)

5. Conclusions

Given the challenges to international cooperation on mitigating climate change, a number of climate policies have been implemented by various countries and regions, while others remain on the sideline. The heterogeneity of climate policy approaches has given rise to an internationally fragmented climate policy regime. Subsequently, global emission externalities such as carbon leakage have emerged as an important topic within the climate change mitigation debate.

This study illustrates the incidence and consequences of carbon leakage as an effect of early action in a fragmented climate policy regime. For this analysis, the REMIND integrated assessment model of the global economy, energy sector and the climate system is used to evaluate the environmental effectiveness and economic implications of unilateral and joint mitigation efforts. Overall, the main scope of this paper is to examine the role of carbon leakage via the energy channel, i.e. the increase in fossil fuel use in regions with weaker or non-existent climate policies due to more stringent mitigation action in other regions. The study also includes the capital market channel of carbon leakage.

We derive four main findings from our study. First, a reference policy scenario extrapolating fragmented action at current levels of ambition into the future will reduce emissions only modestly compared to the idealized case of immediate cooperative action on reaching a 450 ppm CO2e stabilization target (compare Blanford et al. [35]). Therefore, **a pioneering region adopting more stringent emission reductions may be needed to strengthen climate mitigation**. We show that the main impact on **additional emission reductions** does not come from the early mover action itself, but from the rest of the world following up with strengthening their abatement effort **post 2030**. Thus, a pioneer in adopting more stringent mitigation action needs to be particularly concerned with its ability to induce others to follow.

Second, the carbon leakage rate via the energy channel **is limited to below 16%** of the additional emission reductions from more stringent abatement action by pioneering regions. This result holds for different sizes and compositions of the early mover coalition. The carbon leakage mechanisms include the reduction of coal use in pioneering regions, or indirectly in other regions via knock-on substitution effects from reduced gas use in abating regions, leading to increased coal consumption in the rest of the world. While the type of mechanism and the regions that increase their fossil fuel consumption vary with the early mover coalition, **the general result of limited leakage stands**. This implies that carbon leakage, at least via the energy channel investigated here, **is not strongly impacting the emission reduction gains from early mover action**, and **does not permanently increase the lock-in into fossil fuel infrastructure in other regions**. It therefore does not provide a strong counter-argument against adoption of more stringent mitigation efforts by pioneering regions.

Compared with the scientific literature that mainly focused on the competitiveness channel the upper limit of 16% **carbon leakage rate due to the energy market channel is small** (Babiker [36]; Babiker [37]; Bernstein et al. [38]; Bollen et al. [39]; Burniaux and Oliveira-Martins [40]; Burniaux and Truong [41]; Gerlagh and Kuik [42]; Kuik and Gerlagh [43]; Light et al. [44]; Manne and Richels [45]; McKibbin et al. [19]). In the REMIND model the representation of international fossil fuel markets is highly flexible and fossil based energy **conversion technologies can easily replace alternatives**. Hence, fossil fuel suppliers can, in principle, find new demands easily, if demand is reduced due to unilateral climate policies. Carbon leakage via the energy market channel is mainly limited **due to trade costs of fossil fuels and demand for final energies in non-abating countries**. In the present study also the carbon prices of the moderate climate policies dampen the carbon leakage. Studies focusing on the competitiveness channel usually depend on the choice of trade elasticities with higher elasticities implying larger carbon leakage rates. In this study fossil energy trade is not limited in a similar way, and therefore limitations should imply even smaller carbon leakage rates.

Third, we observe that the re-allocation of emissions due to carbon leakage depends mostly on the energy system structure of the region that takes abatement action i.e. whether the region is a fossil resource importer (e.g. Europe), exporter (e.g. the United States) or de facto carbon intensive economy (e.g. China). We conclude that carbon leakage is a dynamic effect that mostly depends on (i) demand response of fuel importers to price changes, (ii) inter-fuel substitution possibilities and (iii) transportation cost barriers in the fossil fuel market.

Regarding the economic implications of fragmented climate action we confirm the assertion that early mitigation action leads to short-run GDP losses for the first movers, but **delayed implementation of the carbon tax can lead to larger losses after the introduction of the tax.** The larger tax shock can act as a significant barrier to take more stringent action and therefore delaying action might further impede the adoption of more ambitious carbon tax levels in the long run. We also find reallocation of GDP between early mover and late-comer regions triggered by the international capital market, but this is not a major driver of carbon leakage. This result is, however, different to the result of McKibbin et al. [19] who identified the converse effect on carbon leakage for the US.

Several caveats apply to the analysis here. First, the REMIND version used for this study does not take into account bilateral fossil fuel trade, but assumes a global pool trading scheme. Considering bilateral (or multilateral) trading reduces the flexibility of fossil fuel owners to redirect their supplies as some regions reduce their demand. Hence, this improvement might lead to lower leakage rates. Second, the study focused only on the energy channel of carbon leakage, although macro-economic substitution effects between energy, capital and labor were accounted for. Expanding the analysis of dynamic leakage in staged accession scenarios to a larger set of leakage channels, particularly including the re-allocation of energy intensive industries, would help to **better constrain the full carbon leakage effect**. It is worth mentioning that technology spillovers related to technology learning are not observed in this study.

We conclude from the results that the value of individual regions or coalitions adopting more stringent climate action rises or falls with their ability to induce others to follow suit. Thus, while global cooperation on climate mitigation may prove illusory in the short run, **credible and strong mitigation action by major countries can help to keep the door open for future global action to stabilize climate change as carbon leakage effects are limited**.

**Even small carbon price increases impact behavior—changes consumption patterns**

**Hsu 11** (Shi-Ling Hsu, Professor of Law at University of British Columbia – previously Associate Prof at George Washington School of Law, Senior Attorney & Economist for the Environmental Law Institute The Case for a Carbon Tax: Getting Past our Hang-ups to Effective Climate Policy, Island Press Page 139-142)

While curmudgeons may grudgingly concede that a high carbon tax like that in Sweden would reduce emissions, a smaller one like the British Columbia carbon tax is a different matter. When the British Columbia government introduced its carbon tax in 2008, it admitted that its modest price effects would not have a substantial effect on car- bon dioxide emissions in the province. 41 More action was needed, and was in fact contemplated as the British Columbia government also en- acted a companion program laving the foundation for a cap-and-trade program as part of British Columbia's participation in the California- led Western Climate Initiative. But the carbon tax is indeed so small that one wonders if it really was meant to accomplish anything. The BC carbon tax was designed to ramp up from about $9 per ton of C02 in 2008 to about $30 in 2012. This translates into about 2.4 cents per little of gasoline, up to about 7.2 cents per liter in 2012. Gasoline prices fluctuate a great deal more than that, spiking in 2005 in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina to more than $1.12 per liter, only to see a higher spike in the summer of 2008 to nearly $1.50, fol- lowed by a dip just a few months later to below 80 cents. 42 In Vancou- ver, gas stations even commonly lower the price by three and a half cents at nighttime. Does an extra 2.4 cents—or even 7 cents—per liter really change behavior very much?

It is a fair question. The standard economic answer is that a price increase will lead to a decline in consumption. It could take a while, but higher prices always lead to lower consumption, all other things being equal. So for the household wondering if it will drive less be- cause of a small increase in the price of gasoline, the answer could well be no, but there are many, many other consumers that could be right at the margins of making a consumption decision. Price elasticity is the term that economists use to denote how much of an adjustment con- sumers, in the aggregate, can be expected to make in response to a price change. Consumption of commodities respond not only to changes in the price of the commodity itself—measured by the own- price elasticity—but also changes in the prices of other goods that may be substitutes or affect the economic environment some other wav— measured by the cross-price elasticities. Finally, consumption of com- modities can change to varying degrees as income changes— measured by the income elasticity. Bread and milk have low income elasticities. Sports cars and cosmetic surgery have high income elasticities.

Most energy analysis is conducted on own-price elasticities, al- though income also figures very prominently in energy consumption. There are short-term and long-term elasticities—adjustments that are made in the relatively short term—on the order of a few months—and those that are made for the longer term. Long-term elasticities are in- variably greater, since at any given time, the timing may or many not be right for any individual household to make an adjustment. Over a longer period of time, there arise more and more times during which an adjustment—some decision that might be affected by a price— seems appropriate. For example, a family that has just purchased a new sport-utility vehicle would not contemplate replacing it even if gaso- line prices rose sharply. One would expect very few adjustments of that sort. However, over a five- or ten-year period, as the sport-utility vehi- cle starts to age and incur more maintenance costs, and as it nears the end of its useful life, a replacement decision is more likely to take into account gasoline prices. As the same family contemplates what they will buy to replace that sport-utility vehicle, the family has a wider ar- ray of options available than it does when it has a brand-new shiny SUV. And in the aggregate, over a longer period, more and more households are likely to arrive at that decision point at which they con- template replacing an aging vehicle, and more adjustments are likely to be made. As long-term elasticity takes into account this greater number of adjustments, it would naturally be larger than short-term elasticities.

Among commodities, fossil fuel usage is one of the more studied phenomena, **and the likelihood that people adjust to even small price changes in fossil fuel price is so well-established that it almost rises to the level of an economic maxim**. While one might ask oneself whether a family might change their mind about anything if the carbon price is as small as $9 per ton of C02 (translating into 2.4 cents per liter at the gas pump), there are a myriad of other decision makers that could well change their behavior. As argued above, the University of British Columbia is just such an entity. Facing a tax liability that would be consid- ered small by industrial standards, but significant to an academic institution or a medium-sized business or industry, it set about finding ways to reduce its reliance on fossil fuels for powering the campus.

For decades, economists have been studying the aggregate responses to change in energy prices. The range of estimates can be quite large, as some studies are limited to certain regions or countries, and some ate limited in time, so the economic environment in which price changes are studied can be quite varied. As an empirical matter, it is safe to say that long-term elasticities are indeed greater than short- term elasticities. It is also likely that industrial and commercial consumers have larger long-term elasticities than residential consumers. 43 So it might be misleading for individuals to examine their own personal situation and ask themselves, "would I turn down my thermo- stat if the price of natural gas went up by 5 percent?" The point is how much, in the aggregate, all consumers of energy change their behavior, and on this score, industrial and commercial consumers, which ac- counted for half of all energy consumption in the United States in 2008 (with residential accounting for 22 percent), 44 would provide a different answer.

**Pragmatism is better than purity**

Frederic C. **RICH**, J.D., University of Virginia School of Law, practiced at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (1981-2014), Vice Chair of the Land Trust Alliance, head of the Environmental Leaders Group in New York State, **16** [*Getting to Green*, 2016, p. 196-198]

Bill Clinton recently said of the U.S. Constitution, "[I]t ought to be subtitled: 'Let's make a deal.'"10 He's right. But the Green movement has for decades been led by policy experts who are confident that their policies present the best solutions to environmental issues and who often are unwilling to consider alternatives, or accept incremental progress when a comprehensive solution is not possible. Green advocates have appeared to many to prefer confrontation to compromise, and Green colleagues are often harsh in criticizing others [END PAGE 196] who accept partial solutions or show willingness to deviate from the movement's ask in order to show some progress.11

Even after the fact, Green orthodoxy often paints landmark compromises as failures. David Brower, longtime head of the Sierra Club, came to regret the deal that saved Dinosaur National Monument because it involved a compromise that permitted a single dam at the spectacular Glen Canyon.12 Rejection of compromise is deeply embedded in the DNA of the more radical part of the movement. Earth First!, for example, has as its slogan "No compromise in the defense of Mother Earth." And although the rest of the movement does not share the approach of these more radical groups, their rhetoric echoes in the consciences of mainstream Greens. As a result, among Greens **purity** too often is prized above **pragmatism**. The former president of the Izaak Walton League complains bitterly about some of his colleagues in the Green movement, where, he says, "people often want to be viewed as the most holy defender of the faith, rather than the most effective at making progress."13

The Green movement has had a particular problem accepting incrementalism, although recent history is filled with examples, such as the **gradual tightening of fuel efficiency and auto emissions standards**, that are **successful models** of exactly this approach. In some cases opposition to incremental gain is strategically sound, or is simply a tactic designed to improve and broaden the scope of a law or rule. But when it results in positive legislation or regulation being stalled or killed, with no realistic hope of anything better replacing it, then **it is a mistake**. When motivated by pure politics, such as the desire to deny the Republicans an environmental victory, then it is a betrayal of our environmental mission for partisan gain.

Greens also sometimes seem to take pride in spewing out "big thinking" without regard to its political feasibility. Gus Speth, for example, wrote, "If someone says these proposals are impractical, [END PAGE 197] or politically naïve, then I would respond that we need impractical answers."14 These habits—reluctance to compromise, distrust of incrementalism, and insufficient attention to pragmatism—have **contributed to the movement's failures** and resulted in missed opportunities to make at least some progress on climate change. Any well-managed organization should insist that results define success. If the perfect policy is dead on arrival as a political matter, **then compromise**. The environmental movement is funded by its supporters to make a difference in the environment. So figure out what is achievable and go for that, even if it means you are negotiating with yourself, compromising before you sit down at the table with the other side, or "thinking small," all of which have been cardinal sins in many NGO cultures. **Incremental progress is progress, and progress is what is urgently needed**.

**Working within the system is necessary to solve particular instances of climate change—there’s no guarantee revolution will solve**

-It’s too late to solve the whole environmental crisis, but can work to mitigate the damage

-No guarantee the alternative’s regression to socialism won’t have same environmental problems

Christian **PARENTI**, professor of sustainable development at the School for International Training, Graduate Institute, **13** [“A Radical Approach to the Climate Crisis,” *Dissent*, Summer 2013, http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/a-radical-approach-to-the-climate-crisis]

Several strands of green thinking maintain that capitalism is incapable of a sustainable relationship with non-human nature because, as an economic system, capitalism has a growth imperative while the earth is finite. One finds versions of this argument in the literature of eco-socialism, deep ecology, eco-anarchism, and even among many mainstream greens who, though typically declining to actually name the economic system, are fixated on the dangers of “growth.”

All this may be true. Capitalism, a system in which privately owned firms must continuously out-produce and out-sell their competitors, may be incapable of accommodating itself to the limits of the natural world. However, that is not the same question as whether capitalism can solve the more immediate climate crisis.

Because of its magnitude, the climate crisis can appear **as the sum total of all environmental problems**—deforestation, over-fishing, freshwater depletion, soil erosion, loss of biodiversity, chemical contamination. But halting greenhouse gas emissions is a much more specific problem, the **most pressing subset** of the **larger apocalyptic panorama**.

And the very bad news is, time has run out. As I write this, news arrives of an ice-free arctic summer by 2050. Scientists once assumed that would not happen for hundreds of years.

Dealing with climate change by first achieving radical social transformation—be it a socialist or anarchist or deep-ecological/neo-primitive revolution, or a nostalgia-based localista conversion back to a mythical small-town capitalism—would be a very **long and drawn-out**, maybe even **multigenerational, struggle**. It would be marked by years of **mass education** and organizing of a scale and intensity not seen in most core capitalist states since the 1960s or even the 1930s.

**Nor is there any guarantee** that the new system would not also degrade the soil, lay waste to the forests, despoil bodies of water, and find itself still addicted to coal and oil. Look at the history of “actually existing socialism” before its collapse in 1991. To put it mildly, the economy was not at peace with nature. Or consider the vexing complexities facing the left social democracies of Latin America. Bolivia, and Ecuador, states run by socialists who are beholden to very powerful, autonomous grassroots movements, are still very **dependent on petroleum** revenue.

A more radical approach to the crisis of climate change begins **not with a long-term vision** of an alternate society but with an honest engagement with the very compressed timeframe that current climate science implies. In the age of climate change, **these are the real parameters of politics**.

**Strategic use of market mechanisms to politicize the inequalities of the status quo is possible – radical system change alone is a demand for a clean slate we don’t have**

**Hoffman 16** (Andrew, Professor and director of the Erb Institute for Global Sustainable Enterprise at the University of Michigan, 2/15/2016, The Invisible Hand Won’t Solve the Climate Crisis. Capitalism Must Evolve., Evonomics, http://evonomics.com/the-invisible-hand-wont-solve-the-climate-crisis-capitalism-must-evolve/)

This binary framing masks the real questions we face, both what we need to do and how we are going to get there. Yet there are serious conversations within management education, research and practice about the next steps in the evolution of capitalism. The goal is to develop a more sophisticated notion of the role of the corporation within society. These discussions are being driven not only by climate change, but concerns raised by the financial crisis, growing income inequality and other serious social issues.¶ The market’s rough edges¶ Capitalism is a set of institutions for structuring our commerce and interaction. It is not, as some think, some sort of natural state that exists free from government intrusion. It is designed by human beings in the service of human beings and it can evolve to the needs of human beings. As Yuval Levin points out in National Affairs, even Adam Smith argued that “the rules of the market are not self-legislating or naturally obvious. On the contrary, Smith argued, the market is a public institution that requires rules imposed upon it by legislators who understand its workings and its benefits.”¶ And, it is worth noting, capitalism has been quite successful. Over the past century, the world’s population increased by a factor of four, the world economy increased by a factor of 14 and global per capita income tripled. In that time, average life expectancy increased by almost **two-thirds** due in large part to advances in medicine, shelter, food production and other amenities provided by the market economy.¶ Capitalism is, in fact, quite malleable to meet the needs of society as they emerge. Over time, regulation has evolved to address emergent issues such as monopoly power, collusion, price-fixing and a host of other impediments to the needs of society. **Today, one of those needs is responding to climate change**.¶ The question is not whether capitalism works or doesn’t work. The question is how it can and will evolve to address the new challenges we face as a society. Or, as Anand Giridharadas pointed out at the Aspen Action Forum, “Capitalism’s rough edges must be sanded and its surplus fruit shared, but the underlying system must never be questioned.”¶ These rough edges need be considered with the theories we use to understand and teach the market. In addition, we need to reconsider the metrics we use to measure its outcomes, and the ways in which the market has deviated from its intended form.¶ Homo economicus?¶ To begin, there are growing questions around the underlying theories and models used to understand, explain and set policies for the market. Two that have received significant attention are neoclassical economics and principal-agent theory. Both theories form the foundation of management education and practice and are built on extreme and rather dismal simplifications of human beings as largely untrustworthy and driven by avarice, greed and selfishness.¶ As regards neoclassical economics, Eric Beinhocker and Nick Hanauer explain:¶ Behavioral economists have accumulated a mountain of evidence showing that real humans don’t behave as a rational homo economicus would. Experimental economists have raised awkward questions about the very existence of utility; and that is problematic because it has long been the device economists use to show that markets maximize social welfare. Empirical economists have identified anomalies suggesting that financial markets aren’t always efficient.¶ As regards principal-agent theory, Lynn Stout goes so far to say that the model is quite simply “wrong.” The Cornell professor of business and law argues that its central premise – that those running the company (agents) will shirk or even steal from the owner (principal) since they do the work and the owner gets the profits – does not capture “the reality of modern public corporations with thousands of shareholders, scores of executives and a dozen or more directors.”¶ The most pernicious outcome of these models is the idea that the purpose of the corporation is to “make money for its shareholders.” This is a rather recent idea that began to take hold within business only in the 1970s and 1980s and has now become a taken-for-granted assumption.¶ If I asked any business school student (and perhaps any American) to complete the sentence, “the purpose of the corporation is to…” they would parrot “make money for the shareholder.” But that is not what a company does, and most executives would tell you so. Companies transform ideas and innovation into products and services that serve the needs of some segment of the market. In the words of Paul Pollman, CEO of Unilever, “business is here to serve society.” Profit is the metric for how well they do that.¶ The problem with the pernicious notion that a corporation’s sole purpose is to serve shareholders is that it leads to many other undesirable outcomes. For example, it leads to an increased focus on quarterly earnings and short-term share price swings; it limits the latitude of strategic thinking by decreasing focus on long-term investment and strategic planning; and it rewards only the type of shareholder who, in the words of Lynn Stout, is “shortsighted, opportunistic, willing to impose external costs, and indifferent to ethics and others’ welfare.”¶ A better way to gauge the economy¶ Going beyond our understanding of what motivates people and organizations within the market, there is growing attention to the metrics that guide the outcomes of that action. One of those metrics is the discount rate. Economist Nicholas Stern stirred a healthy controversy when he used an unusually low discount rate when calculating the future costs and benefits of climate change mitigation and adaptation, arguing that there is a ethical component to this metric’s use. For example, a common discount rate of 5% leads to a conclusion that everything 20 years out and beyond is worthless. When gauging the response to climate change, is that an outcome that anyone – particularly anyone with children or grandchildren – would consider ethical?¶ Another metric is gross domestic product (GDP), the foremost economic indicator of national economic progress. It is a measure of all financial transactions for products and services. But one problem is that it does not acknowledge (nor value) a distinction between those transactions that add to the well-being of a country and those that diminish it. Any activity in which money changes hands will register as GDP growth. GDP treats the recovery from natural disasters as economic gain; GDP increases with polluting activities and then again with pollution cleanup; and it treats all depletion of natural capital as income, even when the depreciation of that capital asset can limit future growth.¶ A second problem with GDP is that it is not a metric dealing with true human well-being at all. Instead, it is based on the tacit assumption that the more money and wealth we have, the better off we are. But that’s been challenged by numerous studies. ¶As a result, French ex-president Nicolas Sarkozy created a commission, headed by Joseph Stieglitz and Amartya Sen (both Nobel laureates), to examine alternatives to GDP. Their report recommended a shift in economic emphasis from simply the production of goods to a broader measure of overall well-being that would include measures for categories like health, education and security. It also called for greater focus on the societal effects of income inequality, new ways to measure the economic impact of sustainability and ways to include the value of wealth to be passed on to the next generation. Similarly, the king of Bhutan has developed a GDP alternative called gross national happiness, which is a composite of indicators that are much more directly related to human well-being than monetary measures. ¶ The form of capitalism we have today has evolved over centuries to reflect growing needs, but also has been warped by private interests. Yuval Levin points out that some key moral features of Adam Smith’s political economy have been corrupted in more recent times, most notably by “a growing collusion between government and large corporations.” This issue has become most vivid after the financial crisis and the failed policies that both preceded and succeeded that watershed event. The answers, as Auden Schendler and Mark Trexler point out, are both “policy solutions” and “corporations to advocate for those solutions.”¶ We can never have a clean slate¶ How will we get to the solutions for climate change? Let’s face it. Installing efficient LED light bulbs, driving the latest Tesla electric car and recycling our waste are admirable and desirable activities. But they are not going to solve the climate problem by reducing our **collective emissions** to a necessary level. To achieve that goal **requires systemic change**. To that end, **some argue for creating a new system to replace capitalism.** For example, Naomi Klein calls for “shredding the free-market ideology that has dominated the global economy for more than three decades.”¶ Klein is performing a valuable service with her call for extreme action. She, like Bill McKibben and his 350.org movement, is helping to make it possible for a conversation to take place over the magnitude of the challenge before us through what is called the “radical flank effect.”¶ All members and ideas of a social movement are viewed in contrast to others, and extreme positions can make other ideas and organizations seem more reasonable to movement opponents. For example, when Martin Luther King Jr first began speaking his message, it was perceived as too radical for the majority of white America. But when Malcolm X entered the debate, he pulled the radical flank further out and made King’s message look more moderate by comparison. Capturing this sentiment, Russell Train, second administrator of the EPA, once quipped, “Thank God for [environmentalist] Dave Brower; he makes it so easy for the rest of us to be reasonable.”¶ But **the nature of social change never allows us the clean slate that makes sweeping statements for radical change attractive.** Every set of institutions by which society is structured evolved from some set of structures that preceded it. Stephen Jay Gould made this point quite powerfully in his essay “The Creation Myths of Cooperstown,” where he pointed out that baseball was not invented by Abner Doubleday in Cooperstown New York in 1839. In fact, he points out, “no one invented baseball at any moment or in any spot.” It evolved from games that came before it. In a similar way, Adam Smith did not invent capitalism in 1776 with his book The Wealth of Nations. He was writing about changes that he was observing and had been taking place for centuries in European economies; most notably the division of labor and the improvements in efficiency and quality of production that were the result. ¶ In the same way, we **cannot simply invent a new system** to replace capitalism. Whatever form of commerce and interchange we adopt must **evolve out of the form we have at the present**. There is simply no other way. ¶ But one particularly difficult challenge of climate change is that, unlike Adam Smith’s proverbial butcher, brewer or baker who provide our dinner out of the clear alignment of their self-interest and our needs, climate change breaks the link between action and outcome in profound ways. A person or corporation cannot learn about climate change through direct experience. We cannot feel an increase in global mean temperature; we cannot see, smell or taste greenhouse gases; and we cannot link an individual weather anomaly with global climate shifts. ¶ A real appreciation of the issue requires an understanding of **large-scale systems** through “big data” models. Moreover, both the knowledge of these models and an appreciation for how they work require deep scientific knowledge about complex dynamic systems and the ways in which feedback loops in the climate system, time delays, accumulations and nonlinearities operate within them. Therefore, the evolution of capitalism to address climate change must, in many ways, be based on trust, belief and faith in stakeholders outside the normal exchange of commerce. To get to the next iteration of this centuries-old institution, we must envision the market through all components that help to establish the rules; corporations, government, civil society, scientists and others. ¶ The evolving role of the corporation in society¶ At the end of the day, the solutions to climate change must come from the market and more specifically, from business. The market is the most powerful institution on earth, and business is the most powerful entity within it. Business makes the goods and services we rely upon: the clothes we wear, the food we eat, the forms of mobility we use and the buildings we live and work in. ¶ Businesses can transcend national boundaries and possess resources that exceed that of many countries. **You can lament** that fact, **but it is a fact**. If business does not lead the way toward solutions for a carbon-neutral world, there will be no solutions.

**Economic valuation is key to the environment**

**Polasky 12** (Stephen, Professor of Ecological/Environmental Economics, University of Minnesota, Seth Binder, Summer 2012, Valuing the Environment for Decisionmaking, http://issues.org/28-4/polasky/)

Virtually all important environmental management and policy decisions have a wide range of effects. For example, zoning or development decisions about land use can have a variety of environmental impacts (for example, on local water and air quality, the potential for flooding downstream, carbon sequestration, and habitat for wildlife) as well as economic and social effects (on economic development, jobs, and income). Similarly, decisions on limits on emissions of air pollutants or greenhouse gases can affect a range of environmental, economic, and social concerns. These results affect multiple groups who often have very different views about desired outcomes (for example, developers versus environmentalists). Effects differ across geography (upstream versus downstream) and time (current versus future impacts). Choosing among management or policy options that differ in terms of environmental, economic, and social outcomes with spatial and temporal components may at first glance seem overwhelmingly complex, with dimensions that seem incomparable. Good environmental management and policy decisionmaking, however, necessitates systematic evaluation and consideration of the effects of management and policy on the affected public. **Even though the quantitative valuation of these effects will never be perfect**, the outcome of **attempts to assess value provides important information to help guide decisionmaking**.¶ ¶ Decisions, decisions¶ ¶ Management and policy decisions typically involve difficult tradeoffs that bring improvements in some dimensions and declines in others. Ultimately, deciding whether to choose management or policy alternative A or B requires an evaluation of whether A or B is “better,” where better is determined by the objectives of the decisionmaker. It is easy to conclude that one alternative is better than another if it is better in all dimensions. But making comparisons in which one alternative is better in some dimensions but worse in others requires making difficult value judgments. For example, clearing land for housing development may result in higher incomes and more jobs but reduce habitat for species and worsen local water quality. Whether land clearing is the right decision will depend on whether an increase in incomes and jobs is valued more highly than maintaining habitat and water quality. But how can one really compare income versus habitat for species or jobs versus water quality? Comparing across these different dimensions seems like comparing the proverbial apples and oranges. Reaching an environmental management or policy decision, though, requires the decisionmaker to compare apples and oranges, either explicitly or implicitly.¶ ¶ For an individual, deciding which college to attend, where to live, or what job to take is often a hard choice to make, in large part because it involves changes in multiple dimensions simultaneously. Moving to a new job in a new city may be a better professional opportunity and offer a new set of cultural amenities, but is it worth disrupting family life, moving away from friends, and making adjustments to a new community? Though it is difficult to compare such alternatives, people do make these decisions all the time. In choosing an option, taking account of all the factors, people make a determination that one option is better than the other available options.¶ ¶ As difficult as such choices can be for an individual, making environmental management and policy decisions adds yet another level of complexity. Such decisions affect many people simultaneously and thus require finding a way to aggregate values across different people to reach a decision. Management and policy decisions can make some groups better off while making others worse off, requiring a different sort of apples-and-oranges comparison.¶ ¶ Two methods used in such multidimensional, multiperson decisionmaking contexts are economic benefit/cost calculations and multicriteria decision analysis (MCDA). Each of these methods transforms a complex multidimensional problem involving multiple people into a single dimension that can be used to rank alternatives. These methods act like a blender that mixes apples and oranges to produce a fruit smoothie. Decisionmakers can then decide which fruit smoothie they like the best.¶ ¶ Economics reduces multidimensional problems to a single dimension by measuring the value of changes in each dimension with a common metric, which is typically, but not necessarily, a monetary metric. Economist8s tend to prefer a monetary metric because it is a pervasive, intuitive, and easily observable measure of the values that people attribute to an array of everyday goods and services. In wellfunctioning markets, the price of a good or service reflects its marginal value to the buyer measured in terms of the common monetary metric: what the buyer is willing to pay to have the good or service. This fact makes the marginal values of many very different goods and services commensurable. The concept extends even to environmental attributes that do not have a market value, such as clean air, as long as people are willing to make tradeoffs in their consumption of some market goods in order to obtain other nonmarket attributes.¶ ¶ The ability to measure values with a common monetary metric rests on two key premises. First, individual willingness to pay for an item is assumed to accurately represent the value of that item to the individual: that is, how much better off the individual is with the item than without the item, measured in monetary terms. Second, the aggregation of values to the societal level requires that the correspondence between willingness to pay and well-being be comparable across individuals, so that a measure of societal value is equal to the (appropriately weighted) sum of values across all individuals in society. This comparability is necessary in order to do benefit/cost analysis resulting in a single number that summarizes social net benefits.¶ ¶ With the ability to produce an aggregate social net benefit calculation for any policy option, the economic benefit/cost decision rule is simple: Choose the option that maximizes social net benefits. This simple rule can be extended to account for uncertainty by maximizing expected social net benefits, where net benefits for individuals can include risk aversion (that is, a willingness to pay to avoid being subjected to uncertain outcomes). The decision rule can also incorporate constraints that restrict outcomes, so that they do not violate minimum environmental standards or basic human rights. As noted, however, the social net benefit calculation requires that individuals evaluate multiple dimensions with a single monetary metric of value and that these values be comparable across individuals. Without such interpersonal comparability, management or policy changes resulting in both winners and losers cannot be evaluated. In this case, only alternatives in which everyone is better off are clearly superior, and such alternatives are extremely unlikely to emerge.¶ ¶ Benefit/cost calculations have been applied to a wide variety of environmental policies. All recent presidents, both Democratic and Republican, have required agencies to evaluate the benefits and costs of regulations, including environmental regulations. Executive Order 12866 signed by President Clinton in 1993 states that agencies “shall assess both the costs and the benefits of the intended regulation” and “in choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, agencies should select those approaches that maximize net benefits” The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has done extensive benefit/cost calculations of regulations, particularly regulations under the Clean Air Act. The EPA estimated that the 1990 Clean Air Act would provide benefits of $2 trillion between 1990 and 2020 while imposing costs of $65 billion, a benefit-to-cost ratio of approximately 30-to-1. A prior study of the benefits and costs of the Clean Air Act from 1970 to 1990 found a similarly large benefitto-cost ratio.¶ ¶ The economic benefit/cost approach to maximizing social net benefits may be thought of as belonging to the broader class of MCDA methods, all of which require explicit or implicit weighting of various attributes of expected outcomes of management or policy decisions. Although some MCDA methods accommodate only quantitative attributes, others also permit qualitative attributes. Given attributes and weights, different MCDA methods take different approaches to evaluating alternatives. Some methods seek to identify the best alternative, similar to the economic approach of maximizing social net benefits, while others, such as goal programming, seek to identify alternatives that meet certain thresholds of performance. In goal programming, aspirational or minimally acceptable thresholds are set for each criterion, and alternatives are evaluated according to the priority-weighted distances by which criteria fall short of these thresholds. In general, MCDA methods seek to maximize a social welfare function of a particular, often implicit, form.¶ ¶ Setting relative values¶ ¶ To be operational, benefit/cost and MCDA methods require information on relative values (weights) for different dimensions of value affected by environmental management or policy. Economics and decision sciences tend to take different approaches to assembling information about values. In economics, the values of different management or policy options are derived from aggregating the net benefits to individuals in society for that option. In decision sciences, a variety of methods are used to assemble information on weights to assign to different dimensions.¶ ¶ The task of the economist in understanding relative values for an individual is far easier for marketed goods and services than for nonmarketed environmental attributes. For marketed goods and services, economists use observations on how much is purchased at a given price over a range of different prices to construct a demand function. The demand function summarizes information on the willingness to pay of the individual for the good or service. In competitive markets, the supply function reflects the marginal cost of producing the good or service. Demand and supply can be used to define economic surplus, which is the difference between the (marginal) willingness to pay given by demand and the marginal cost of production given by supply. Summing up this difference over the entire quantity traded is equal to economic surplus; that is, the value generated from the production and consumption of the good or service.¶ ¶ Some environmental changes directly affect marketed goods and services, and the value of these effects can be evaluated by assessing the net change in economic surplus in the affected markets. Take, for example, the potential effects of excess nutrients in a body of water that cause dead zones (areas of low oxygen), resulting in lowered fish and shellfish populations and reduced commercial harvests. With basic information about consumer demand and the costs of supply, economists can estimate the expected loss in economic surplus from the reduction in harvests. Adjustments to economic surplus calculations are necessary when market imperfections, such as monopoly pricing, taxes, or subsidies, result in price distortions so that prices are not a true reflection of the value of marketed goods and services.¶ ¶ The concept of economic surplus (value) also applies to environmental attributes, such as clean air or access to natural areas, for which there is no market. Valuing nonmarket goods and services is more difficult, because there is no readily observable signal of value that is comparable to a marke8t price. Economists have devised a suite of nonmarket valuation tools that can be applied to value nonmarketed environmental attributes. Some nonmarket valuation methods use observable expenditure on a different marketed good or service to draw an inference about the value of the nonmarketed environmental attribute of interest. For example, housing prices may reflect the increased willingness to pay for housing in locations with better environmental amenities, such as access to lakes and parks or better air quality. The choice of where to recreate can reveal information about the relative value of environmental amenities that vary across recreation sites. Other methods of estimating value record changes in expenditures, such as changes in the cost to treat drinking water with changes in water quality.¶ ¶ Economists cannot use observed expenditures to value all important changes to the environment. For example, if all of the lakes in a region are polluted and no one uses them for recreation, it will be difficult to assess the value of reducing pollution on recreational value, unless one is willing to make inferences from other regions. More fundamentally, there are limited or no directly observable expenditures or other behavioral clues for some environment attributes, particularly non-use benefits such as knowing that species exist. In Antonio Briceño, Overfishing, from the Millions of Pieces: Only One Puzzle Project, Digital c-print on Fuji Crystal Archival paper, 21 x 60 inches, 2010. the absence of observable behavior, economists use survey questions to ask people about values for changes in environmental attributes. Such “stated preference” methods include contingent valuation and conjoint analysis. The contingent valuation method presents survey respondents with a hypothetical change in the environment, such as a 10% increase in the size of humpback whale populations, and asks whether they would be willing to pay a specified amount for the change. Varying the specified amount and observing the proportion of people saying yes generates information analogous to a demand curve for marketed goods and services. In conjoint analysis, people are asked to rank a series of outcomes that differ in the quantities of various attributes. Conjoint analysis allows direct evaluation of how people trade off one attribute versus another, such as an improvement in air quality versus greater access to open space. If one of the attributes is income or expenditure, then the analyst can also estimate willingness to pay.¶ ¶ Some actions, such as emissions of greenhouse gases, cause changes in multiple dimensions that occur over extended periods. For example, a change in carbon storage in ecosystems that reduces atmospheric concentrations causes changes in climate forcing and ocean acidification, which in turn affect myriad other environmental attributes, including precipitation patterns, with effects on agricultural production, the probability and severity of flooding, and the health of marine resources, among others. Summarizing the value of all these changes into a single estimate of the social cost of carbon (SCC) requires complex integrated assessment models that predict both environmental and economic outcomes and attach estimates of the value of those outcomes. Further complicating matters, SCC estimates depend on levels of emissions that can be affected by the very policy choice that SCC is meant to inform. For this reason and others, such as the choice of social discount rate, the estimates of the SCC range from near zero to hundreds of dollars per ton of carbon.¶ ¶ Instead of the often-complex process of economic valuation, MCDA typically relies on a set of alternative methods for establishing relative values or weights on different criteria, to be chosen by the decisionmakers. The identification of weights may be done by introspection, deliberation, or negotiation—or some combination of the three—among stakeholders. Setting relative weights may also be done as part of an iterative process in which alternatives are evaluated, weights reassessed in light of the evaluation, and new criteria weights applied.¶ ¶ One example of how relative weights for different criteria are set in MCDA is through application of the analytical hierarchy process. In this process, decisionmakers are asked to determine a set of top-level criteria, and within each of these to determine the subcomponent criteria. They are then asked to rank the relative importance of criteria at each level of the hierarchy. For example, suppose a decisionmaker is evaluating policies aimed at controlling non–point-source pollution from agriculture with two overarching criteria of water quality and economic effects. If these criteria are assigned equal importance, then each receives a weight of 0.5. At the next level of hierarchy, suppose that the water quality criteria include water clarity, dissolved oxygen content, and temperature, and that the economic criteria include farm income and jobs. If the decisionmaker believes that water clarity is twice as important as dissolved oxygen, and dissolved oxygen is twice as important as temperature, their weights at this level of hierarchy are 4/7, 2/7, and 1/7, respectively. Suppose that jobs are ranked as twice as important as farm income, then the weights would be 2/3 and 1/3. The overall weights in the analysis would then be 0.5 times these values: 2/7 for water clarity, 1/7 for dissolved oxygen content, 1/14 for water temperature, 1/3 for jobs, and 1/6 for farm income.¶ ¶ A potentially important difference between economic and MCDA approaches to valuation is in whose values are incorporated. In principle, valuation in benefit/cost assessments includes the value of everyone affected by management or policy choices, though in practice there may be questions about whether economic valuation methods accurately reflect societal values. In MCDA, it is typically a smaller subset of people that is involved in setting relative weights. For local-scale problems, MCDA methods could include all affected parties in a deliberative process, but as the scale of the problem grows, this will not be possible. For larger-scale environmental problems, ranging up to global concerns such as climate change, there is the question of representation and whether those present adequately reflect the views of the wider public. In addition, relative weights in MCDA should not be treated as constant but should reflect changes in circumstances, something that is typically captured in economic valuation methods.¶ ¶ Weighty issues¶ ¶ Any environmental management or policy decision is likely to entail winners and losers. How should the distribution of benefits and costs across groups be treated in environmental management and policy decisions? Critics of benefit/cost analysis contend that reliance on economic valuation systematically disadvantages those with less money. Greater wealth means greater ability (and thus willingness) to pay, so benefit/cost analysis effectively gives more weight to those with more money (“voting with dollars”). One way to answer this criticism is to give a higher weight to the values of those with less wealth. Economists have found considerable evidence of diminishing marginal utility of income, meaning that the value of an additional dollar to a poor person is greater than to a rich person. This fact can be used to justify “equity weights” based on differences in wealth. For example, an equity weight argument would mean that otherwise equal damages from future climate change should be given greater weight in low-income countries than in high-income countries. In addition, if society is committed to protecting the interests of particular groups, it can constrain consideration of options to those that achieve specified distributional goals.¶ ¶ Since the effects of alternative environmental management and policy options will differ across generations, a fundamental challenge in valuing environmental management and policy decisions is how to aggregate benefits and costs that accrue to current and future generations (inter-generational distribution). For example, more aggressive climate change mitigation strategies impose costs on the current generation but generate benefits for future generations.Economists typically use discounting to aggregate benefits and costs over time. The standard economic rationale for discounting is that investments yield a positive expected real rate of return, so that having a dollar today is worth more than having a dollar in the future. Costs and benefits realized at different points in time are thus commensurable in present value terms after discounting.¶ ¶ The standard discounting approach works well for nearterm private investment decisions, but what about for longterm social decisions affecting the welfare of future generations? If one accepts the principle of equal moral standing of all generations, there would seem to be little ethical justification for discounting future welfare. Frank Ramsay, the father of economic approaches to discounting and growth theory, maintained that it was “ethically indefensible” to treat the welfare of current and future generations differently. However, to the extent that future generations are expected to be better off than the current generation, discounting can be justified as an intergenerational application of equity weights. By the same principle, if environmental conditions worsen significantly and future generations are expected to be less well off than the present generation, this would imply a negative discount rate; that is, discounting of present benefits relative to future benefits. As recent debates on climate change policy aptly illustrate, there is little agreement among economists, or between economists and others, on discounting.¶ ¶ Uncertainty is a central issue in environmental management and policy. Uncertainty enters at various steps in the link between management and policy choices and eventual effects on the value of outcomes. There can be uncertainty about how changes in management or policy affect choices made by individuals and businesses (behavioral uncertainty), how changes in human actions affect the environment (scientific uncertainty), and how consequent changes in the environment will affect human well-being (value uncertainty). Recent work on the value of ecosystems services illustrates each of these uncertainties. For example, the Conservation Reserve Program, which pays landowners for taking land out of production and restores perennial vegetation, can shift patterns of land use and, in turn, result in changes in carbon sequestration, water quality, and habitat provision. Program participation and the provision of services depend on the choices of individual landowners, which are uncertain. There are key gaps in the science linking land use to service provision, such as how changes in land use will affect changes in carbon storage in soil or populations of particular species, making provision uncertain even when behavioral uncertainty is ignored. There are also key gaps in information pertaining to the link between services and benefits, making value uncertain even if provision is known. The value of water quality improvement, for example, depends as much on who uses the water and for what purpose as on the water quality itself.¶ ¶ Economic approaches typically use an expected utility framework to deal with uncertainty, where the value of each potential outcome is weighted by its probability of occurrence. This approach summarizes expected social net benefits across dimensions, as discussed above, but also across all possible outcomes that could occur given a management or policy choice. Using the expected utility framework, however, requires information about probabilities as well as values under all potential outcomes. For environmental issues involving complex system dynamics, such as climate change or the provision of ecosystem services, the list of possible outcomes in the future may be unknown, much less how to specify probabilities or likely values for each of these outcomes. Beyond the challenge of scientific uncertainty, there may also be uncertainty about the preferences of future generation and how they will value various outcomes. Inability to objectively quantify probabilities or values requires modifying expected utility, such as by using subjective judgments to establish probabilities or values, or setting bounds on decisions thought to pose unacceptable risks (for example, safe minimum standards). A particular challenge to making decisions under uncertainty arises from consideration of catastrophic outcomes. It is difficult to set probabilities on such events because they are rare, but small changes in assumptions about these probabilities can lead to large changes in policy advice.¶ ¶ People make mistakes, often in systematic and predictable ways. They tend to be overly optimistic, biased toward the present, and averse to losses. They have trouble thinking through complex problems, especially those with uncertainty. Given these facts, some analysts question the validity of using valuation studies that rely on observed choices, survey responses, or even deliberative processes among affected parties as an important input for setting environmental policy**. The alternative**, however, **would be to delegate judgments about the relative value of outcomes to political leaders or scientific experts**. Elected leaders, at least in theory, should reflect public values. Environmental scientists, however, have no special claim to understanding public values. In either case, there is no guarantee that top-down decisions will reflect the underlying values of the public at large any better than an imperfect reflection of values gathered through valuation exercises.¶ ¶ In principle, economic valuation methods can estimate value for all environmental attributes, either through inferences from observable behavior or responses in stated preference surveys. In practice, however, it is generally not possible to get a complete economic assessment of all environmental values. Some values connected with the environment are notoriously difficult to assess in monetary terms. For example, what is the monetary value of conserving species with important spiritual or cultural value? Some critics contend that individuals are cognitively incapable of evaluating tradeoffs between utilitarian goods (such as commodities and ecosystem services) and moral goods (such as the existence of a species). There are sharp disagreements between psychologists and economists—and among economists themselves—on this point. Even when it is possible in principle to estimate monetary values, there may be insufficient data to do so. Nevertheless, economic methods can provide evidence about the value of many important environmental attributes.¶ ¶ The value of valuation¶ ¶ Though difficult, collecting information about the relative values of alternative potential outcomes, in all of their multiple dimensions, is vital to good environmental management and policy decisionmaking. Setting environmental policy is not simply a matter of applying the best science, as important as that is. **Environmental management and policy typically involve making decisions about tradeoffs** among multiple objectives about which society cares. **Making decisions about such tradeoffs involves making value judgments.** If these judgments are to improve human wellbeing, they should reflect the underlying values of individuals affected by the policy.¶ ¶ Economic valuation methods applied in the context of environmental management and policy seek to inform decisionmaking by collecting information about the value of alternatives to affected individuals and then aggregating these values to determine an estimate of social net benefits. In simple benefit/cost analysis, the management or policy option with the highest social net benefits should then be the preferred option. The great advantage of the simple benefit/cost approach is that it incorporates economic valuation methods to represent values of the affected public, summarizes this information into a single ranking, and uses this ranking to help guide policy. Valuation information can also be combined with other decisions rules, such as those that minimize the risk of bad outcomes occurring.

**Radical alternatives pave the way for authoritarian environmentalism.**

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For me, **the main worry** emerging from such considerations **is not that liberal societies are incapable of embracing meaningful change towards "eco-sanity**", such that anarchism is the only hope. That hope seems more unrealistic - more utopian in that sense - than that of liberal reform. **The main worry is that those from the authoritarian end of the spectrum will convince people that the liberal mainstream is inherently incapable of reform, and** so **must be replaced by more coercive forms of green politics**, **and people from the radical left will help with the critique**, **provide no realistic, non-utopian alternative** themselves, **thus leaving the door open for the "Leviathan or oblivion" school: nakedly authoritarian, radically hierarchical programmes** regarding substantive political equality as an obstacle to progress. 10) Sometimes the point about the practical need to oppose the state is made with impatience about philosophy and abstract theorizing. This does not apply to Carter. But it does to Sale, for example, who denounces abstract philosophical discussion of ethical responses to the "environmental crisis", mainly because dithering over abstruse conceptual matters is to ignore the simple practical issue of scale. '°4 **It would be better if those with such powerful rhetorical skills used them to further the green cause as continuous with furthering the liberal cause against** more **reactionary elements**. Perhaps this is **particularly** true **in the USA**, **clearly the main player in the scientific-industrial-capitalist global order and, in terms of environmental policy agenda**, in various ways a beacon of unreconstructed unreason. **That would** probably **be of greater practical benefit than giving fellow citizens of the modern world a collection of quasi-religiose blueprinting ideas** coloured with the dismal tinge of an anxious instrumentalism. That is, **it seems more practically feasible to seek to work with the flow of modernity in order to help channel it on to a course more respectful of nature**. That it is, in principle, possible to do this within the terms of what is often taken to be the main political philosophy of modernity, has been the point of this book.

**Command and control and regulations don’t set a price signal – invites litigation not innovation**

**Hsu 11** (Shi-Ling Hsu, Professor of Law at University of British Columbia – previously Associate Prof at George Washington School of Law, Senior Attorney & Economist for the Environmental Law Institute The Case for a Carbon Tax: Getting Past our Hang-ups to Effective Climate Policy, Island Press] Page 33-34)

In the United States, command-and-control regulation of green- house gas emissions would fall under the ambit of the Clean Air Act. The EPA, having issued the finding that greenhouse gas emissions,"18 "endanger" the "public health and welfare, is empowered to issue regulations, industry by industry, pertaining to greenhouse gas reduction measures that will be requited as a condition of a permit under the Clean Air Act. The Canadian counterpart to EPA, Environment Canada, issued an analogous finding far earlier (in 2005), that green- house gases fell within a statutory definition of "toxic substances," in that they, among other effects, "have or may have an immediate or long-term harmful effect on the environment or its biological diver- sitv."19 Environment Canada is thus also positioned to issue command- and-control-style greenhouse gas regulations, although other forms of regulation are possible under the Canadian statute.

One might think that command-and-control regulation, by potentially imposing the highest price on emitters, would be the most effective in re-ordering economies to be lower-carbon. The mistake is to equate an administrative price with a market price. Under command- and-control regulation, an administrative price is imposed by an agency. This price need not bear any relation to greenhouse gas emissions. Most often, the key consideration in setting standards is the state of technology of pollution abatement. If abatement technology seems "cheap" or "feasible," then it likely factors into the setting of an administrative standard. This is, in very rough measure, an agency's at- tempt to balance costs and benefits: if requiring abatement technology seems somehow "worth it," by an eyeball estimate of the compliance costs and environmental benefits, then it becomes law.

Over the past several decades, command-and-control regulation has been continuously and successfully attacked on efficiency grounds. The most common arguments ate that: (i) command-and-control **regulation is clumsy**, its uniformity of standards **sometimes too stringent** and **sometimes too lenient**, resulting in wasteful over-abatement m some cases and missed opportunities to abate more in other cases, (ii) fails to strike a correct balance between costs and benefits as administrative agencies make poor guesses about compliance costs, (iii) being a fixed administrative price, fails to offer incentives for emitters to **find innovative ways of reducing emissions**, and (iv) provides **fodder for delay and litigation** by well-funded and disgruntled industry groups.

These well-rehearsed criticisms are thoroughly treated elsewhere. I argue here that, in addition to these arguments, command-and- control **regulation sends an uneven price signal** to greenhouse gas emitters. While there is controversy over the amount of damages from greenhouse gas emissions, it is still worth making the price proportional to greenhouse gas emissions. Command-and-**c**ontrol regulation, be- cause it imposes a different requirement for each industry, imposes a different price for each industry. A price signal that is different from one industry to another **is no price signal at all**, if the goal is to sort industries by carbon emissions. If the price wanes from industry to industry, then the sorting is not accomplished by carbon emissions, but by an administrative agency. Moreover, command-and-control regulation has in the past generated so much litigation, the **administrative "price" often does not emerge at all**. Because the locus of so much decision making and adjudication is at the administrative agency, and be- cause these decisions and adjudications invariably invite comparisons with those that affect other industries, perceptions of unfairness (accurate or not) run rampant through command-and-control regulation. So not only does an uneven price signal frustrate greenhouse gas reduction objectives, but sometimes litigation or just the threat of litigation **erases the price signal completely.**

# 2AC

## Theory

#### Creating disparate racial disclosure standards reproduces a form of violent coercive mimeticism that amplifies antiblackness

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Part of what I am talking about here is what the Lacanian Latino Studies scholar Antonio Viego (2007) refers to as “coercive mimeticism,” an institutional and social practice whereby there are certain ways in which ethnic minorities must act, believe, dress, and be in order to present themselves as “recognizably ethnic,” as Latino-enough, as Black-enough, as Asian-enough, and so forth. It is mimetic insofar as one has to look into the mirror of ethnic identity and adapt oneself to that image, reproducing a very particular ego-identity, one that is often a poor fit to one’s more immediate subjective experience. It is also coercive in that there are institutional, cultural, and societal pressures to conform to that notion of identity in order to find one’s place in the coordinates of race and ethnicity – essentially, to be allotted a place on the color line. We are to take up our respective place on the chessboard as Black or White, pawns in a much bigger and deadlier game. Here we can glean both the imaginary and symbolic functions of racial object maps. These object maps provide coherence and integration in the imaginary to an otherwise chaotic collection of signifiers – the racialized bodies in which we exist. At the same time, racial object maps yield symbolic categories of me and not-me, Black and White, and a language with which to organize and regulate closeness, distance, and racial desire. Conversely, what is contained, or to be more precise, excluded, through the symbolic and imaginary operations of the object map is the Real dimension of race – the ever shifting, anxiety-producing, formless nature of the color line. When ambiguously ethnic subjects fail to see their image in the mirror, when they are unable to play the language games of race and racial signification, there is a noticeable discomfort and anxiety that sets in among those who partake in the production of coercive mimeticism. The illusion of the color line comes into focus, disrupting how we see and define racialized bodies, evoking the fragmented and uncoordinated nature of the child’s body prior to Lacan’s (2005a, b) mirror stage. The illusion of wholeness, of being a whole body-ego – whether White, Black, or Brown – falters, revealing the destitute, undifferentiated, and broken nature of race and racial identity. To survive the encounter with the Real of race, I argue, paves the way for a unique kind of freedom. To give one example, a Puerto Rican-ness is more malleable, flexible, and non-linear than one bound into one static form and yields a fluidity that fosters experimental and novel ways of responding to oppression. This fluidity at the same time can validate the ghosts of one’s ancestors while integrating their wisdom into new, emancipatory potentialities. To be clear, I am not denying the importance of addressing colorism, racism, and the privileging of white skin that exists in the Latino community and other ethnic minorities (not to mention society as a whole). It is important for us to have that conversation, and point out how notions of mestizaje, of hybridity in the Latino experience, may mask underlying tensions around race and skin color, and render the relative privilege of light-skinned Latinos such as myself invisible. At the same time, I am proposing that we also have a conversation that is perpendicular to a critique of racism and colorism, intersecting with it but going towards a different vector. How we exclude one another based on not meeting certain expectations about what it means to be Latino, Asian, Black, etc., threatens to disempower us further, limiting our political power by carving out a “minority of a minority” as opposed to sustaining often difficult conversations about our sameness and difference. Similarly, as Baratunde Thurston (2011) points out in his recent book, How to be Black, often this kind of black-checking or color-checking narrows our vision of what it means to be Black (or Latino, or Asian, etc.). Reflecting on his own sense of his Blackness, he writes, “One of the most consistent themes in my own experience… is this notion of discovering your own Blackness by embracing the new, the different, the uncommon, and, simply, yourself” (p. 218). Color-checking prevents us from experimenting with different forms of dis-identification which enrich, challenge, and nourish us, and which hold the promise of new forms of resistance, emancipation, and psychosocial revolt. As I argue, these perpendicular conversations push and pull toward different trajectories, but have as their intersection the most crucial nexus of political, cultural, and social justice. So what am I, in the end? I am whatever you want me to be: oppressor, oppressed, cracker, spic, enemy, friend, White, Black, lover, fighter, masculine, effeminate, strong, weak, dead or alive. Just know that with each turn, each attempt to define me, to mark me, to confine and bind me, you free me. Like the hysteric who produces ever shifting configurations of symptoms in order to throw the obsessive physician off guard (see Gherovici, 2003), I will keep producing knowledge of something else, something other, something that is incalculable and undefinable. Something Real. For you I’ll become a Hispanic hysteric, screeching Foucault (1972) with each symptom, with each episode of acting out, “Do not ask me who I am and do not ask me to remain the same” (p. 17). Because in the end this is not really about me, or where I stand on the color line. It is about your illusion about where you stand and where you place yourself in the coordinates of race and ethnicity, of self and other, of Black and White. In that sense I function as your blank screen, receiving your projections and identifications, hopefully returning them to you as knowledge productions that question, destabilize, and decenter your ego, paving the way for the subject that slides in the link between signifier and signified, that does not know if it is caused by the signifier or the signified of race, but is instead, its own cause.

#### Being rude isn’t a voting issue, their interp trivializes antiblack violence and reinforces hostile race relations

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Call-out culture refers to the tendency among progressives, radicals, activists, and community organizers to publicly name instances or patterns of oppressive behaviour and language use by others. People can be called out for statements and actions that are sexist, racist, ableist, and the list goes on. Because call-outs tend to be public, they can enable a particularly armchair and academic brand of activism: one in which the act of calling out is seen as an end in itself. What makes call-out culture so toxic is not necessarily its frequency so much as the nature and performance of the call-outitself. Especially in online venues like Twitter and Facebook, calling someone out isn’t just a private interaction between two individuals: it’s a public performance where people can demonstrate their wit or how pure their politics are. Indeed, sometimes it can feel like the performance itself is more significant than the content of the call-out. This is why “calling in” has been proposed as an alternative to calling out: calling in means speaking privately with an individual who has done some wrong, in order to address the behaviour without making a spectacle of the address itself. In the context of call-out culture, it is easy to forget that the individual we are calling out is a human being, and that different human beings in different social locations will be receptive to different strategies for learning and growing. For instance, most call-outs I have witnessed immediately render anyone who has committed a perceived wrong as an outsider to the community. One action becomes a reason to pass judgment on someone’s entire being, as if there is no difference between a community member or friend and a random stranger walking down the street (who is of course also someone’s friend). Call-out culture can end up mirroring what the prison industrial complex teaches us about crime and punishment: to banish and dispose of individuals rather than to engage with them as people with complicated stories and histories. It isn’t an exaggeration to say that there is a mild totalitarian undercurrent not just in call-out culture but also in how progressive communities police and define the bounds of who’s in and who’s out. More often than not, this boundary is constructed through the use of appropriate language and terminology – a language and terminology that are forever shifting and almost impossible to keep up with. In such a context, it is impossible not to fail at least some of the time. And what happens when someone has mastered proficiency in languages of accountability and then learned to justify all of their actions by falling back on that language? How do we hold people to account who are experts at using anti-oppressive language to justify oppressive behaviour? We don’t have a word to describe this kind of perverse exercise of power, despite the fact that it occurs on an almost daily basis in progressive circles. Perhaps we could call it anti-oppressivism. Humour often plays a role in call-out culture and by drawing attention to this I am not saying that wit has no place in undermining oppression; humour can be one of the most useful tools available to oppressed people. But when people are reduced to their identities of privilege (as white, cisgender, male, etc.) and mocked as such, it means we’re treating each other as if our individual social locations stand in for the total systems those parts of our identities represent. Individuals become synonymous with systems of oppression, and this can turn systemic analysis into moral judgment. Too often, when it comes to being called out, narrow definitions of a person’s identity count for everything. No matter the wrong we are naming, there are ways to call people out that do not reduce individuals to agents of social advantage. There are ways of calling people out that are compassionate and creative, and that recognize the whole individual instead of viewing them simply as representations of the systems from which they benefit. Paying attention to these other contexts will mean refusing to unleash all of our very real trauma onto the psyches of those we imagine represent the systems that oppress us. Given the nature of online social networks, call-outs are not going away any time soon. But reminding ourselves of what a call-out is meant to accomplish will go a long way toward creating the kinds of substantial, material changes in people’s behaviour – and in community dynamics – that we envision and need

#### “Surrender to Blackness” is worse for community formation, reifies trauma, and actively strengthens anti-Black structures by marginalizing Black people opposed to their strategy

Táíwò, 20—assistant professor of philosophy at Georgetown University (Olúfémi, “Being-in-the-Room Privilege: Elite Capture and Epistemic Deference,” The Philosopher, vol. 108, no. 4, dml)

I think it’s less about the core ideas and more about the prevailing norms that convert them into practice. The call to “listen to the most affected” or “centre the most marginalized” is ubiquitous in many academic and activist circles. But it’s never sat well with me. In my experience, when people say they need to “listen to the most affected”, it isn’t because they intend to set up Skype calls to refugee camps or to collaborate with houseless people. Instead, it has more often meant handing conversational authority and attentional goods to those who most snugly fit into the social categories associated with these ills – regardless of what they actually do or do not know, or what they have or have not personally experienced. In the case of my conversation with Helen, my racial category tied me more “authentically” to an experience that neither of us had had. She was called to defer to me by the rules of the game as we understood it. Even where stakes are high – where potential researchers are discussing how to understand a social phenomenon, where activists are deciding what to target – these rules often prevail.

The trap wasn’t that standpoint epistemology was affecting the conversation, but how. Broadly, the norms of putting standpoint epistemology into practice call for practices of deference: giving offerings, passing the mic, believing. These are good ideas in many cases, and the norms that ask us to be ready to do them stem from admirable motivations: a desire to increase the social power of marginalized people identified as sources of knowledge and rightful targets of deferential behaviour. But deferring in this way as a rule or default political orientation can actually work counter to marginalized groups’ interests, especially in elite spaces.

Some rooms have outsize power and influence: the Situation Room, the newsroom, the bargaining table, the conference room. Being in these rooms means being in a position to affect institutions and broader social dynamics by way of deciding what one is to say and do. Access to these rooms is itself a kind of social advantage, and one often gained through some prior social advantage. From a societal standpoint, the “most affected” by the social injustices we associate with politically important identities like gender, class, race, and nationality are disproportionately likely to be incarcerated, underemployed, or part of the 44 percent of the world’s population without internet access – and thus both left out of the rooms of power and largely ignored by the people in the rooms of power. Individuals who make it past the various social selection pressures that filter out those social identities associated with these negative outcomes are most likely to be in the room. That is, they are most likely to be in the room precisely because of ways in which they are systematically different from (and thus potentially unrepresentative of) the very people they are then asked to represent in the room.

I suspected that Helen’s offer was a trap. She was not the one who set it, but it threatened to ensnare us both all the same. Broader cultural norms – the sort set in motion by prefacing statements with “As a Black man…” – cued up a set of standpoint-respecting practices that many of us know consciously or unconsciously by rote. However, the forms of deference that often follow are ultimately self-undermining and only reliably serve “elite capture”: the control over political agendas and resources by a group’s most advantaged people. If we want to use standpoint epistemology to challenge unjust power arrangements, it’s hard to imagine how we could do worse.

To say what’s wrong with the popular, deferential applications of standpoint epistemology, we need to understand what makes it popular. A number of cynical answers present themselves: some (especially the more socially advantaged) don’t genuinely want social change – they just want the appearance of it. Alternatively, deference to figures from oppressed communities is a performance that sanitizes, apologizes for, or simply distracts from the fact that the deferrer has enough “in the room” privilege for their “lifting up” of a perspective to be of consequence.

I suspect there is some truth to these views, but I am unsatisfied. Many of the people who support and enact these deferential norms are rather like Helen: motivated by the right reasons, but trusting people they share such rooms with to help them find the proper practical expression of their joint moral commitments. We don’t need to attribute bad faith to all or even most of those who interpret standpoint epistemology deferentially to explain the phenomenon, and it’s not even clear it would help. Bad “roommates” aren’t the problem for the same reason that Helen being a good roommate wasn’t the solution: the problem emerges from how the rooms themselves are constructed and managed.

To return to the initial example with Helen, the issue wasn’t merely that I hadn’t grown up in the kind of low-income, redlined community she was imagining. The epistemic situation was much worse than this. Many of the facts about me that made my life chances different from those of the people she was imagining were the very same facts that made me likely to be offered things on their behalf. If I had grown up in such a community, we probably wouldn’t have been on the phone together.

Many aspects of our social system serve as filtering mechanisms, determining which interactions happen and between whom, and thus which social patterns people are in a position to observe. For the majority of the 20th century, the U.S. quota system of immigration made legal immigration with a path to citizenship almost exclusively available to Europeans (earning Hitler’s regard as the obvious “leader in developing explicitly racist policies of nationality and immigration”). But the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act opened up immigration possibilities, with a preference for “skilled labour”.

My parents’ qualification as skilled labourers does much to explain their entry into the country and the subsequent class advantages and monetary resources (such as wealth) that I was born into. We are not atypical: the Nigerian-American population is one of the country’s most successful immigrant populations (what no one mentions, of course, is that the 112,000 or so Nigerian-Americans with advanced degrees is utterly dwarfed by the 82 million Nigerians who live on less than a dollar a day, or how the former fact intersects with the latter). The selectivity of immigration law helps explain the rates of educational attainment of the Nigerian diasporic community that raised me, which in turn helps explain my entry into the exclusive Advanced Placement and Honours classes in high school, which in turn helps explain my access to higher education...and so on, and so on.

It is easy, then, to see how this deferential form of standpoint epistemology contributes to elite capture at scale. The rooms of power and influence are at the end of causal chains that have selection effects. As you get higher and higher forms of education, social experiences narrow – some students are pipelined to PhDs and others to prisons. Deferential ways of dealing with identity can inherit the distortions caused by these selection processes.

​But it’s equally easy to see locally – in this room, in this academic literature or field, in this conversation – why this deference seems to make sense. It is often an improvement on the epistemic procedure that preceded it: the person deferred to may well be better epistemically positioned than the others in the room. It may well be the best we can do while holding fixed most of the facts about the rooms themselves: what power resides in them, who is admitted.

But these are the last facts we should want to hold fixed. Doing better than the epistemic norms we’ve inherited from a history of explicit global apartheid is an awfully low bar to set. The facts that explain who ends up in which room shape our world much more powerfully than the squabbles for comparative prestige between people who have already made it into the rooms. And when the conversation is about social justice, the mechanisms of the social system that determine who gets into which room often just are the parts of society we aim to address. For example, the fact that incarcerated people cannot participate in academic discussions about freedom that physically take place on campus is intimately related to the fact that they are locked in cages.

Deference epistemology marks itself as a solution to an epistemic and political problem. But not only does it fail to solve these problems, it adds new ones. One might think questions of justice ought to be primarily concerned with fixing disparities around health care, working conditions, and basic material and interpersonal security. Yet conversations about justice have come to be shaped by people who have ever more specific practical advice about fixing the distribution of attention and conversational power. Deference practices that serve attention-focused campaigns (e.g. we’ve read too many white men, let’s now read some people of colour) can fail on their own highly questionable terms: attention to spokespeople from marginalized groups could, for example, direct attention away from the need to change the social system that marginalizes them.

Elites from marginalized groups can benefit from this arrangement in ways that are compatible with social progress. But treating group elites’ interests as necessarily or even presumptively aligned with full group interests involves a political naiveté we cannot afford. Such treatment of elite interests functions as a racial Reaganomics: a strategy reliant on fantasies about the exchange rate between the attention economy and the material economy.

Perhaps the lucky few who get jobs finding the most culturally authentic and cosmetically radical description of the continuing carnage are really winning one for the culture. Then, after we in the chattering class get the clout we deserve and secure the bag, its contents will eventually trickle down to the workers who clean up after our conferences, to slums of the Global South’s megacities, to its countryside.

But probably not.

A fuller and fairer assessment of what is going on with deference and standpoint epistemology would go beyond technical argument, and contend with the emotional appeals of this strategy of deference. Those in powerful rooms may be “elites” relative to the larger group they represent, but this guarantees nothing about how they are treated in the rooms they are in. After all, a person privileged in an absolute sense (a person belonging to, say, the half of the world that has secure access to “basic needs”) may nevertheless feel themselves to be consistently on the low end of the power dynamics they actually experience. Deference epistemology responds to real, morally weighty experiences of being put down, ignored, sidelined, or silenced. It thus has an important non-epistemic appeal to members of stigmatized or marginalized groups: it intervenes directly in morally consequential practices of giving attention and respect.

The social dynamics we experience have an outsize role in developing and refining our political subjectivity, and our sense of ourselves. But this very strength of standpoint epistemology – its recognition of the importance of perspective – becomes its weakness when combined with deferential practical norms. Emphasis on the ways we are marginalized often matches the world as we have experienced it. But, from a structural perspective, the rooms we never needed to enter (and the explanations of why we can avoid these rooms) might have more to teach us about the world and our place in it. If so, the deferential approach to standpoint epistemology actually prevents “centring” or even hearing from the most marginalized; it focuses us on the interaction of the rooms we occupy, rather than calling us to account for the interactions we don’t experienc. This fact about who is in the room, combined with the fact that speaking for others generates its own set of important problems (particularly when they are not there to advocate for themselves), eliminates pressures that might otherwise trouble the centrality of our own suffering – and of the suffering of the marginalized people that do happen to make it into rooms with us.

The dangers with this feature of deference politics are grave, as are the risks for those outside of the most powerful rooms. For those who are deferred to, it can supercharge group-undermining norms. In Conflict is Not Abuse, Sarah Schulman makes a provocative observation about the psychological effects of both trauma and felt superiority: while these often come about for different reasons and have very different moral statuses, they result in similar behavioural patterns. Chief among these are misrepresenting the stakes of conflict (often by overstating harm) or representing others’ independence as a hostile threat (such as failures to “centre” the right topics or people). These behaviours, whatever their causal history, have corrosive effects on individuals who perform them as well as the groups around them, especially when a community’s norms magnify or multiply these behaviours rather than constraining or metabolizing them.

For those who defer, the habit can supercharge moral cowardice. The norms provide social cover for the abdication of responsibility: it displaces onto individual heroes, a hero class, or a mythicized past the work that is ours to do now in the present. Their perspective may be clearer on this or that specific matter, but their overall point of view isn’t any less particular or constrained by history than ours. More importantly, deference places the accountability that is all of ours to bear onto select people – and, more often than not, a hyper-sanitized and thoroughly fictional caricature of them.

The same tactics of deference that insulate us from criticism also insulate us from connection and transformation. They prevent us from engaging empathetically and authentically with the struggles of other people – prerequisites of coalitional politics. As identities become more and more fine-grained and disagreements sharper, we come to realize that “coalitional politics” (understood as struggle across difference) is, simply, politics. Thus, the deferential orientation, like that fragmentation of political collectivity it enables, is ultimately anti-political.

Deference rather than interdependence may soothe short-term psychological wounds. But it does so at a steep cost: it can undermine the epistemic goals that motivate the project, and it entrenches a politics unbefitting of anyone fighting for freedom rather than for privilege, for collective liberation rather than mere parochial advantage.

How would a constructive approach to putting standpoint epistemology into practice differ from a deferential approach? A constructive approach would focus on the pursuit of specific goals or end results rather than avoiding “complicity” in injustice or adhering to moral principles. It would be concerned primarily with building institutions and cultivating practices of information-gathering rather than helping. It would focus on accountability rather than conformity. It would calibrate itself directly to the task of redistributing social resources and power rather than to intermediary goals cashed out in terms of pedestals or symbolism. It would focus on building and rebuilding rooms, not regulating traffic within and between them – it would be a world-making project: aimed at building and rebuilding actual structures of social connection and movement, rather than mere critique of the ones we already have.

The water crisis in Flint, Michigan presents a clear example of both the possibilities and limitations of refining our epistemic politics in this way. Michigan’s Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), a government body tasked with the support of “healthy communities”, with a team of fifty trained scientists at its disposal, was complicit in covering up the scale and gravity of the public health crisis from the beginning of the crisis in 2014 until it garnered national attention in 2015.

The MDEQ, speaking from a position of epistemic and political authority, defended the status quo in Flint. They claimed that “Flint water is safe to drink”, and were cited in Flint Mayor Dayne Walling’s statement aiming to “dispel myths and promote the truth about the Flint River” during the April 2014 transition to the Flint River water source. That transition was spearheaded under the tenure of the city’s emergency manager Darnell Earley (an African-American, like many of the city residents he helped to poison). After the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) circulated a leaked internal memo from the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in July of 2014 expressing concern about lead in Flint water, the MDEQ produced a doctored report that put the overall measure of lead levels within federally mandated levels by mysteriously failing to count two contaminated samples.

The reaction from residents was immediate. The month after the switch in water source, residents reported that their tap water was discoloured and gave off an alarming odour. They didn’t need their oppression to be “celebrated”, “centred”, or narrated in the newest academic parlance. They didn’t need someone to understand what it felt like to be poisoned. What they needed was the lead out of their water. So they got to work.

The first step was to develop epistemic authority. To achieve this they built a new room: one that put Flint residents and activists in active collaboration with scientists who had the laboratories that could run the relevant tests and prove the MDEQ’s report to be fraudulent. Flint residents’ outcry recruited scientists to their cause and led a “citizen science” campaign, further raising the alarm about the water quality and distributing sample kits to neighbours to submit for testing. In this stage, the alliance of residents and scientists won, and the poisoning of the children of Flint emerged as a national scandal.

But this was not enough. The second step – cleaning the water – required more than state acknowledgement: it required apportioning labour and resources to fix the water and address the continuing health concerns. What Flint residents received, initially, was a mix of platitudes and mockery from the ruling elite (some of this personally committed by a President that shared a racial identity with many of them). This year, however, it looks as though the tireless activism of Flint residents and their expanding list of teammates has won additional and more meaningful victories: the ongoing campaign is pushing the replacements of the problematic service lines to their final stage and is forcing the state of Michigan to agree to a settlement of $600 million for affected families.

This outcome is in no way a wholesale victory: not only will attorney fees cut a substantial portion of payouts, but the settlement cannot undo the damage that was caused to the residents. A constructive epistemology cannot guarantee full victory over an oppressive system by itself. No epistemic orientation can by itself undo the various power asymmetries between the people and the imperial state system. But it can help make the game a little more competitive – and deference epistemology isn’t even playing.

The biggest threats to social justice attention and informational economies are not the absence of yet more jargon to describe, ever more precisely or incisively, the epistemic, attentional, or interpersonal afflictions of the disempowered. The biggest threats are the erosion of the practical and material bases for popular power over knowledge production and distribution, particularly that which could aid effective political action and constrain or eliminate predation by elites. The capture and corruption of these bases by well-positioned elites, especially tech corporations, goes on unabated and largely unchallenged, including: the corporate monopolization of local news, the ongoing destruction and looting of the journalistic profession, the interference of corporations and governments in key democratic processes, and the domination of elite interests in the production of knowledge by research universities and the circulation of the output of these distorted processes by established media organizations.

Confronting these threats requires leaving some rooms – and building new ones.

The constructive approach to standpoint epistemology is demanding. It asks that we swim upstream: to be accountable and responsive to people who aren’t yet in the room, to build the kinds of rooms we could sit in together, rather than merely judiciously navigating the rooms history has built for us. But this weighty demand is par for the course when it comes to the politics of knowledge: the American philosopher Sandra Harding famously pointed out that standpoint epistemology, properly understood, demands more rigour from science and knowledge production processes generally, not less.

But one important topic stands unaddressed. The deferential approach to standpoint epistemology often comes packaged with concern and attention to the importance of lived experience. Among these, traumatic experiences are especially foregrounded.

At this juncture, scholarly analysis and argument fail me. The remainder of what I have to say skews more towards conviction than contention. But the life of books has taught me that conviction has just as much to teach, however differently posed or processed, and so I press on.

I take concerns about trauma especially seriously. I grew up in the United States, a nation structured by settler colonialism, racial slavery, and their aftermath, with enough collective and historical trauma to go round. I also grew up in a Nigerian diasporic community, populated by many who had genocide in living memory. At the national and community level, I have seen a lot of traits of norms, personality, quirks of habit and action that I’ve suspected were downstream of these facts. At the level of individual experience, I’ve watched and felt myself change in reaction to fearing for my dignity or life, to crushing pain and humiliation. I reflect on these traumatic moments often, and very seldom think: “That was educational”.

These experiences can be, if we are very fortunate, building blocks. What comes of them depends on how the blocks are put together: what standpoint epistemologists call the “achievement thesis”. Briana Toole clarifies that, by itself, one’s social location only puts a person in a position to know. “Epistemic privilege” or advantage is achieved only through deliberate, concerted struggle from that position.

I concede outright that this is certainly one possible result of the experience of oppression: have no doubt that humiliation, deprivation, and suffering can build (especially in the context of the deliberate, structured effort of “consciousness raising”, as Toole specifically highlights). But these same experiences can also destroy, and if I had to bet on which effect would win most often, it would be the latter. As Agnes Callard rightly notes, trauma (and even the righteous, well-deserved anger that often accompanies it) can corrupt as readily as it can ennoble. Perhaps more so.

Contra the old expression, pain – whether borne of oppression or not – is a poor teacher. Suffering is partial, short-sighted, and self-absorbed. We shouldn’t have a politics that expects different: oppression is not a prep school.

When it comes down to it, the thing I believe most deeply about deference epistemology is that it asks something of trauma that it cannot give. Demanding as the constructive approach may be, the deferential approach is far more demanding and in a far more unfair way: it asks the traumatized to shoulder burdens alone that we ought to share collectively. When I think about my trauma, I don’t think about grand lessons. I think about the quiet nobility of survival. The very fact that those chapters weren’t the final ones of my story is powerful enough writing all on its own. It is enough to ask of those experiences that I am still here to remember them.

Deference epistemology asks us to be less than we are – and not even for our own benefit. As Nick Estes explains in the context of Indigenous politics: “The cunning of trauma politics is that it turns actual people and struggles, whether racial or Indigenous citizenship and belonging, into matters of injury. It defines an entire people mostly on their trauma and not by their aspirations or sheer humanity”. This performance is not for the benefit of Indigenous people, but “for white audiences or institutions of power”.

I also think about James Baldwin’s realization that the things that tormented him the most were “the very things that connected me with all the people who were alive, who had ever been alive”. That I have survived abuse of various kinds, have faced near-death from both accidental circumstance and violence (different as the particulars of these may be from those around me) is not a card to play in gamified social interaction or a weapon to wield in battles over prestige. It is not what gives me a special right to speak, to evaluate, or to decide for a group. It is a concrete, experiential manifestation of the vulnerability that connects me to most of the people on this Earth. It comes between me and other people not as a wall, but as a bridge.

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#### Role experimentation should orient our politics. Viewing the climate crisis through the lens of a policymaker can alter our perception in ways that catalyze micro and macro political action. Although it’s a symptom of broader social relations, investigating climate change can expose faults in the system in order to foster broader forms of resistance

Connolly 13 [William E. Connolly, Krieger-Eisenhower Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, The Fragility of Things: Self-Organizing Processes, Neoliberal Fantasies, and Democratic Activism, Duke University Press, 2013, 186]

There is no zone of complete neutrality in a world of role performances. Obedient performances in cumulative effect tend to support the existing regime as they insinuate its dictates into our collective habits of perception, judgment, and action. Unless a dissident group of workers meticulously “works according to rule” to disrupt production through excruciating obedience in a way that discloses how tangled formal rules can become. Or a group creatively improvises on the performance of Bartleby the Scrivener, posing endless questions about the orders given to it until the machine overflows itself or is jammed. These indeed are creative role experimentations. So was the practice in Eastern Europe during the late stages of Soviet rule to clap endlessly when a Soviet stooge spoke, until the bewildered speaker was moved to sit down amid the roar around him. I recently attended a faculty meeting with the president of my university at which the entire faculty remained silent after his Ceo-style talk ended and he departed slowly up the aisle. Sometimes silence sends a message to power. Our lives are messages.5 Role experimentation can disrupt and redirect the flow of authority, habit, institutional regularity, and future projection. It can also encourage others to look more closely at their own performances in this or that domain. Such experiments can also set the stage for more adventurous and larger scale actions. My examples will be limited to con- stituencies who are the most apt to read this book, though they could easily be adjusted to a broader array. Suppose a constellation of students, studying to enter professional life, forms study groups to explore more closely how those professions presuppose and enforce a set of practices that contribute to the fragility of things as they simultaneously draw attention away from that contribution. The students may pose untimely questions in their political science, economics, engineering, medical, business, legal, and biology classes. If in a secular institution, they may seek out courses that complicate the assumptions of secularism. If in a religious school, they may organize a group to explore the history of atheism or of minority faiths that eschew the theme of a per- sonal God. They can engage experimental artistic work that stretches their habitual patterns of perception and judgment. The nature- and soundscape compositions of John Luther Adams have salutary effects on many in this respect. Such activities can also prime you to experiment with other role performances once you enter professional life. If a lawyer, you may organize to rethink your connections to the ugly prison system and to adjust your practice to protest its ugliness. Or you may give a portion of your time to challenge corporations, localities, and states that defile the environment. If a doctor, you may organize voluntary medical care for the poor and publicize what you are doing. In both cases these experimentations make a modest difference on their own, prime our capacities for more sensitive perception in other domains of life, and may prepare us to participate with others in yet more adventurous activities. These are minor moments, but an accumulation of minor moments can jostle settled habits of perception; they can encourage a readiness to become more exploratory; and they can extend the time horizon within which we think and act. Suppose, now, you are middle- or upper-middle-class citizens in a polity that has competitive elections. You have become increasingly dissatisfied with the course your society is taking. Voting, while pertinent, seems radically insufficient to the issues involved. Its time horizon is too short and the strategic place of ill-informed undecided voters in electoral politics skews campaigns too sharply. Inequality has been extended. The lower reaches of society are left out in the cold and often blamed for the suffering they undergo. The news media are organized around scandal and a brief time horizon. Racial differences are exploited to break up potential coalitions on the left. A large slice of the population is periodically suscep- tible to war fever. Climate change is widely subjected to deferral, denial, or formal acceptance disconnected from action. And the right wing actively promotes filibusters and legislative stalemates to encourage more and more people to withdraw from citizenship and to tolerate the privatization of more and more of life. The sciences and professions with which you are familiar are often too narrowly defined. Too many churches either provide refuges from the world or serve as sites of aggressive attack on ecological concerns, homosexu- ality, carriers of alternative faiths, or poor minorities. You know what po- litical party you support; you vote regularly; and you give time and money to your party. But you also find it difficult to connect the sentiments you profess to the role expectations sedimented into your practices of work, church, consumption, neighborhood association, investment portfolio, children’s school, artistic pursuits, and local news reporting. Now is the time to join others in becoming role experimentalists. You may actively support the farm-to-table movement in the restaurants you visit; you may support the slow food movement; you may frequent stores that offer food based on sustainable processes; you may buy a hybrid or, if feasible, join an urban zip-car collective, explaining to friends, family, and neighbors what effect such choices could have on late modern ecology if a majority of the populace did one or the other; you may press your neighborhood association and workplace to buy solar panels and install them yourself; you may use writing and media skills developed in school to write for a blog; you may shift a large portion of your retirement account into investments that support sustainable energy; you may withdraw from aggressive investments that presuppose an unsustainable growth pattern, threaten economic collapse, and/or undermine the collec- tive future; you may bring new issues and visitors to your church, temple, or mosque to support rethinking about interdenominational issues and the contemporary fragility of things; you may found, join, or frequent a repair club, at which volunteers collect and repair old appliances, furni- ture, and vehicles to cut back on urban waste and increase the longevity of these items; you may probe and publicize the multimodal tactics by which twenty-four-hour news stations work on the visceral register of their viewers, as you explore ways to counter those techniques; you may travel to places where unconscious American assumptions about world entitlement are challenged on a regular basis; you may augment your pattern of films and artistic exhibits attended to stretch your habitual powers of perception and to challenge some affect-imbued prejudgments embedded in them; you may seek out new friends who are also moving in these directions. You may regularly relay pregnant essays you encounter to friends, colleagues, and relatives. A series of minor role experiments. As we proceed our aspirational selves may now begin to exceed our operational selves, and the shame we feel about the discrepancy between these two aspects of the self may generate energy to enter into yet new modes of role experimentation.6 We thus begin to make ourselves and our engagements more experimental rather than simply falling into a ready- made set of role expectations. We have begun to become what Nietzsche calls “our own guinea pigs” rather than merely being the guinea pigs of those in charge of these institutions. As such experiments accumulate, the ice in and around us begins to crack. First, the shaky perceptions, feelings, and beliefs with which we started these experimentations now become more refined and more entrenched. Second, we are now better situated to forge connections with yet larger constituencies engaging in similar experiments. Third, as these connections accumulate we may be more inspired to join macropolitical movements that speak to the issues. Fourth, as we now join protests, slowdowns, and confrontational meetings with corporate managers, church leaders, union officials, university officials, and neighborhood leaders, we may now become more alert to the institutional pressures that propel these constituencies forward too. They are also both enmeshed in a web of roles that en- able and constrain them and often more than mere role bearers. These roles too exhibit varying degrees of pressure and slack as they link the details of daily conduct to the strategic practices of the larger political economy.

#### Empirical evidence proves some debaters will inevitably occupy positions of power---debate should make them as good at politics

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Debate is a cross-disciplinary method of collaborative inquiry and intentional learning, focused on the controversial public policy issues of the day, emphasizing the fundamentals of argument—reasoning, research, communication, and practical judgment—through the clash of competing ideas and the habits of mind that come from understanding others’ arguments as well as one’s own. Although intercollegiate debate is a highly competitive activity, it is profitably viewed from a pedagogical perspective as a leadership laboratory designed to prepare the next generation for entry into the public sphere and the process of lifelong learning. From public administration to community activism, from personal decision making to government policy, and across a wide variety of fields from business to education, intercollegiate debate provides a liberal education that is the foundation of civic engagement. How does contemporary intercollegiate debate embody the values and goals of liberal education for a democratic society? At its core and from its earliest appearance in the American academy in the once wildly popular literary societies to its contemporary manifestation in national championship tournament competition, intercollegiate debate is a well-established and highly successful educational practice with substantial educational benefits for all students (O’Donnell 2008a). It is, in every sense, what George Kuh (2008) refers to as a “high-impact educational practice.” The literature review that follows seeks to ground this claim in a body of research. In so doing, it identifies the essential skills, virtues, and modes of inquiry that participation in debate fosters: critical thinking, leadership training, academic achievement, and ethics of advocacy, community building, active, intentional and cooperative learning, and empowerment.1 The literature selected for review focuses predominantly on research concerning intercollegiate debate. The body of work concerning classroom debating and other forms of noncompetitive debate have been intentionally excluded, although they are equally robust and provide additional testimony to the enduring value of debate education. Much of that literature has been collected in an annotated bibliography compiled by Sarah Spring, Joseph Packer, and Timothy O’Donnell (see Appendix 1). 1. Critical Thinking Developing critical-thinking skills is one of the primary goals of American education. A survey by the Higher Education Research Institute (2009) of 22,562 full-time college and university faculty members reported that 99.6% of them viewed critical-thinking skills as paramount to undergraduate education. Several national reports (Association of American Colleges and Universities 1985; National Educational Goals Panel 1991; National Institute of Education Study Group 1984) have identified critical thinking as a major goal of higher education. Many have written about the importance of critical thinking to achieving a free, safe, and prosperous society. Richard Franke, a fellow of the National Academy of Sciences, observes: “the value of critical thinking is incalculable. From assessing markets to identifying the salient features of a policy to decisions about life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, critical thinking clears a path for rational judgment” (2009, 22). Argumentation professors Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede recognize that in the nuclear age, it is imperative for society to develop leaders with strong critical-thinking skills: “in an age when a single bomb can wipe out a great city, critical thinking is not a luxury but a necessity” (1978, 3). Edward Panetta and Dale Herbeck argue that critical-thinking skills developed by policy-debate training “will help resolve impending geo-political crises” (1993, 25). John Dewey considered critical-thinking skills to be an essential characteristic of good citizenship, and subsequent work has demonstrated this connection. Critical-thinking skills are a precondition for citizenship engagement and deliberation about public affairs (Owen 2004). For example, Jack Rogers (2005) shows that debaters are more likely than nondebaters to vote in elections and to participate in social and political campaigns. Debate scholars claim that the teaching of critical-thinking skills is one of debate’s greatest educational achievements. Enhancing critical thinking is “the most frequently cited educational merit of debate” (Omelicheva 2007, 163). Glenn Capp and Thelma Capp (1965) list critical thinking as one of the seven educational benefits to debate training. James McBath argues that debate provides an educational laboratory for training students in “critical thinking skills through the discovery of lines of argument and their probative value” (1984, 10). Edward Inch, Barbara Warnick, and Danielle Endres state “that intercollegiate debate provides students with an intensive and exciting method for developing their debating skills and critical thinking abilities” (2006, 354). Austin Freeley and David Steinberg contend, “since classical times, debate has been one of the best methods of learning and applying the principles of critical thinking” (2005, 2). Lived experience is reflected in the opinion of former debaters’ assessment of acquiring critical-thinking skills. Several demographic surveys (Katsulas and Bauschard 2000; Matlon and Keele 1984; Williams, McGee, and Worth 2001) reveal overwhelming support from former debaters that the activity sharpened their critical-thinking skills. In response to the survey by John Katsulas and Stefan Bauschard, Daniel Sutherland, the National Debate Tournament (NDT) winner in 1982, replied, “debate significantly enhanced my development as a lawyer. I think the major area is in critical thinking—understanding my own arguments, coming to grips with my opponents’ arguments and forecasting how the judge might evaluate both positions” (Katsulas and Bauschard 2000, 7). Cynthia Leiferman, an NDT finalist in 1984, agreed, writing that debate training taught her how “to think ‘outside the box.’ Creative critical thinking is the lifeblood for a successful litigator” (ibid.). Additionally, empirical research demonstrates that debate training increases critical-thinking skills. Several studies comparing debaters to nondebaters substantiate this link. Kent Colbert’s (1987) study of NDT and Cross Examination Debate Association (CEDA) debaters found that they scored substantially higher than nondebaters on the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (WGCTA). This research tool measures critical-thinking ability in five areas: “inference, recognition of assumptions, deduction, interpretation, and evaluation of arguments” (Colbert 1987, 199). Colbert’s study validated the results of prior studies (Cross 1971; Howell 1943; Jackson 1961; Williams 1951) showing a link between debate participation and critical thinking. Using a different measuring technique, studies by Kenny Barfield (1989) and Kip McKee (2003) also demonstrate a positive link between debate and critical thinking. Barfield and McKee found that high school debaters scored substantially higher than nondebaters in reading comprehension and thinking skills on the Stanford Achievement Test (SAT). Because research proves that higher reading comprehension scores on the SAT correlate well with higher criticalthinking skills on the WGCTA, Barfield and McKee’s findings prove that debate participation enhances critical thinking. The most definitive evidence comes from a meta analysis by Mike Allen et al. (1999), which examined data from 22 studies over 50 years that had explored the link between communication skills and critical thinking. Most of these studies used the WGCTA as their measurement instrument. The cumulative evidence indicated that communication skill instruction increased criticalthinking ability by 44%. However, “participation in forensics demonstrated the largest improvement in critical thinking whether considering longitudinal or cross-sectional designs” (Allen et al. 1999, 27). Allen et al. conclude that competitive debate enhances critical thinking more effectively than argumentation classes and public speaking. This study provides powerful support for the value of competitive debate to improve critical thinking. Given all of the above evidence, Colbert’s assessment that “the preponderance of defendable evidence suggests competitive debate experience can indeed improve critical thinking skills” is a valid conclusion (1995, 60). He also correctly points out that the few studies (e.g., Whalen 1991) not demonstrating a link suffer from flaws in “design limitations, instrument ceiling, sampling, teaching methods, or statistical procedures” (Colbert 1995, 60). How does debate teach effective critical-thinking skills? There are numerous ways. Debate teaches analytical skills, whereby students practice identifying errors in reasoning and proof, recognizing inconsistencies in arguments, assessing the credibility of sources, challenging assumptions, and prioritizing the salience of points (Murphy and Samosky 1993). Critical thinking requires that decision makers arrive at conclusions based on a careful examination of the facts and reasons, which is the heart of the methodology taught by debate. Jeffrey Parcher (1998) argues that the devil’s advocacy approach to debating, whereby students argue both sides of a controversy, improves critical thinking. Research also shows that critical-thinking skills are developed through consistent practice, which debate tournament competitions afford to students (McKee 2003) 2. Leadership Training and Career Advancement Debate is a “premier training ground for the future leaders of this country” (O’Donnell 2008b, A38). The former debaters who occupy prestigious leadership positions in law, education, government, politics, and business have long constituted an illustrious club. Brilliant lawyers who were former debaters include Alan Dershowitz, famous criminal appellate attorney and Harvard law professor; Thomas Goldstein, cofounder of SCOTUSBLOG and a litigator who has argued over 20 cases before the U.S. Supreme Court; Laurence Tribe, preeminent constitutional law professor of Harvard; Erwin Chemerinsky, founding dean of the University of California, Irvine School of Law; and Neal Katyal, the deputy solicitor general of the United States. Prominent educators include three former college presidents: Alexander Meiklejohn of Amherst College, Lawrence Summers of Harvard, and David B. Henry of the University of Illinois. At least two active college presidents, David Boren of the University of Oklahoma and John Sexton of New York University, were debaters. Politicians include six U.S. presidents who served during the twentieth century, including John F. Kennedy Jr., and numerous U.S. senators and representatives. Titans from the world of business include Lee Iacocca, former CEO of Chrysler, Ted Turner, the media and entertainment mogul, and Ross Perot, billionaire businessman and former presidential candidate. A plethora of evidence exists to support the claim that participation in debate facilitates the professional careers of students. Numerous surveys of former debaters have overwhelmingly found that debate participation was a positive influence in advancing their careers. Ronald Matlon and Lucy Keele’s survey of 703 debaters who participated in the NDT found that “successful attorneys, educators, legislators, businesspersons, and consultants” stated unequivocally “that debate was as important as the total of the rest of their education, or more so” (1984, 205). A survey of former debaters by Jeffrey Hobbs and Robert Chandler (1991) arrived at similar findings, with 86% of the respondents recommending debate as beneficial training, including 75% of lawyers, 85% of managers, 97% of ministers, and 84% of teachers. David Zarefsky, a past president of the National Communication Association, a distinguished professor of communication at Northwestern, and an immensely successful debater and coach, says, “It’s hard for me to imagine a profession for which debate is not a valuable kind of preparation” (Wade 2006). Evidence from two longitudinal studies comparing the employment success of debaters and nondebaters provides empirical support for the claim that debate participation enhances career skills (Rogers 2002, 2005). In the first longitudinal study, Jack Rogers (2002) tracked the performance of 100 freshmen who were debaters versus 100 nondebaters over four years. The results showed that upon graduation, the debaters received job offers superior to those of the control group. Rogers concluded there is “a strong correlation between debate experience and involvement in professional internships,” which resulted in the debaters receiving a higher rate of job offers upon graduation as compared with the nondebaters (2002, 16). In a follow-up study, Rogers (2005) examined the performance of this same group of students over four additional years. Once again, the results showed the debate group with superior career advancement. The study found that debaters received more job offers in their field, more positive evaluations from their supervisors, and slightly higher pay increments. Especially in the field of law, debate training is overwhelmingly beneficial. A survey of 98 law school deans found that 70% of them recommended that students should participate in intercollegiate debate (Freeley and Steinberg 2005). Most prelaw academic counselors also advise undergraduates to take courses in argumentation and debate (Pfau, Thomas, and Ulrich 1987). A survey directed to 82 prominent lawyers who were former debaters asking about the benefits of collegiate debating revealed strong support for the belief that debate taught them skills in oral advocacy, critical thinking, brief writing, research, and listening (Katsulas and Bauschard 2000). Law school dean Erwin Chemerinsky credits his debate training for teaching him skills in analysis, research, and public speaking and he claims that “not a day goes by that I do not use the skills and lessons I learned in debate in my teaching, my writing, and my advocacy in courts” (2008, A11). While the law remains the preferred career choice for many debaters, the skills taught by debate are just as necessary and useful for debaters who want to succeed in the world of business. Employers recognize this and perceive debating experience as a valuable asset. Bill Lawhorn, an economist with the Bureau of Labor Statistics, speaks about the value of debate training for employers: “Debaters must have strong research skills, be able to think quickly, and be able to communicate well. In addition, debaters must be comfortable performing in front of an audience—and having the confidence to do so is a valuable workplace skill, especially when it comes to making presentations to coworkers or superiors” (Lawhorn 2008, 19). Several large companies have been established and are being operated by for-mer debaters. For instance, Michael Beckley, a former Emory debater, and Marc Wilson, a former Dartmouth debater, cofounded Appian, a fast-growing software company. Beckley and Wilson credit their debate training for affording them the presentation skills to persuade clients such as Home Depot to use Appian’s software instead of that of larger companies such as Oracle and IBM (D. Jones 2004). Beckley and Wilson go so far as to say that their company, which has grown to 190 employees, would never have existed without their debate background (D. Jones 2004). Other former debaters who are CEOs of successful companies include Lance Rosenzweig of PeopleSupport, Chuck Berger of Nuance Communications, Mark Astone of Panagraph, Tod Loofbourrow of Authoria, and Cynthia McKay of Le Gourmet Gift Basket (ibid.). Management consulting firms also recognize the value of hiring debaters. A.T. Kearney, a global management firm with offices in 34 countries, has actively sought to hire former debaters after being highly impressed with the job skills brought by Leslie Mueller, a former Northwestern debater (Ross 2002). Mueller now attends debate tournaments to recruit prospective employees because she says debaters have superior analytic and communication skills (ibid.). 3. Academic Achievement in the Classroom College educators overwhelmingly believe that participation in debate increases students’ academic achievement. Melissa Wade, the director of forensics at Emory University, who has coached thousands of high school and college debaters over two decades, says that the value of debate training is well documented: “the effect on academic achievement has been measured and confirmed to improve critical thinking, research and communication and organization skills” (2006, 1). Kent Colbert and Thompson Biggers share this view: “the educational benefits of debate seem to be well documented: improved communication skills; exposure to important social issues of our time; improvement of critical thinking ability” (1985, 238). In fact, there is considerable empirical evidence to prove that academic debate boosts academic achievement. Several studies show that debaters achieve higher average grade point averages than nondebaters (Barfield 1989; Collier 2004; Hunt, Garard, and Simerly 1997; K. Jones 1994). It is also the case that almost three-quarters of debaters believe that involvement in debate benefits them academically (Hunt, Garard, and Simerly 1997). Jack Rogers (2002) found that debaters maintained higher grade point averages than nondebaters, matriculated at the same rate as nondebaters, and enjoyed a higher acceptance rate into graduate school programs. In another study, Rogers (2005) determined that debaters were more successful than nondebaters in completing their graduate studies and achieving higher scores on their LSATs and GREs. Debate participation improves academic performance because it promotes numerous skills that are essential to realizing a high level of educational proficiency. The educational benefits of debate include teaching research skills, acquiring cross-disciplinary knowledge about the world, learning how to organize and construct arguments, improving writing skills, enhancing listening and note-taking skills, increasing student self-confidence, and improving timemanagement skills. a. Research One of the obvious benefits of policy debate is that it teaches research skills in a manner “unparalleled in the world of academics” (Fritch 1993/1994, 7). No undergraduate college class assignment requires as much research as debate does. Robert Rowland argues that “debate, more than perhaps any other educational activity at the university level, teaches students about both the importance of research and the wealth of material that is available” (1995, 101). The research effort undertaken by debaters over the course of a single year’s topic is often greater than the work to obtain a law degree or dissertation (Parcher 1998). Many debaters spend as many as 20 to 30 hours per week doing research (ibid.). A typical debate team gathers enough evidence to write thousands of pages of argument briefs. This emphasis on research is due to several factors. Because debaters are required to debate both sides of a topic, they must collect evidence to support a myriad of arguments. Debate judges also reward evidence more than oratory. There is an expectation that debaters are required to support every point with evidence (Panetta 1990). Therefore, everyone has a competitive incentive to collect as much evidence as possible. In many cases, the best researchers are the most successful debaters (Cheshire 2002). Because doing research is so integral to competitive success, debaters have a strong incentive to acquire excellent research skills. Unlike most undergraduates who specialize in doing research in their own area of academic study, debaters require expansive research skills. Even when a debate topic is confined to a particular subject area, for example, reducing U.S. agricultural subsidies, debate arguments will emerge requiring research in the fields of economics, political science, law, international relations, the environment, and philosophy. This means debaters must learn to use all available library databases as well as locate evidence from books, government documents, newspapers, and the Internet. The process of doing debate research is also making debaters more proficient in using computers and a wide variety of new and emerging technologies. On a regular basis, debaters utilize computerized research databases to conduct research (Freeley and Steinberg 2005). While no studies have been done on this point, observational evidence suggests that debaters are more skilled than nondebaters in using sophisticated searching techniques. Because debaters need to locate evidence that supports very precise claims, they become skilled at conducting Boolean searches where words such as OR, AND, AND NOT, and NEAR are inserted to create relationships among keywords in a search query. Debate also teaches techniques in using scanners. Many debate squads now require students to produce their research in digital form. This requires debaters to scan evidence that cannot be downloaded electronically from books and periodicals. Debate alumni strongly support the belief that debate participation improves research skills. In surveys that ask former debaters how their participation in debate has benefited them, developing research skills is always mentioned as a valued benefit (Hobbs and Chandler 1991; Matlon and Keele 1984). In the most recent studies, the value of research skills has increased in importance. In a survey of lawyers who debated during the 1990s, Katsulas and Bauschard (2000) found that acquiring research skills was ranked as the second greatest benefit of debate participation. A survey by Doyle Srader (2006) of former debaters who are now college educators (but not debate coaches) cited the acquisition of research skills as the most important educational benefit of debate. In a survey of former NDT and CEDA debaters, David Williams, Brian McGee, and David Worth report that a high percentage of these debaters viewed the acquisition of research skills “to be a valued element of debate participation” (2001, 201). b. Student Knowledge About the World The knowledge gained by students competing in debate is wide-ranging and substantial. As soon as the college topic area is announced in mid-May, students begin background reading on the topic. When the actual topic wording is announced in July, the intensity of the research effort accelerates to a vigorous pace, as debaters scramble to find as many research materials as possible before the first tournament in September. From this point forward until the last tournament in early April, arguments are revised and created on a continuous basis. During the course of one debate season, a debate team will produce thousands of pages of argument briefs. Individually, every debater will be responsible for reading and carefully filing them. The range of cumulative knowledge accrued from compounding several years of debate, is even more astounding. For example, 2009 graduates who debated in each of the past four years, have learned a great deal about four public policy topics: (1) increasing U.S. economic and diplomatic pressure on China; (2) overruling U.S. Supreme court cases involving federalism, school racial segregation, abortion, and military commissions; (3) promoting U.S. constructive engagement with Iran, Syria, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Authority; and (4) reducing U.S. agricultural subsidies. Any student who debated over these four years would have learned an incredible amount about some of the great issues and controversies of the twenty-first century. Should the United States engage or confront China? Can U.S. economic pressure force China to respect human rights and intellectual property rights? Should the Supreme Court allow the federal government to have greater control over state governments? Do U.S. military commission trials for enemy combatants violate international law? Can U.S. diplomacy with Syria promote peace in the Middle East? Will constructive engagement prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons? Will increasing U.S. troops to Afghanistan promote peace? Do industrial farming practices threaten the environment? Do government subsidies for biofuels reduce U.S. energy dependency and global warming? In fact, over a four-year academic debate career, “students grapple with virtually every contemporary issue of American public policy” (O’Donnell 2008b). However, debaters learn much more than topic knowledge. They also learn a great deal about political institutions and practice. The policy-systems approach essential to intercollegiate debate teaches students about the intricacies of how the three branches of the U.S. government operate. Debaters also learn about current events because they are forced to imagine the passage of controversial policies derived from the yearlong intercollegiate debate topic in a contemporaneous political climate that involves political costs and trade-offs with other agenda items under consideration. This means that in any given year, the top agenda items being pursued in Washington will be hotly debated in the form of politics disadvantages. For example, if the topic requires the affirmative team to advocate reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, a negative team might argue that doing so at this time would trade off with ongoing health care reform efforts.

**Pragmatism is key---sacrificing the short term gains of the 1AC in search for purity fails**

**Pielke 19** (Roger, faculty of the University of Colorado, “The Yawning Gap Between Climate Rhetoric and Climate Action”, https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogerpielke/2019/09/19/the-yawning-gap-between-climate-rhetoric-and-climate-action/?sh=289ce2e2ec46)

A better explanation for the gap between **action and calls for action** is the absence of **workable policy proposals** at the scale of what is needed to start making progress on accelerating decarbonization. Much of what we will see tomorrow with the planned climate strike and next week at the United Nations will represent a victory of exhortation over workable policy.

Demands for action cannot lead to actual action in the absence of **viable options**. Viability has **technical, political, social elements, and more**. Scientists have done their job in calling attention to the problems posed by climate change now and in the future. Political advocates, including youth activists, have also done their job in helping to raise the salience of the issue among the public. The job now sits with politicians and those who support them.

But **demanding “action” is not enough**. Politicians need policy options in order for action to occur. Climate policy is incredibly complex, and options won’t simply emerge from legislative halls. More effort is needed from policy experts to develop, propose, debate and test new paths forward.

Some climate advocates seem to believe that we simply need to get new politicians who can better support the policies that have been tried – and repeatedly failed – for the past generation. Perhaps a better option is to open up the climate discussion to a broader set of voices and views in order to generate options that **can be implemented and show results in the short term**, based on the politicians we have rather than the ones climate advocates might prefer.

PwC tells us that we need to average a greater than 11% rate of decarbonization for the remainder of this century to achieve deep decarbonization. No one knows how to do this. We are currently at a 1.6% annual rate of decarbonization. If we are to ever get close to 11%+ we will have to learn how to achieve 2%, 3% 4% and so on. **It is far more important to figure out how to start meeting the decarbonization challenge, than it is to know how it will end.**

The gap between words and deeds on climate policy exists – at least in part – **because we have failed to prioritize the short term and the next steps we should take to start what will be a journey of this century**. So long as we favor exhortation to act in the absence of practical actions that can meet real-world tests of policy and politics, climate change will continue to be a potent political symbol, but with little connection to actual decarbonization of the global economy.

#### Black women can engage with the state in empowering ways.

Nash, 19—Professor of Gender, Sexuality, and Feminist Studies at Duke University (Jennifer, “love in the time of death,” *Black Feminism Reimagined: After Intersectionality*, Chapter 4, 121-126, dml)

Returning to the State

This book began with substantial engagement with intersectionality’s origin stories, examining how the question of where the analytic came from, who coined it, and who deserves “credit” for its rise and circulation have come to predominate in black feminist scholarship. Curiously, though, none of these widely circulating origin stories contend with intersectionality’s connections to the juridical, or think deeply about intersectionality as a legal project. Though this book eschews simple origin stories that presume that intersectionality has a singular history, in this section, I advocate for remembering intersectionality’s connections to critical race theory, and thus its intimate relationship with remaking law. I invest in this project because intersectionality has been swept into a larger black feminist conversation that presumes the violence of the juridical, ignoring both intersectionality’s loving investment in the juridical and the juridical as a potential site of loving practice. Put differently, in this section, I emphasize intersectionality’s location in critical race theory, in Left legal projects, to move beyond the now knee-jerk Left (and black feminist) sense that radical and transgressive projects are necessarily antistate. In place of this now familiar political terrain, I seek to ask different questions: Is it simply collusion or “cruel optimism” for black feminists to seek engagement with the state?31 Can we imagine black feminist engagements with the state as taking forms other than seeking redress and demanding visibility? Are there ways to imagine black feminist legal engagement that circumvent the uncomfortable and problematic position of being “at home with the law”? How can black feminists reimagine law as a site for staging productive intimacies and enacting radical vulnerabilities?

In its juridical iteration, intersectionality emerged in a moment where critical race theorists offered analytical tools to upend prevailing fictions of law’s objectivity, to reveal the quotidian nature of racism and sexism, and to argue for fundamental transformations in legal pedagogy. Critical race theory, then, was born of a sustained attention to law’s failures, even as it contained—at times—certain kinds of faith in law’s potentiality and promise. Critical race scholars were a post–Brown v. Board of Education generation who witnessed the end of the Warren court’s promises of integration and inclusion. They saw affirmative action rolled back, transformed from a substantive remedy for past and ongoing discrimination to a promise of “diversity” to benefit white students who would be changed into global citizens ready for corporate employment thanks to their “exposure” to socalled racial difference.32 They witnessed the ratcheting up of standards for proving employment discrimination from racially disparate effects to discriminatory intent, effectively making it harder for minoritarian plaintiffs to prevail in discrimination suits. They emphatically asked, then, whether the goal of antiracist legal scholars should be inclusion in white institutions or whether it should be, for example, the creation of robustly funded and supported black institutions. They interrogated whether the Warren court’s landmark decision in Brown would have better served its black plaintiffs if it equally funded black schools, rather than championing desegregation and then mandating integration at “all deliberate speed.” They debated whether affirmative action should be supported if the only logic to support it is “diversity,” where students of color provide a pedagogical value for white students. Critical race theory, then, was never an embrace of an ethic of inclusion, or even a form of advocacy for new forms of redress. Instead, it was undergirded by an investment in revealing that racial progress was the result of “interest convergence” rather than a genuine investment in antisubordination, and by a fundamental belief that law would look and feel different if it “looked to the bottom.”33

While critical race theorists offered critical interrogations of law’s imagined progress, treating it as evidence of US self-interest rather than a genuine investment in racial redress, they also routinely offered ways of imagining law otherwise, refashioning antidiscrimination law, conceptions of evidence, property, and contract. They imagined a form of law that eschewed color blindness and argued that any legal regime that sought to contend with American racial violence had to be deeply color-conscious to exact meaningful remedies. They advanced new methods—narrative, parable, allegory, speculative fiction, storytelling—in an effort to jam the fictions of objectivity and neutrality and to expose that law is itself a racial project, never removed from the racial regimes it purports to disrupt. In other words, they sought to use their locations in the legal academy and in the legal profession to radically remake law, to push the boundaries of how legal doctrine could be written, imagined, and enacted. They aspired to make law into something unrecognizable and unimaginable, to push at its very parameters in the pursuit of a “jurisprudence of generosity.”34

My entry point for thinking through law as a site of black feminist love-politics is through the work of Patricia J. Williams. Her book The Alchemy of Race and Rights is complex in its form and its argument—it is memoir, “diary,” legal treatise, and critical theory at once. Williams presents herself as professor, consumer, daughter, granddaughter, train rider, and “crazy” black woman exhausted from the ordinary and spectacular raced and gendered brutalities of American life and the project of teaching law at a historically white law school. The project, then, is a rumination on the felt life of racial and gendered violence, and a critical analysis of the myriad spaces where this violence unfolds, from the media onslaught against Tawana Brawley to the experiences of being a black female faculty member at a law school.

Williams’s inquiry, though, is not simply about documenting the ubiquity of racial and gendered violence but also about engaging and describing the lived experience of racialized and gendered vulnerability, what she terms “spirit murder.” For Williams, “spirit murder” is the psychic and spiritual wounding that unfolds as a result of racial violence. “Spirit murder” describes the wounds left on the flesh, psyche, and even soul of those who experience violence and the wounds, often invisible, that haunt perpetrators of violence, including a willingness to accept, and to render unseen, those who are dispossessed. Williams’s task, then, is to imagine what law could look and feel like if it accounted for “spirit murder,” a form of violence that she argues includes “cultural obliteration, prostitution, abandonment of the elderly and the homeless, and genocide. . . . What I call spirit murder—disregard for others whose lives qualitatively depend on our regard—is that it produces a system of formalized distortions of thought.”35 Williams argues that “we need to elevate spirit murder to the conceptual—if not punitive— level of a capital moral offense. . . . We need to eradicate its numbing pathology before it wipes out what precious little humanity we have left.”36 Williams’s conception of “spirit murder” imagines law’s capacity to remedy forms of violence against the psyche and soul, a terrain that has been unimaginable to law precisely because of its commitment to remedying only visible and legible harms, and law’s ability to be mobilized “conceptually”— but not punitively—to respond to violence. In other words, the endeavor of the text is to imagine a legal project capacious and creative enough to attend to what it has always ignored: the violence inflicted on the psyche. Williams effectively invites us to imagine how we might feel differently toward each other, and toward law itself, if we had legal obligations toward mutual regard, if we knew that law took seriously spirit murder.

If Williams seeks to use law to exceed what it aspires to do, to respond to the “cultural cancer” of spirit murder, her book also contains a resounding, and even surprising, redemption of rights as a key strategy for reforming law. An embrace of rights might sound like a deeply conventional strategy, mobilizing law to do what it has long claimed to do on behalf of racialized and gendered minorities: confer rights. Despite her lengthy engagement with state violence, her exacting critique of how law permits rather than redresses spirit murder, Williams ends not with an abandonment of the state but with a deep affection for what rights could accomplish. She writes:

The task is to expand private property rights into a conception of civil rights, into the right to expect civility from others. . . . Instead, society must give them [rights] away. Unlock them from reification by giving them to slaves. Give them to trees. Give them to cows. Give them to history. Give them to rivers and rocks. Give to all of society’s objects and untouchables the rights of privacy, integrity and self-assertion; give them distance and respect. Flood them with the animating spirit that rights mythology fires in this country’s most oppressed psyches, and wash away the shroud of inanimate-object-status, so that we may say not that we own gold but that a luminous golden spirit owns us.37

If critical legal studies called for the abandonment of investment in rights, treating rights as relatively unsuccessful in securing social change and as promoting problematic conceptions of individualism, Williams makes a plea for a dramatic expansion of rights and a surprising reconceptualization of the labor of rights. Rights, she argues, should not be the purview of those who can explicitly and legibly name harm. Cows, history, and rocks should have rights, including rights to “privacy, integrity and self-assertion.” Rights should not be “reified” but generously bestowed upon everyone and everything; rights should not be used to shore up ideas of property and ownership, to allow us to claim that “we own gold,” but instead to ensure a deep spiritual connection between us. In so doing, law could remake “society,” transforming its investments in rights as something that protects property holders into rights as something that can ensure our mutual accountability, and reminds us of the “luminous golden spirit [that] owns us” all.

It is easy to read Williams as optimistically rehabilitating rights from the critical legal studies’ critique of rights, and problematically investing in precisely the doctrinal formulation that has consistently failed minoritarian subjects. In this reading, Williams is imagined as paradoxically investing in precisely the site of violence she carefully documents with far too little explanation for how rights can circumvent the problems of racism and sexism she delineates. Yet I read Williams’s visionary account of rights differently. For her, law can be mobilized not to produce new causes of action, to simply make visible new wounded subjects who can make appeals to redress, but to imagine new and radical vulnerabilities. As it is currently structured, property deeply organizes sociality, and law operates to protect property from trespass and theft. Thus, law operates to create categories like property holder (owner) and trespasser (thief), and to organize the social world around proximities to ownership. Williams uses her capacious conception of rights to imagine another way of organizing sociality: around vulnerability. Indeed, Williams asks: How are we bound up with others? What is our responsibility to ensuring the vital “spirit” of others, and to demanding the protection of our own “spirits”? What happens when we harm things that can’t articulate injuries (trees, rocks, rivers) but can only make that injury visible and oftentimes in ways that we refuse to recognize, or that might even make that injury visible in another time, in decades or centuries when we are not even here to be accountable? What happens when we take responsibility for our capacity to wound and for the histories of wounding and violence that have unfolded, often in our names? And what happens when law becomes a critical tool in making visible mutual vulnerability, in insisting that we recognize that we can “undo each other,” and in demanding that we take seriously our indebtedness to each other? For Williams, then, expanding rights becomes a strategy for transforming law to be a space that enshrines a vision of interdependence and shared vulnerability.

I begin my investigation of the possibility of rooting black feminist lovepolitics in law with Williams’s visionary work because it reveals the potential of black feminist legal scholarship that fundamentally reorients law around ethics of vulnerability. This is work that expresses a fundamental faith in law’s capacity to perform different kinds of justice work, even as it recognizes how law is often mobilized as an agent of inequality and injustice. Like Williams’s radical remaking of rights, Crenshaw’s conception of intersectionality tugs at the seams of law, working within its confines to radically unleash its transformative capacity. As I explained earlier in the book, intersectionality is primarily remembered for its now widely circulating accident metaphor, where discrimination is imagined as traffic flowing through an intersection. It can move in one direction, another direction, or both, and an “accident” can occur on either street or in the intersection. According to this logic, discrimination can be race-based, gender-based, or race-and-gender-based, yet the possibility of raced and gendered discrimination is rendered impossible by antidiscrimination law that actively refuses to account for this form of violence. As Crenshaw notes, “Judicial decisions which premise intersectional relief on a showing that Black women are specifically recognized as a class are analogous to a doctor’s decision at the scene of an accident to treat an accident victim only if the injury is recognized by medical insurance.”38 Intersectionality, then, spotlights law’s refusal to see black women’s race- and gender-based injuries.

Many have envisioned intersectionality’s mandate as the insertion of black women into existing antidiscrimination law, as a call for antidiscrimination law to abandon its race or gender logic and instead embrace a race and gender logic. Yet, as Crenshaw’s second metaphor reveals, antidiscrimination law is constructed around leaving the multiply marginalized in the proverbial basement. Put differently, antidiscrimination law itself is constructed around remedying only certain forms of discriminatory activity and is designed to refuse to recognize and redress discrimination against the most vulnerable. Intersectionality, then, is not a call for inserting black women into a preexisting legal regime, precisely because that regime is designed to refuse to see black women. Instead, it is a tactic of making visible black women’s status as witnesses who can name and describe the basement, which is not merely a social location but a space produced by law’s doctrinal failures.

If intersectionality embraces black women’s social location as a juridical starting point, it also advocates for tailoring law to address injuries in particular ways. In other words, it offers a vision of law that is rooted in flexibility and customization, in responding to particular lived experience. In her second article on intersectionality, “Mapping the Margins,” Crenshaw reveals not only that law ignores black women’s experiences of injury but also that intersectionality compels state interventions that more appropriately respond to black women’s particular experiences of injury. In the context of domestic violence, for example, Crenshaw shows that meaningful legal intervention requires an attention to race, gender, class, and immigration status, and thus state intervention might need to take different and multiple forms to produce substantive justice. Intersectionality, then, requires a commitment to witnessing, to empathic looking, that responds not with the messy bluntness that law so often deploys in the name of fairness and uniformity. Instead, intersectionality calls for imagining legal action that can be individualized, intimate, and rooted in lived experience. This work has been expanded by other scholars, especially those working in the context of domestic violence law, including Linda Mills and Elizabeth Schneider, who have considered how mandatory arrest/no-drop policies ignore the particular experiences of women of color who may have to weigh their own distrust of the state, the necessity of a partner’s income to survive, and the potential stigma, shame, or violence of calling law enforcement against a desire for bodily integrity and safety. As Mills suggests, a vision of legal intervention that is survivor-centered and survivor-guided, that recognizes the differently situatedness of each subject who engages with the state, is the only way to ensure justice, particularly in the context of intimate life. Similarly, Crenshaw’s work asks for law to witness violence as it unfolds and to respond contextually, to recognize that uniformity might not be the hallmark of fairness and equity. Ultimately, Crenshaw’s vision of the demands of intersectionality in the context of violence has underscored the importance of law as a tool that sees, witnesses, and even willingly inhabits the social locations of the multiply marginalized.

If it is easy to dismiss Williams’s embrace of rights as overly optimistic in the face of ample description of law’s failures, it is all too easy to treat Crenshaw as an inclusionist, one who imagines intersectionality as a strategy that grants black women entry into the problematic logics of antidiscrimination law. Yet in my reading of intersectionality, Crenshaw’s vision is not one of including black women in existing legal doctrine, or simply expanding legal doctrine to make space for black women’s particular experiences of discrimination. Indeed, Crenshaw ends “Demarginalizing the Intersection” with a personal account that underscores her deep commitment to unsettling inclusionary politics. She describes an experience in which, as a law school student, she was invited to a prestigious Harvard men’s club, one that was formerly all white, to celebrate the end of first-year exams. Upon her arrival, her friend—a member of the club—quietly mentioned that he had forgotten to share an important detail: Crenshaw would have to enter the club through the back door because she was a woman. She and her friends had long assumed that it was their blackness that would bar them from the club, but it was her womanhood that required her to use the back door if she wanted entry into the club. Crenshaw ruminates on this experience as emblematic of the importance of intersectional analysis, noting that “this story does reflect a markedly decreased political and emotional vigilance toward barriers to Black women’s enjoyment of privileges that have been won on the basis of race but continue to be denied on the basis of sex.”39 Yet what interests me about this account, and how it animates the end of the article, which borrows from Paula Giddings’s work to conclude “when they enter, we all enter,” is that intersectionality is not a tool Crenshaw uses to advocate access and entry. In other words, she does not suggest that an intersectional analysis demands her inclusion—and all black women’s inclusion—in a structure constructed around black women’s exclusion. Instead, the story reveals that battles for entry are always imperfect, exclusionary, and problematic. To be granted entry to a space because of blackness and to be barred entry to that same space because of womanhood speaks to the flimsiness of entry as a form of politics, precisely because inclusion always hinges on a system of exclusion, hierarchy, and valuation. Ultimately, intersectionality reveals both the limits of juridical projects and the possibility of mobilizing law to exceed law’s own critical desires. In Crenshaw’s hands, intersectionality invites a legal project that takes seriously black women’s witnessing (and black women as witnesses, something crucial in a juridical system that continues to disbelieve black women), that invites an attention to a literal, material space—the intersection, the basement—that black women know, experience, and inhabit.

In this section, I ask what might happen if black feminists treated intersectionality’s legal roots not as an embarrassment but as a crucial site of the analytic’s transformative potential. Indeed, in reading Crenshaw’s conception of intersectionality alongside Williams’s work on rights, and in emphasizing intersectionality’s roots in critical race theory, I treat intersectionality as an analytic that radically occupies law, takes hold of legal doctrine and refuses its conceptions of neutrality and uniformity as performance of justice. It is, then, a strategy of demanding that law move otherwise, that it center witnessing and vulnerability, that it encourage forms of relationality and accountability that jettison logics of contract and property. My reading insists that black feminists refuse well-rehearsed dismissals of intersectionality as an inclusionary project (dismissals that are all the more possible to rehearse because this is how intersectionality so often circulates in the university) that seeks to insert black women’s bodies into otherwise problematic structures, and instead advocates treating intersectionality’s juridical project as the very heart of its radical political agenda. It is intersectionality’s capacity to index vulnerability and witnessing, to imagine legal doctrine as centering those ethics (even as law might refuse those efforts), that makes intersectionality a space that resonates deeply with black feminism’s ongoing efforts to construct a political agenda rooted in love.

Risk and Promise

What if we refused the lure of negative affects, the tendency to grieve and mourn black feminism and its analytics? What if we rejected both the notion that blackness is synonymous with death and the idea that black feminism is dead or dying? My call for this rejection is not meant as a wholesale rejection of afropessimism, and its attendant affects of grief, loss, mourning, and despair. Nor is my plea here rooted in a sense that negative affects are per se problematic; indeed, the work of a host of scholars including Ann Cvetkovich, Heather Love, and Sianne Ngai has been to reclaim negative affects and to mine these feelings for their productive, world-making potential. Instead, my call is for us to consider why the position of death has become so alluring in this moment, particularly for black feminists who have made a practice of lamenting the slow and steady demise of our tradition. This chapter, then, aspires to perform letting go by suggesting another way to feel black feminism, one rooted in love rather than territoriality and defensiveness. Indeed, I argue that remembering intersectionality’s juridical orientations, and recovering them rather than eschewing them (even in a moment where law is treated as the paradigmatic site of antiblack violence), might allow black feminists to encounter the broad sweep of our transformative call for love-politics. In so doing, I emphasize that law might be a space of black women’s survival rather than simply the site of black women’s wounding. Moreover, I underscore that a space that black women did not author, and that was created largely with the interest in enshrining black women as property rather than as subjects, might become a site that allows us to imagine other ways of being and feeling black feminist. As I argue, black feminism’s long-standing commitment to lovepolitics, to ethics of mutual vulnerability and witnessing, is echoed by critical race feminist legal practices, including Williams’s expansive investment in rights and Crenshaw’s engagement with intersectionality as a critique of inclusionary politics. What both share are demands that law imagine itself otherwise, that it unfold and move in ways that might seem contrary to its fundamental project. These are demands that law acknowledge the failures and short-sightedness of inclusion and redress projects, and that law instead imagine its radical work to be an embrace of ideas of intimacy, proximity, vulnerability, and mutual regard. Reanimating black feminist engagement with law is particularly important because it upends the long-standing tenet that black women’s freedom comes exclusively through spaces that we self-authored, and, correlatively, that sites historically constructed to secure our status as property can never become locations where we stage our liberation. My inquiry shows otherwise and argues that freedom and radical black feminist politics can be rooted in myriad sites, including spaces that have been rife with our own subordination. Indeed, my engagement with law seeks to rescue law’s status of death in black studies, tracing how it can be a location of radical freedom-dreaming and visionary world-making rather than simply a death-world and the paradigmatic site of antiblackness.

#### Humanist legal imaginaries are a valuable part of Black feminist praxis. Refusing to compare material consequences of our methods reproduces exclusion of Black feminist thought.

Kupupika, 21—J.D. candidate at the University of Virginia School of Law (Trust, “Shaping Our Freedom Dreams: Reclaiming Intersectionality through Black Feminist Legal Theory,” Virginia Law Review, Vol. 107, (2021): 27-47, dml)

The collective struggle of the Black women in Beloved mirrors the essential function of Black feminist legal theory. Heeding Baby Suggs's call, Black feminist legal theorists imagine beyond the confines of the legal academy's margins, skillfully developing their own legal theory in order to write themselves into larger conversations. The push to imagine beyond erasure, as is emphasized tenderly by Baby Suggs's invocation, is a will to love hard the core, human elements of Black women's belonging. Not a holy mission, but a human one meant to unearth the depths of selfhood that are constantly denied until a new and liberating understanding is discovered.

It is critical to contextualize the function of Black feminist legal theory because, since it exists as a distinctly humanizing practice, it demands respect. Humanizing, here, distinguishes Black feminist practice from the normative approach of the legal academy.2 Legal scholarship offers well meaning, oftentimes essential, theoretical tools to the legal field, but there is no prescriptive requirement that scholarship operate in the service of any particular community. And while there is some merit to wrestling with intangible, looming social issues for its own sake, Black feminist legal theorists must contend with the specific, material realities present within their community with the goal of eradicating oppression.3 Black feminist legal theory has produced frameworks with deliberate and urgent liberatory purpose; any misuse of these frameworks is, at best, irresponsible and, at worst, a continuation of the legal field's devaluation of Black female scholarship.4

**Its specifically empirically proven in the context of the climate**

Karl S. **COPLAN 16**, Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law and Co-Director, Pace Environmental Litigation Clinic, [“Fossil Fuel Abolition: Legal And Social Issues,” *Columbia Journal of Environmental Law*, 41 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 223, June 28, 2016, Accessed Online through Emory Libraries]

Law-driven social changes of this magnitude are not unprecedented, but seem relatively few. Climate activists in the United States consciously draw on the civil rights movement of the 1960s in both their rhetoric and their tactics, hoping to repeat the relatively successful social change accomplished by 1960s civil rights legislation. n240 However, the civil rights struggle is not the only paradigm for fundamental social and economic change driven by law. Other examples of such fundamental change include abolition, prohibition, gender equality, school desegregation, and to a lesser extent, the twentieth century development of the administrative state, the New Deal, and the 1970s environmental law revolution. At least one of these social change initiatives (prohibition) was an abject failure, another (abolition) was a complete success. The others have had moderate--but incomplete--success at achieving the degree of social restructuring.

[\*273] While climate activism has begun to take on the mantle of the "New Abolitionism," climate activists and law reform advocates have yet to adopt the implication of this sobriquet--that the proper response to human induced climate change is a total ban on the burning of fossil fuels. n241 Rather, climate law reform advocates argue for putting a price on carbon, effectively **converting** the problem from one of **moral and ethical responsibility** for destruction of the planetary ecosystem to one of **proper economic allocation** of a limited resource. n242 It is the premise of this Article that such a ban is the logical and rhetorically consistent response to human-induced climate change, and that the abolition movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries provides the most promising analogue for **successful law-induced cultural reform**. Conversely, prohibition serves as a cautionary example of a failed law reform movement; the civil rights movement may be a flawed analogue. In short, the climate movement (at least in the United States) consciously models itself on the civil rights movement, but bears some unfortunate similarities to the temperance movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and needs to become more like the globally successful movement for the abolition of slavery of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries

#### A confluence of statistical factors prove racial progress is possible and occurring

Hochschild 17 (Jennifer L. Hochschild , Professor of Government, African and African American Studies, and the Chair of the Department of Government (Harvard University), Chair in American Law and Governance at the Library of Congress, President of the American Political Science Association, “Left Pessimism and Political Science,” Perspectives on Politics, Volume 15, Issue 1, March 15th, p. 6-19, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592716004102> \*\*modified to allow for more humanizing frames)

Is Pessimism the Only Sensible or Empirically Warranted Response in these Two Arenas? It is easy to find evidence to support pessimism about American racial dynamics or the societal deployment of genomic science. The United States is notorious for its racially- and ethnically-inflected poverty and excessive levels of incarceration; undocumented migrants live in legal limbo; new genomics techniques such as CRISPR-Cas9 tempt humankind into hubristic manipulation of nature, and scientists’ promises to cure cancer through genetics knowledge ring hollow to many. The question for this article is whether there are also strong grounds for optimism in my two illustrative realms, such that one could plausibly and persuasively choose to be “centered on advancement concerns” rather than “centered on security concerns.” The answer is yes. Again I can point only to illustrative, suggestive evidence. First, the gap between ~~blacks’~~ [black people’s] and whites’ life expectancy declined from seven years in 1990 to 3.4 years in 2014. That is an astonishing, perhaps unprecedented, rate of change given the usual slow pace of demographic transformation. It is important in itself, of course, and also as a summary statement about an array of other social phenomena in which racial disparities are declining. ~~Blacks~~ [Black people] are living longer mainly because of declining rates of homicides, HIV mortality, infant mortality, cancer and heart disease, and suicide among black men.19 A lot of things have to go right for a group’s life expectancy to rise rapidly. Second, applications for U.S. citizenship rose from the previous year in ten of the fifteen years from 2000 to 2015, while declining in four (and remaining stable in one). That is an important indicator of immigrant incorporation, and especially relevant to political scientists because “Hispanics and Asians who are naturalized citizens tend to have higher voter turnout rates than their U.S.-born counterparts.” 20 Third, non-white Americans themselves tend to feel pretty good about their lives. Gallup Poll asked in 2016, “Where do you expect your life satisfaction to be in five years?” If whites’ response is standardized at 1, then ~~blacks~~ [black people’s] are at 2.97, and Hispanics at 1.29. Only Asian Americans, at 0.97, were less optimistic than whites. Gallup also asked about one’s level of stress in the previous day. If whites are again standardized at 1, then ~~blacks~~ [black people] are at 0.48; Hispanics at 0.53; and Asian Americans at 0.75. Middle-class ~~blacks~~ [black people] were half as likely as middle class whites to report stress during the previous day.21 In the arena of genomics also, one can point to grounds for optimism rather than pessimism. The Innocence Project, “dedicated to exonerating wrongfully convicted individuals through DNA testing and reforming the criminal justice system to prevent future injustice,” has enabled about 350 people to be released from prison. (Not so parenthetically, seven out of ten are African American or Latino, mostly poor men.) More extensive DNA testing might lead to many more exonerations; one careful analysis of serious crime convictions found that “in five percent of homicide and sexual assault cases DNA testing eliminated the convicted offender as the source of incriminating physical evidence.” Previous estimates had pegged the share of wrongful convictions at no more than one to two percent.22 More generally, “DNA profiling [of convicted felons] reduces the probability of future convictions by 17% for serious violent offenders and by 6% for serious property offenders .... These are likely underestimates of the true deterrent effect of DNA profiling.” 23 Genomic scientists can point to impressive successes with regard to Mendelian (single-gene) diseases, and they focus even more on diagnoses and cures yet to come. Eric Lander, director of the Broad Institute, likens the trajectory of genomic medicine to the development of medicine based on the germ theory of disease, which “took about 75 years. With genomics, we’re maybe halfway through that cycle.” In his view, “the rate of progress is just stunning. As costs continue to come down, we are entering a period where we are going to be able to get the complete catalogue of disease genes.” Cancer is a prime target, almost in sight:“If you understand that this is a game of probability, and there is only a finite number of cancer cells and each has only a certain chance of mutating, and if we can put together two or three independent attacks on the cancer cell, we win. If we invest vigorously in this and we attract the best young people into this field, we get it done in a generation. If we don’t, it takes two generations.” Lander is “not Pollyanna .... [I]t’s not for next year. We play for the long game. I don’t want to overpromise in the short term, but it is incredibly exciting if you take the 25-year view.” 24 This is a classic statement of optimism, or being centered on advancement concerns. It begins with expertise and perspective, sees dangers and weaknesses, and nonetheless asserts empirical grounds for faith. President Obama’s insistence that “if you had to choose a moment in human history to live ... you’d choose now” has the same quality. My point is not that left pessimism is wrong—only that there are grounds, perhaps equally strong, for left optimism. One can choose either, and then find good evidence for that choice. Why Is Left Pessimism Problematic? That wily politician, Barney Frank, offers the best answer from the vantage point of the public arena: “When you tell your supporters that nothing has gotten better, and that any concessions you’ve received are mere tokenism, you take away their incentive to stay mobilized. As for those you’re negotiating with, if you denigrate anything they concede as worthless, they will soon realize they can obtain the same response by giving nothing at all.” 25 One can offer the same type of answer from the vantage point of a teacher. Many of us have had the experience of teaching a course—about civil war, inequality and politics, environmental policy, or the meaning of liberty—only to have our students politely request on the last day of class some idea or piece of information about which they can feel good or which they can use in their public engagement. We need to offer answers. Optimism may also be associated with academic success; one careful study found that“although achievement in mathematics was most strongly related to prior achievement and grade level, optimism and pessimism were significant factors. In particular, students with a more generally pessimistic outlook on life had a lower level of achievement in mathematics over time.” 26A study of college students similarly found that “dispositional and academic optimism were associated with less chance of dropping out of college, as well as better motivation and adjustment. Academic optimism was also associated with higher grade point average.” 27 And for those of us of a certain age, it is heartening to discover that “after adjusting for covariates, the results suggested that greater optimism [among middle-aged, predominantly white Americans] was associated with greater high-density lipoprotein cholesterol and lower triglycerides .... In conclusion, ... optimism is associated with a healthy lipid profile; moreover, these associations can be explained, in part, by the presence of healthier behaviors and a lower body mass index.” 28

#### Political organizing aff isn’t labor draing, its energy producing

B. LOEWE 12, an organizer and communicator, has served as NDLON's Communications Director, supported the Alto Arizona work against SB 1070 and Sheriff Arpaio, and participated in the organizing of the 2010 US Social Forum in Detroit [“An End to Self Care,” *Organizing Upgrade*, October 15 12, http://www.organizingupgrade.com/index.php/blogs/b-loewe/item/729-end-to-self-care]

As long as self-care is discussed as an individual responsibility and additional task, it will be something that middle-class people with leisure time will most easily relate to and will include barriers to the lives of people without time to spare. It becomes one more unchecked box on a to-do list to feel bad about, an unreal expectation, or a far-off dream.

The movement is my self-care not my reason for needing it.

Don Andres awoke every morning at 5:00am to arrive at a street corner to look for work by 6:00am. He’d work a full day of heavy construction and still arrive at the 7:00pm meeting. He’d routinely fall asleep but he was there. Why? Because organizing together to improve conditions, to create alternatives, to band together, was the only option for how care could be anything but alien in his life as a day laborer. Being at the meeting was self-care.

Lack of care is systemic. Therefore resistance to those systems is the highest affirmation of care for oneself and one’s community. Movement work is healing work.

What self-care often misses is the reality that for the majority of people engaged in social justice movements, participation is out of necessity. That a collective effort in the form of social movement is the highest articulation of caring for one’s own self in a world designed to deny your worthiness of care. Too many people discussing self-care overlook the structural barriers that make access to the care they are speaking of impossible without the struggle they often discuss as the cause of their need to ‘take care of themselves.’

Even for someone like myself who has the majority of my materials needs met, I feel most alive, most on fire, most able to go around the clock, when I’m doing political work that feels authentic, feels like it pushes the bounds of authority, and feels like it is directly connected to advancing my individual and our collective liberation.

The truth is that we cannot knit our way to revolution. The issue is not that movements are taxing, because truly they are. It’s called ‘struggle’ for a reason. But they go from strain to overtaxing when we seek to fulfill our political aspirations through vehicles never meant to carry them like in non-political formations or some 501c3s.

The crisis of care is also a crisis of organization. Non-profits are built to do a lot of good, but they have inherent limitations that mean they are rarely built to fulfill our visions of the transformative organizing that would usher in a world where we could feel whole. Most engaged in social movements today are originally driven out of either a concrete material necessity and/or a deep connection to the wrong that accompanies inequality and a drive to make it right. However the majority of organizations available to us today are designed for gentle reforms but not the fundamental transformation our spirits crave. As a result, we try to transform a model unfit to nourish our hearts and then treat that frustration with tonics and diets and stretches instead of placing our efforts in creating a collective space that unleashes our heart’s creative desires.

Maria Poblet of Causa Justa Just Cause once said, “Burnout is not about the amount of hours you work, it is about the amount of political clarity you have.” What that means is that there is no chance of us consistently burning the midnight oil if we don’t at our core believe what we’re working on will get us to a new day and no amount of yoga or therapy or comfort food we supplement our work with will compensate for that. However, if we can see a better world just over the horizon, like a marathon runner nearing a finish line, we can find endless wells to draw upon as we work to usher it in. I have literally gone from being in debilitating pain and only being able to accomplish three hours of work each day to working 18 hour shifts the same week in a completely different context. The difference was not the conditions of my work. It was my connection to my purpose.

The problem with self-care is that there is an underlying assumption that our labor is draining. The deeper question is how do we shape our struggles so that they are life-giving instead of energy-taking processes. When did activities that are aimed to move us closer to freedom stop moving us?

#### Studies confirm---it combats burnout and racial battle fatigue

Caroline Reid 18, “Activism as a Source of Strength for Black College Students at Predominately White Institutions,” https://encompass.eku.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1588&context=honors\_theses

Racism is deeply ingrained in American society, and white supremacy and the oppression of people of color has greatly contributed to the establishment of the very institutions that continue to perpetuate its existence today. Racism manifests itself in a variety of ways, and its most constant and daily appearance is in instances of microaggressions. These experiences contribute to feelings of invisibility, frustration, and anger, an experience known as racism- related stress, which research has shown to severely and negatively impact mental health. In order to combat the insidious effects of racism, Black Americans have utilized coping mechanisms for generations. This resiliency is astoundingly powerful, however, dealing with the omnipresence of racism is a constant and significant internal labor. For Black college students at predominately white institutions, microaggresions and systemic racism create a difficult environment to navigate. Unique opportunities in activism manifest themselves as tools to combat discrimination and racism-related stress. However, some argue that caution is needed in viewing activism as panacea for improving the lives of people of color, particularly Black people. Indeed, some research has suggested that activism is harmful to mental health, as it increases the intensity and frequency of experiences of perceived racism among some populations. This thesis includes a meta-analysis that examines the findings on the effects of activism on mental health. As a result of this analysis, a counter argument argues the potential of the utilization of activism as a source of strength that may combat the harms of racism, supporting the earlier claim that certain factors involved in activism may be protective in nature.

#### Totalizing refusal of humanism prevents effective challenges to power

Shulman, 21—teaches political theory at The Gallatin School of New York University (George, “Fred Moten’s Refusals and Consents: The Politics of Fugitivity,” Political Theory, Vol. 49(2), 272–313, dml) [inserted “when” for grammatical integrity—insertion denoted by brackets]

In turn, radical democrats may refuse his reduction of politics to sovereignty, but if we then identify the properly political as nonsovereign action, as nonrule or (fugitive) refusal to be governed, we remain captive to this demonic picture of power and its idealized other. By affirming only the “power to” of solidarity and action in concert, we risk disavowing power “over,” as participation in rule, as explicit rule-making, and as “ruling out” antidemocratic interests and practices. Do we imagine that generativity thrives only by refusing rule, and not also through forms of structure and even imposition, as parents and teachers know? As Prospero, a personification of both sovereignty and theory, finally acknowledged Caliban as the “dark thing” he must “own as mine,” the trope of fugitivity entails a disavowed remainder, the problem of power and rule, which needs to be acknowledged. For freedom requires not only flight from rule, but flight into it, as a problem that no one can escape, but that a democratic politics explicitly acknowledges and undertakes to rework by participatory practices of contest.40

Using Moten’s own idiom, I would ask: “What if” we do not dichotomize the informal assembly and praxis of fugitive sociality, and politics-as-rule predicated on exclusion and regulation of difference? “What if” a democratic theory must blur the social and political but also acknowledge inescapable, fraught, yet potentially fruitful tensions—between tacit grammar and explicit acts of translation, between informal form and organized forms of power, between fugitive aliveness as resistance to rule, and organizing democratic power to make claims on how the world is ruled? “What if” we refuse (not reverse) the abstract polarity between subjection to sovereign rule as such, or statelessness as refusal to be governed as such, and “come down to earth” as Marx put it? We then find politicality not in rule or nonrule, as such, but in the judgments and actions by which subalterns address who makes decisions (and how) about which practices, values, and inequalities are being ruled out, or which encouraged, in the communities they are building by socio-poetic insurgency? In difficult historical contexts they rework and mediate tacit grammars, customary practices, and explicit forms of organized power as they reconstitute democratic forms of rule-making.41

These what-ifs suggest a conversation between Moten and Sheldon Wolin. The parallels are striking. Wolin depicts a “system” so “immovable and interconnected as to be unreformable as a totality”; he calls “pessimism” a “reasoned insight” and “suppressed revolutionary impulse”; and he endorses a “rejectionism” whereby citizens “withdraw and direct their energies and civic commitment to finding new life forms.” Moreover, “instead of imitating most political theories,” which adopt “the state as the primary structure, and adapt the activity of citizens” to it, Wolin refuses “the state paradigm” and the “liberal-legal corruption of the citizen.” He affirms how “common life resides in cooperation and reciprocity that human beings develop to survive, meet their needs, and explore their capacities and the remarkable world into which they have been cast.” He thus rejects Arendt’s splitting of political and social, and her valorization of the “who,” and in Moten’s terms he instead values how “entanglement and virtuosity” are negotiated in the “common life” of the ordinary. Both theorists thus defend “preservation” of customary ways of “taking care of beings and things,” as Wolin says, against neoliberal correction, progressive promises of incorporation, and radical romances of emancipation.42

Moten’s two antagonisms—between the few who run things and things that run, and between informal form and formalization—echo Wolin’s critique of bureaucracy, of “institutionalized systems of power,” and of “constitutional democracy”; and Moten’s refusals resonate with Wolin’s late claim that democracy names not a form of government but “fugitive” moments of insurgency. And though Wolin seems to mean “fugitive” only in its temporal sense of transient or fleeting, he also depicts democracy as interdicted by idioms of governance, contained by constitutions and organized power, and pathologized by norms stipulating the legal and proper. Like blackness— though Wolin never makes this association—his democracy is (called) criminal, transgressive, and chaotic; it is feared, hunted, and enclosed, though also “wanted,” desired, and used for legitimation. Both theorists embrace such epithets while showing how insurgency bespeaks “jurisgenerative” energies, engendered by commonality and memory, that precede and surround formal (state-centric) politics. Their fugitive protagonists—an undercommons or popular insurgency—claim a spatial and symbolic distance from a deranged modern regime, and in Wolin’s words “replace the old citizenship” by “a fuller and wider notion of being, whose politicalness will be expressed not in one or two activities—voting or protesting—but in many.” Of course, this very “politicalness” is one mark of deep differences.43

Though Wolin’s awareness of racial inequality appears in repeated associations of democratic moments and social movements with black insurgency, he does not grasp how “commonality” names not (only) a resource against enclosure but the historical production of whiteness and settler colonialism. He laments the gap between formal citizenship and genuine participation, which effectively disempowers legally enfranchised citizens, but never construes citizenship as a racial status, “standing” as white, constituted by a racial state of exception. His hard-pressed “citizens” draw on tacit (local, rooted) customs, but he does not credit how their “commonality” reproduces popular power by racial terror. Moten thus brings to this idiom of commonality and democracy, as to Arendt’s “common sense” and “world,” a justified presumption that such predicates of the political mean antiblackness. But acknowledging this truth is also the premise of thinking abolition and radical democracy together.44

For if Wolin’s commonality risks racial innocence, his idea of the political remains essential because it highlights the foreclosures in Moten’s sociality. First, Wolin depicts both tacit commonality and explicit insurgency as contingent and, in that sense, as political. Whereas Moten depicts sociality underwritten by ontology, and reproduced as antiblackness generates “common habitation and flight,” Wolin sees every (under)common undone by political economy and individualism, not only by incorporation into formal politics. Whereas Moten imagines the “absolute sufficiency” of sociality informally reproduced, Wolin argues that commonality itself is (re)generated and remade only by practices that, though “emerging out of” sociality, politicize—acknowledge, (re)articulate, or (re)organize—tacit customs and vernacular memories. Tacit commonality is at once discovered, remade and regenerated only [when] people make explicit claims in “public declarations,” or visibly exercise “collective power” to “promote or protect the well-being” of a “collectivity,” including an undercommon.45

Second, Wolin also links and distinguishes sociality and politicality by depicting the experience and practice of sharing and exercising power. For Wolin, local or customary “institutions and practices are sustained” only by our “capacity to share in power, to cooperate in it.” “Power to,” generated and shared by the ongoing practices of assembly and cooperation that Moten calls planning, is thus the basis of all other goods. But, as “distilled” from the “relations and circles we move within”—call this Moten’s sociality—this power, at once “symbolic, material, and psychological,” “enables political beings to act together.” As the political dimension of sociality, “power” can be extracted by states or undermined by individualism, and thus alienated, a loss that devitalizes the solidarity—and thereby the generative capacity—of sociality. The recurring “loss of the political,” as capacities to articulate the tacit and organize power, reveals the nature of the political as a distinctive “mode of experience,” for “we are always losing it and having to recover it.” But “renewal” is always possible, partly “as human beings rediscover the common being of human beings,” partly by “creating new patterns of commonality” across differences, and partly by (re)making “modes of action” by which to “concert their powers.” Though grounded in sociality, Wolin’s political thus opens an interval between the tacit and the explicit, in which experience is metabolized and (re)articulated. In this interval people question the organization of power and rules of justice, and they answer as they “reinvent forms and practices” that express “a democratic conception of collective life.”46

For Moten, of course, “democratic” and collective” signal the alienated rule that abstracts from lived sociality to “designate” a political to represent us, whereas black fugitives refuse to be governed or represented by others but also to translate themselves into legible political terms. In contrast, Wolin offers a potentially fruitful, not only correctional or appropriative—we might say agonistic—relation between the tacit and the explicit. In fact, practices of “fugitive democracy” recurrently emerge in and from black sociality, as the practices of Black Lives Matter activism most recently demonstrate. For sure, practices of concealment and evasion, which defend black fugitivity from surveillance, regulatory correction, and violence, and practices of public action that engage whites and the state, are contradictory in crucial ways, as Juliet Hooker has argued. But as Rom Coles and Lia Haro argue, frontline communities on the underground railroad also engaged repeatedly in “flagrantly public” action in concert, both in literal self-defense of black autonomy in its fugitive illegality, and to contest the rule(s) of police, the law, and the state; as recent protests suggest, they viewed formal political institutions both as “integral to white supremacy so far,” but also “as potential instruments toward emancipatory ends.”47

If Hooker sees temporal shifts between moments of “black fugitivity” and moments of “fugitive democracy” in the thought and practice of Frederick Douglass, Coles/Haro depict an ongoing “oscillation” between inward-facing and outward-turning practices. Likewise, Neil Roberts defends grand marronage for seeking a “sustainable rather than fleeting form of flight” by forging autonomous spaces, and yet, because “freedom in our world lies not in permanent evasion of Leviathan” but in “taming” it, he proposes an idea of “sociogenic marronage” to reconstruct “an order in need of systemic repair.” Not coincidentally, Wolin’s fugitive democracy, though “rejectionist” and antistatist in its major chords, includes a social democratic minor key, which notes the limits of localism and the necessity of seeking and using state power to address structural inequality and collective fate.48

Complex and generative tensions are lost, then, as Moten recovers the freedom schools organized by Fannie Lou Hamer but not her organizing for the right to vote, to exercise popular sovereignty locally, especially around police and schools, but also to create a “Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party” that entered national politics. Hamer (like the Black Panthers and Black Lives Matter) models how black radicalism has lived in an interval between the tacit grammar and ongoing “planning” of black fugitivity—as loopholes of retreat practiced and concealed in plain sight—and flagrant publicity as fugitive democracy. Whereas for Moten, the historical failure or defeat of outward-facing public action proves the futility of fugitive democracy, I would ask: “what if” we follow his own fugitive view that any being or act is both incomplete and excessive, to infer that specific historical experiments are not definitive failures, but unfinished in meaning, examples we could retrieve and refashion now? If keeping open such possibility risks cruel optimism, foreclosing it reifies the impasse he generatively transvalues in so many other ways.

**Critique alone without action won’t do anything to mobilize people.**

**Adkin 16** (Laurie, teaches Political Science at the University of Alberta, “Political Ecology and Counter-Hegemonic Politics” in A World to Win, ed. by Carroll and Sarker, 2016, p. 109-110)

Political ecology is integral to a counter-hegemonic reform agenda because it offers a substantive set of directions for a post-capitalist, ecologically sustainable model of development. Returning to the brief discussion of resource sector workers, above, and to Raymond Williams's insistence that people need to be able to believe that “practical alternatives” are available, it is clear that political ecologists must build coalitions to develop and negotiate transitional plans as well as new institutions. The starting points for such coalitions may be municipal or regional; the ways in which national and global institutions (treaties, trade and investment agreements, WTO rules, jurisdictional division of powers, etc.) constrain, obstruct (or occasionally enable) changes at the local level will become clear soon enough, and will point the way toward the coalitions and reforms needed at other scales. What is important, as Williams observed, is that: “while certain principles can be established, all actual policies have to depend on new and difficult audits of resources, which must by definition be specific. We can look first at the principles, but their full practical bearings cannot be set down except in this place and that, by [END PAGE 109] this enquiry and that, in a sustained and necessarily negotiated process” (1983: 256). This conclusion directs our attention to what are, in my view, the critical tasks of the organic intellectuals of counter-hegemonic politics. There is, of course, the need to **root political discourse** in shared values and a common agenda of democratic reforms. Research must construct a solid account of the political, economic, cultural and ecological relationships operative within a **given frame of action**, including the ways in which these relationships cross multiple scales (from the local to the global). This foundation is essential to identifying the agency of change and the resources needed to strengthen civil society, and to develop a program and strategy for change. All of the social movements, including the unions, have important, **necessary** roles to play in such planning and negotiation.

Williams argued further that criticism of capitalism or enumeration of the many horrors of the times (salient then, the fear of nuclear war) would, **alone, do little to mobilize people** to undertake collective action for a better world. When he wrote these words, climate change and peak oil were hardly on our radar, nor the risks of genetically modified organisms, nor imminent mass extinctions of other species due to human demands on the planet's carrying capacity. Chernobyl hadn't happened yet. Today, more than ever, counter-hegemonic politics must be about “making hope practical, rather than despair convincing” (Williams, 1983: 240). Political ecology offers many of the tools we need to build a world in which humans and all of nature are no longer treated, as Williams put it, as “raw material for production,” but in which there is a “new orientation of livelihood: of practical, self-managing, self-renewing societies, in which people care first for each other, in a living world” (1983: 262, 266).

# 1AR

## Theory

### 1AR---Theory

#### Calling our argument “stupid” was ableist and disrespectful against disabled folks

Ravishankar 20 ([Rakshitha Arni Ravishankar](https://hbr.org/search?term=rakshitha%20arni%20ravishankar), <https://hbr.org/2020/12/why-you-need-to-stop-using-these-words-and-phrases>, EM)

Try this thought experiment: You’re sitting at your desk, when your friend texts you an article about a topic you’re passionate about. You read it and ask her what she thinks. To your surprise, her opinion is the complete opposite of your own. This obviously upsets you. Later that evening, as you explain what happened to your partner, how do you describe your friend’s point of view? If you said it was “stupid,” “insane,” “crazy,” “lame,” or “dumb,” you have (unknowingly or not) participated in spreading ableist language. You may be surprised to learn that your response was a form of discrimination. People use ableist words and phrases everyday without realizing the harm they do. Ableism is defined as discrimination or social prejudice against people with disabilities [based on the belief that typical abilities are superior](https://www.accessliving.org/newsroom/blog/ableism-101/#:~:text=Ableism%20is%20the%20discrimination%20of,defines%20people%20by%20their%20disability.). It can manifest as an attitude, stereotype, or an outright offensive comment or behavior. When it comes to language, ableism often shows up as metaphors (“My boyfriend is emotionally crippled.”), jokes (“That comedian was hysterical!”), and euphemisms (“He is differently abled.”) in conversation. As a journalist with a background in media studies, I spend a lot of time thinking about language and the words we choose to express ourselves. Our words, and the reasons why we choose them, reflect the times we live in. Just like some historically racist, sexist, and derogatory terms have been retired, so have a handful of ableist slurs that were used to dehumanize, stigmatize, and institutionalize people in the past. At the same time, too many people continue to casually spew ableist language to ridicule, criticize, or dismiss others. My intent is not to shame anyone, it is to help more people understand how to identify and stop using words and phrases that reinforce ableism. I reached out to several disability rights advocates for their insights. Here’s what I learned. Ableism is bigger than language. Language is a tool we use to make sense of our feelings and environment. When we verbally describe the things, experiences, and people around us we are also assigning value to them and that value impacts how we interact with each other. Ableist language largely influences us in three ways: 1) It reveals our unconscious biases. Lydia X.Z. Brown, a disability justice advocate, told me that our attitudes towards disability show up in the language we use. “If we believe people with mental illness should not be in our workplace, life, family, or neighborhood, then, it’s easier to rationalize using ableist words,” Brown said. “You might think: ‘Only crazy people do that. I don’t do that, so it’s okay for me to say.’ But when people say these things, they send a signal to people with psychosocial disabilities that we are not welcome.” Of course, Brown noted, that language is just one way ableism shows up. “By removing ableism from your vocabulary, you don’t remove ableism from your surroundings.” Ableism can be blatant, especially in work or school environments. It could be the lack of accessible infrastructures, or something more insidious, like performance evaluations based on what are traditionally considered “productive” or “appropriate” behaviors. Shain Neumeier, a lawyer and activist, added, “Unfortunately, people may not realize that doodling during a meeting [or class] may be your way of paying attention, especially if you’re someone with an invisible disability. They might just think it’s an abnormal behavior for that space.” 2) It makes us internalize harmful biases about disability. When you treat a disability as a joke, metaphor, or euphemism, you are causing harm in a couple of ways. First, you are spreading the idea that it’s acceptable to dehumanize and stigmatize someone with a disability. Depending on your circle or friend group, you could even be enabling others to do the same. Second, a disabled person may end up internalizing those tropes themselves. “The first time someone makes fun of you or people like you (even if it’s not directed at you), it’s a little drop in the bucket. It’s like a poke,” Neumeier said. “But, when you are put down 100 times, over and over again, you start feeling disrespected, and it becomes hard to be around the perpetrators. Specifically in the work environment, if there is an imbalanced power dynamic, and the perpetrator is your boss, it can be very difficult.” Neumeier also pointed out that writing off a slur or universally unacceptable expression — like the r-word or the m-word — may be easier for a disabled person than constantly confronting microaggressions. If the person facing discrimination doesn’t have a support system, they may start to believe something is wrong with them, and that’s dangerous. 3) It stigmatizes already marginalized people. Allilsa Fernandez, a mental health and disability activist, told me that using words that are ableist can distract attention from the point you’re trying to make and normalize the idea that disabilities equate to insults. Fernandez explained, “When you say Trump is such a ‘psycho’ or ‘weirdo’ for his stance on immigration, you end up focusing on those specific words, without addressing the real issue: what it is that you don’t like about the immigration policy.” If you do want to critique the administration’s policy, or anything for that matter, Fernandez advises that you talk about the reasons you agree or disagree with it. “When you attack a person’s physical and mental abilities in place of actually expressing an opinion or idea, you further stigmatize people with disabilities,” said Fernandez. Make a conscious effort to improve your vocabulary. Using ableist language doesn’t make you a bad person. It makes you a person. But, if you have the privilege to change your vocabulary for the better, then why not try?

#### Standpoint epistemology is bad---minority experiences aren’t universal and blindly trusting minorities backfires

**Stephens 14** [R.L. Stephens, Chicago-based organizer for DSA (personal site/bio: [https://dsapraxis.org/rl-stephens](https://dsapraxis.org/rl-stephens/)), Orchestrated Pulse, leftist magazine based in DC, “My Skinfolk Ain’t All Kinfolk: The Left’s Problem with Identity Politics”, <http://www.orchestratedpulse.com/2014/03/problem-identity-politics>]

Imperial America, murderous America, the America that abused and robbed countries like Bolivia —that America was me. I too was a settler; my Black feet were stained red with blood as I stood on stolen indigenous land. I too benefitted from colonialism, capitalism, and the other facets of White supremacy. I could no longer simply point the finger at White people. My marginalized identity didn’t absolve me. I began to think systemically. I had to actually develop a multidimensional worldview and take political stances that drew on more than my lived experiences. When I returned to the United States and became involved in leftist politics, I soon realized that the political scene was, unfortunately, still stuck on personal identity.

WHAT IS IDENTITY POLITICS?

In this age of (misinterpreted) intersectionality, our politics tend to rely on the body. When we deal with race, White people embody White supremacy and privilege, while non-Whites are the corporal manifestation of resistance. We obsess over White privilege and how we can get more people of color involved in our spaces and projects, but does White supremacy really disappear when there are no White people in the room?

Some people look at these flaws and call for an end to “identity politics”, but I think that’s a mistake. At its most basic level, identity politics merely means political activity that caters to the interests of a particular social group. In a certain sense, all politics are identity politics. However, it’s one thing to intentionally form a group around articulated interests; it’s another matter entirely when group membership is socially imposed.

Personal identities are socially defined through a combination of systemic rewards/marginalization plus actual and/or potential violence. We can’t build politics from that foundation because these socially imposed identities don’t necessarily tell us anything about someone’s political interests. Successful identity politics requires shared interests, not shared personal identities.

I’m not here to tell you that personal identity doesn’t matter; we rightfully point out that systemic power shapes people’s lives. Simply put, my message is that personal identity is not the only thing that matters. We spend so much energy labeling people—privileged/marginalized, oppressor/oppressed—that we often neglect to build spaces that antagonize the systems that cause our collective trauma.

All You Blacks Want All the Same Things

We assume that if a person is systemically marginalized, then they must have a vested interest in dismantling that system. Yet, that’s not always the case.

Take Orville Lloyd Douglas, who last summer wrote an article in the Guardian in which he admitted that he hates being Black.

I can honestly say I hate being a black male… I just don’t fit into a neat category of the stereotypical views people have of black men. I hate rap music, I hate most sports, and I like listening to rock music… I have nothing in common with the archetypes about the black male… I resent being compared to young black males (or young people of any race) who are lazy, not disciplined, or delinquent. Orville Lloyd Douglas, Why I Hate Being a Black Man

As we can see from Douglas’ cry for help, membership in a marginalized group is no guarantee that a person can understand and effectively combat systemic oppression. Yet, we seem to treat all marginalized voices as equal, as if they are all insightful, as if there is no diversity of thought, as if—in the case of race– “All you Blacks want all the same things”.

Shared identity does not equal shared interests. John Ridley, the Oscar-winning screenplay writer of 12 Years a Slave, is a good example. He’s written screenplays based on Jimi Hendrix, the L.A. riots, and other poignant moments and icons within Black history. He wants to see more Black people in Hollywood and he has a long history of successfully incorporating Black and Brown characters into comic book stories and franchises.

However, in 2006, Ridley made waves with an essay in which he castigated Black people who did not live up to his standards; saying, “It’s time for ascended blacks to wish niggers good luck.”

So I say this: It’s time for ascended blacks to wish niggers good luck. Just as whites may be concerned with the good of all citizens but don’t travel their days worrying specifically about the well-being of hillbillies from Appalachia, we need to send niggers on their way. We need to start extolling the most virtuous of ourselves. It is time to celebrate the New Black Americans—those who have sealed the Deal, who aren’t beholden to liberal indulgence any more than they are to the disdain of the hard Right. It is time to praise blacks who are merely undeniable in their individuality and exemplary in their levels of achievement. The Manifesto of Ascendancy for the Modern American Nigger

While Ridley and I share cultural affinity, and we both want to see Black people doing well, shared cultural affinity and common identity are not enough– which recent history makes abundantly clear. Barack Obama continues to deport record numbers of Brown immigrants here at home, while mercilessly bombing Brown folks abroad. Don Lemon, speaking in support of Bill O’Reilly, said that racism would be lessened if Black people pulled up their pants and stopped littering. Last fall, 40% of Black U.S. Americans supported airstrikes against Syria.

My skinfolk ain’t all kinfolk, and the Left needs to catch up.

NO MORE ALLIES

John Ridley, Barack Obama, myself, and Don Lemon are all Black males. We also have conflicting political positions and interests, but how can we decide which paths are valid if we only pay attention to personal identity?

Instead of learning to recognize how the overarching systems maintain their power and then attacking those tools, we spend our energy finding an “other” to embody the systemic marginalization and legitimize our spaces and ideals. In some interracial spaces I feel like nothing more than an interchangeable token whose only purpose is to legitimize the politics of my White peers. If not me, then some other Black person would fill the slot.

We use these “others” as authorities on various issues, and we use concepts like “privilege” to ensure that people stay in their lanes. People of color are the authorities on race, while LGBTQ people are the authorities on gender and sexuality, and so forth and so on. Yet, experience is not the same as expertise, and privilege doesn’t automatically make you clueless. As I’ve discussed, these groups are not oriented around a singular set of political ideals and practices. Furthermore, as we see in Andrea Smith’s work, there are often competing interests within these groups. We mistake essentialism for intersectionality as we look for the ideal subjects to embody the various forms of oppression; true intersectionality is a description of systemic power, not a call for diversity.

If we don’t develop any substantive analysis of systemic power, then it’s impossible to know what our interests are, and aligning with one another according to shared interests is out of the question. In this climate all that remains is the ally, which requires no real knowledge or political effort, only the willingness to appear supportive of an “other”. We can’t build power that way.

After having gathered to oppose organized White supremacy at the University of North Carolina, a group of organizers in Durham, North Carolina found that the Left’s emphasis on personal identity and allyship was a major reason why their efforts collapsed. They proposed that we adopt the practice of forming alliances rather than identifying allies. (h/t NinjaBikeSlut)

Much of the discourse around being an ally seems to presume a relationship of one-sided support, with one person or group following another’s leadership. While there are certainly times where this makes sense, it is misleading to use the term ally to describe this relationship. In an alliance, the two parties support each other while maintaining their own self-determination and autonomy, and are bound together not by the relationship of leader and follower but by a shared goal. In other words, one cannot actually be the ally of a group or individual with whom one has no political affinity – and this means that one cannot be an ally to an entire demographic group, like people of color, who do not share a singular cohesive political or personal desire. The Divorce of Thought From Deed

While it’s vital for me to learn the politics and history of marginalized experiences that differ from my own, listen to their voices, and respect their spaces and contributions — it’s also important for me to understand the ways in which these same systems have shaped my own identity/history as well. Since we know that oppression is systemic and multidimensional, then I’m going to have to step outside of personal experience and begin to develop political ideals and practices that actually antagonize those systems. I have to understand and articulate my interests, which will allow me to operate from a position of strength and form political alliances that advance those interests– interests which speak to issues beyond just my own immediate experience.

Ultimately, I want to attack power, not people. In order to get there, the Left needs more identity politics, not less.